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Climate Sea Level Rise

Troubled Waters: Coastal Avulsion, A State Survey


Click here to download this white paper.

As the world warms, rising seas and more intense storms threaten to reshape the American coastline. Climate change has already had a dramatic effect on US coasts. For example, from 2004 to 2009 the US lost 80,160 acres of coastal wetlands per year. Erosion and sea level rise will increasingly submerge coastal landscapes and have a significant impact on property ownership in the US. As that happens, these new realities will confront existing legal principles that may present challenges for governments trying to navigate climate adaptation options.

The common law principles of avulsion, erosion, accretion, and reliction have traditionally governed changes to coastal property lines. These principles have changed little for over two centuries. However, given the rapid pace of change facing US coastlines, these principles may not be enough to efficiently and equitably resolve questions of coastal property rights. Avulsion, in particular, is ripe for change. Avulsion refers to sudden, perceptible changes in land from water action (such as the subtraction or addition of beach due to a storm event). Most coastal states adhere to common law principles of avulsion, yet these principles may not be suited for a future where avulsive events occur regularly.

Ari Sillman, JD 2021, surveyed the state of the law in coastal states regarding the property law principle of avulsion. Read his white paper to understand the importance of this seemingly arcane legal principle and to review his chart of relevant cases and statutes by state.


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Corporate Climate Risk

Regulatory Activity and Legal Liabilities Affecting Management of Financial Climate Risks


Click here to download this post.

Legal structures and liabilities can influence the ability of markets, companies, financial entities, and governments to adjust to climate change impacts. Climate change impacts will affect the entire economy, creating new economic leaders and resulting in losses in some areas of the economy. But such a realignment of our economic system does not automatically translate to systemic financial risks. The challenge for financial regulatory bodies is to foster an orderly adjustment to these impacts while avoiding destabilizing shocks. This means accounting for foreseeable risks and asset valuation shifts, countering mispricing, and regulating core financial system entities to encourage resilience to inevitable changes. In this memorandum I outline some legal considerations relevant to assessing and mitigating climate-related market risks.

Regulatory Structures That Can Minimize Risk

US financial regulatory bodies have not yet taken significant direct actions to address climate change risks, but are under pressure to do so. Most of the activity addressing climate-related risk in the economy has centered on more detailed and expansive disclosure by individual firms. The Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) galvanized these disclosure efforts and brought together a broad coalition of companies and investors to agree on general framework recommendations for climate-related disclosures. Organizations such as GRI, CDP, Carbon Tracker, Ceres, and SASB, have also made enhanced disclosure a priority.

The dialogue on climate-related risks and opportunities has evolved significantly in the last five years. What was once the exclusive purview of impact investors, has now moved squarely into the realm of mainstream asset managers and institutional investors. Investor focus on climate-related information has progressed from publicly stated concern, through engagement with companies about expanding disclosures, to a new phase that pairs continued engagement with efforts to actively incorporate climate change-related information into day-to-day decisionmaking and portfolio management. Investment firms, ratings agencies, and investment services companies have partnered with or bought climate data shops and are exploring ways to incorporate physical risk impact analysis into their financial models and investment assessments. Large asset managers like BlackRock announced changes to their voting practices and expectations for corporate management and boards.

Adding to pressure from advocates and investors, academics have proposed various approaches to revising Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure requirements to expand discussion of sustainability issues, including climate. Eccles and Youmans (2016) suggest requiring a statement of significant audiences and materiality to better define what environmental, social, and governance issues boards consider material and the specific stakeholders to which they relate. Fisch (2019) proposes creating a new “SD&A” (sustainability, disclosure, & analysis) section of SEC filings modeled after the MD&A in which companies would identify and explain the three sustainability issues most significant to their operations. Esty and Karpilow (2019) suggest a three-tiered mandatory ESG reporting regime. These proposals would likely require additional SEC guidance on their applicability to climate-related topics should they be incorporated into SEC disclosure requirements.

SEC Disclosure and the Evolving Materiality of Climate-Related Information

The SEC has largely resisted calls to adjust disclosure requirements to specifically address climate change since issuing interpretive guidance in 2010 acknowledging the potential materiality of climate related information, followed by lackluster enforcement action and a limited impact on disclosure practices. (Fisch, 2019, pp. 934-941; Vizcarra, 2019a) No additional significant action by the SEC to directly address the materiality and disclosure of climate change information has occurred since. Yet, because the standard in US securities law is designed to evolve, we may already be within sight of an inflection point for the materiality of some types of climate-related information even absent regulatory action. (Vizcarra, 2020)

Two cases testing the waters on the materiality of climate-related information have resulted in opinions to date. A federal district judge denied a motion to dismiss in a shareholder suit against ExxonMobil, acknowledging that certain types of information related to climate change transition risks could be material to reasonable investors in the process. Ramirez v. ExxonMobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2018). The New York attorney general brought the second case resulting in an opinion. In New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the court considered whether ExxonMobil misled investors in disclosures about the potential impacts of future climate policies on product demand and about how ExxonMobil incorporated this information into its project-level business planning. Plaintiffs failed to convince the court of the materiality of the company’s statements and supposed omissions. The court found plaintiffs’ experts unpersuasive and no evidence of impact on investors’ analyses or decisions during the relevant timeframe. New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 65 Misc. 3d 1233(A), 49 ELR 20199 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (slip copy). These cases acknowledged the potential materiality of climate-related information but did not find the future cost estimates of an energy transition material to a reasonable investor’s decisions made between 2013 and 2016, a finding that may change for more recent timeframes. (Vizcarra, 2019c)

The widespread, deepening interest by shareholders in various types of climate change information suggests future litigation around the materiality of such information is likely, particularly as climate change impacts become apparent in corporate bottom lines and acute events. As cases increase, trends in investor-corporate engagement and investor use of climate-related information indicate that courts are likely to find some of that information material. (Vizcarra, 2020) Yet, regulatory involvement may still be necessary to effectively manage climate risks at a systemic level. Given the opportunity to avoid or limit disclosure of climate-related information, individual firms could accumulate risk unnoticed. Risk accumulation that results in significant loss at the individual firm level may only harm that firm and its investors, but climate-related risks are often industry, region, or economy wide—raising the possibility of losses that could pose systemic problems.

The current administration seems unlikely to support the efforts of independent financial regulatory bodies. President Trump issued a directive to the Department of Labor in 2019 to review data on ERISA plans, identify trends in investments in the energy sector, and review guidance on fiduciary responsibilities for proxy voting. (Executive Order 13868, 2019) This may have been an effort to nudge DOL into revising earlier guidance relevant to ERISA plan consideration of environmental, social, and governance issues—perhaps to counter rising pension fund and asset manager pressure around climate change and other issues. (Vizcarra, 2019b) However, the financial system regulatory authorities have significant independence from the President, allowing for considered action despite potential resistance.

Federal Reserve System Responses to Rising Concerns of Climate Change

US Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said in January that the Fed has a role to play “to ensure that the financial system is resilient and robust against the risks of climate change” and is working to understand how to do so. (Saphir, 2019) The Fed has not yet joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGSF) or publicly initiated a major climate change related study effort. However, Chairman Powell said the Fed would “probably” join at some point and has sent representatives to participate in NGFS meetings. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco hosted a conference on climate change in 2019, commissioning a series of papers. The Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Kevin Stiroh, delivered remarks on climate change and risk management in bank supervision at a March 4, 2020 event at Harvard Business School.

Comparative Approaches: Non-US Central Bank and Other Regulatory Actions

Other central banks are implementing new risk management assessment strategies. The Bank of England (BofE) plans to test the UK financial system’s resilience to climate change risks in 2021 against three climate scenarios—including insurers as well as banks in the testing and using a 30-year modelling horizon to do so. (Bank of England Discussion Paper, 2019) The BofE’s Prudential Regulatory Authority has also issued expectations for how banks and insurers should manage their climate-related financial risks, address them through risk management, conduct scenario analysis, and disclose. (Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2019) The Bank of Canada has initiated a multi-year research effort to assess climate-related risks and its government’s Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance has released recommendations for supporting sustainable finance, including integrating climate risks into the supervision of federally regulated institutions. (Canada’s Expert panel on sustainable finance, 2019) The European Central Bank listed climate change as a key risk driver in 2019. (ECB, 2019)

Non-US regulators have also issued new disclosure requirements for public companies and guidance on reporting climate-related issues. The European Union issued a non-financial reporting directive in 2014 and the European Commission released guidelines on reporting climate-related information in 2019. (European Commission, 2020) The UK’s Financial Reporting Council has said that companies should report on the direct and indirect effects of climate change and, importantly, highlighted the importance of the auditor. (UK Financial Reporting Council, 2019) The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority also recently proposed a new climate-related disclosure rule and technical note on disclosure obligations under existing rules. (UK Financial Conduct Authority, 2020) Australia has also updated its regulatory guidelines in 2019 to formally include climate change. (Baker McKenzie, 2019)

Litigation and its Potential to Heighten Risk

As communities feel the effects of climate change, litigation seeking to hold corporate actors accountable for climate change impacts and addressing property and constitutional concerns related to these impacts or government adaptation responses will grow in importance.

State attorneys general have brought cases seeking to hold private sector entities accountable for contributing to climate change. Massachusetts sued ExxonMobil in October 2019 alleging the company misled investors (similar to the New York case) and deceived consumers with misleading advertising under its business regulation and consumer protection statute. Complaint, Massachusetts v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 19-3333 (Mass. Supp. Oct. 24, 2019). The District of Columbia’s attorney general has hired outside counsel to handle potential litigation against ExxonMobil for possible violations of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act, awarding the job to Sher Edling LLP and Tycko & Zavareei LLP on Nov. 29, 2019. Given that Sher Edling also represents seven municipalities and the state of Rhode Island in climate change nuisance lawsuits against a host of oil and gas producers, any resulting DC complaint may focus on consumer protection and torts claims.

Nuisance and torts claims against energy companies also continue to emerge. (Sabin Center Climate Case Chart) They have yet to impose liability on corporate actors but do represent significant litigation costs and public relations concerns for targeted companies. These cases are distinct from environmental litigation tied to operations at specific facilities in that they seek to recover for widespread damages to communities. Parties in these cases continue to battle over whether they should be heard in federal or state courts—a federal venue more likely foreclosing the possibility of recovery for plaintiffs. Should any case survive and result in a decision on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs, it could increase litigation liabilities within the energy sector and possibly other industries as new cases are filed.

These cases also highlight the potentially crippling adaptation and resilience costs faced by cities and states in responding to increasing climate change impacts. (Leroy and Wiles, 2019) As cities and states better understand their climate-related risks and begin to more fully evaluate potential costs, the cost of mounting even long-shot litigation to help defray portions of the costs becomes a more reasonable calculation. Climate change impacts and adaptation costs in these communities threaten property values, tax bases, and municipal bond valuations. In some cases, local governments themselves could face tort claims for flood damage to private property. (Ruppert and Grimm, 2013)

Constitutional takings exacerbate this local cost concern. Takings case law foreshadows costly litigation as localities embark on forward-thinking regulatory, zoning, and land use approaches to prepare for climate change impacts. (Peloso, 2018) These cases are extremely fact specific and results differ from state to state because their outcomes depend on how the applicable state’s law defines property rights. For example, a 2011 Florida case imposed a duty on a local government to maintain meaningful access to an area regardless of environmental conditions (and the costs of doing so), and suggested government inaction in the face of such duty could support a takings claim. (Ruppert, 2018) Differing treatments of property lines in the face of avulsive events will also impact state and local jurisdiction ability to absorb the costs of more severe weather events. (Sillman, 2020) A host of federal statutes and authorities impact the ability of states and communities to prepare for and respond to climate change impacts and land use regulation squarely within local jurisdictional powers can be curtailed by past takings jurisprudence. (Tarlock & Chizewer, 2016) Takings concerns have the potential to significantly hinder adequate localized response to climate concerns necessary to avoid rapid property value losses in large swaths of coastal and other climate-vulnerable communities.

Conclusion

The story of financial system response will hopefully be one of disclosure leading to effective risk management – developing appropriate, effective disclosure requirements for material climate-related issues that inform risk management at the firm, sector, and system levels. Regulatory action will likely be necessary to achieve the quality and consistency of disclosures needed to inform larger financial system risk analyses. However, flexibility in approach and experimentation is also important at the outset as organizations build their capacity to assess and disclose climate-related risks. Financial regulators should consider emerging litigation trends as they could have significant impacts on the financial fortunes of particular industries, regional governments, and large swaths of individuals in certain areas. This legal friction may heighten adaptation barriers as well as rapid shifts in local fortunes as judicial decisions set precedents in the face of new scenarios.

 

References

Australian Securities & Investments Commission. (2019, Aug. 12). 19-208MR ASIC updates guidance on climate change related disclosure. Retrieved from https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2019-releases/19-208mr-asic-updates-guidance-on-climate-change-related-disclosure/.

Baker McKenzie. (2019, Aug. 26). Australia: What ASIC’s Updated Regulatory Guidelines on Climate Change Disclosures Mean in Practice. Retrieved from https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/08/what-asics-updated-climate-change-guidelines-mean.

Bank of England. (2019, Dec. 18). The 2021 Biennial Exploratory Scenario on the Financial Risks from Climate Change, A Discussion Paper. Retrieved at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2019/biennial-exploratory-scenario-climate-change-discussion-paper.

Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority. (2019, April) Supervisory Statement SS3/19, Enhanging banks’ and insurers’ approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change. Retrieved at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/supervisory-statement/2019/ss319.

Bank of Canada. (2019). Financial System Review. Retrieved from https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/financial-system-review-2019/.

Canada’s Expert panel on sustainable finance. (2019). Final Report of the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance – Mobilizing Finance for Sustainable Growth. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/expert-panel-sustainable-finance.html.

Carbon Tracker Initiative. (2019, May 3). Reporting for a Secure Climate: A model disclosure for upstream oil and gas. Retrieved from https://carbontracker.org/reports/reporting-for-a-secure-climate-a-model-disclosure-for-upstream-oil-and-gas/.

CERES. (2019, Oct. 21). Ceres launches new center to accelerate efforts to transform capital markets and drive wholesale action on climate crisis. Retrieved from https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/ceres-launches-new-center-accelerate-efforts-transform-capital-markets.

CFTC (2019) CFTC Commissioner Behnam Announces Members of the Market Risk Advisory Committee’s New Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee. Retrieved from https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8079-19.

Davies. (2019) Governance Insights. Retrieved from https://www.dwpv.com/en/Insights/Publications/2019/Davies-Governance-Insights-2019.

DC OAG. (2019, Feb. 28). Outside Counsel for Climate Change Litigation Solicitation. Retrieved from https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03/OAG-RFP-DCCB-2019-R-0011-Outside-Counsel-for-Climate-Change-Litigation-Issued-2-28-19_1.pdf.

DC OAG. (2019, No. 29). Outside Counsel for Potential Litigation – DCCB-2019-C-0011. Retrieved from https://oag.dc.gov/notice-contract-awards-over-100000.

Eccles, R. & Youmans, T. (2016). Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement of Significant Audiences and Materiality. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 28, 39.

Esty, D.C. & Karpilow, Q. (2019). Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation. Yale Journal on Regulation, 36, 625.

European Central Bank, Banking Supervision. (2019). Banking in a changing climate – preparing for what lies ahead. Retrieved from https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2019/html/ssm.nl190515_3.en.html.

European Central Bank. (2019). Financial Stability Review. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr201905~266e856634.en.html.

European Commission. (2020). Non-financial reporting. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/non-financial-reporting_en.

Executive Order 13868. (2019) Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth. Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-04-15/pdf/2019-07656.pdf.

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2019, Nov. 8). The Economics of Climate Change. Retrieved from https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/events/2019/november/economics-of-climate-change/.

Fisch, J. E. Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable. Georgetown Law Journal, 107(4), 923.

LeRoy, S. and Wiles, R. (2019, June). High Tide Tax: The Price to Protect Coastal Communities from Rising Seas. Center for Climate Integrity.

Murphy, E.V. (2015). Who Regulates Whom and How? An Overview of U.S. Financial Regulatory Policy for Banking and Securities Markets. CRS Report 7-5700.

New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 65 Misc. 3d 1233(A), 49 ELR 20199 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (slip copy).

NGFS, https://www.ngfs.net/en.

NGFS, (2019, April 17), p. 4. First Comprehensive Report, a call for action. Retrieved from https://www.ngfs.net/en/first-comprehensive-report-call-action.

NGFS. (2019, July 23). Technical Supplement to the First NGFS Comprehensive Report. Retrieved from https://www.ngfs.net/en/technical-supplement-first-ngfs-comprehensive-report.

NYU Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Climate Case Chart – Common Law Claims. Retrieved from https://climatecasechart.com/case-category/common-law-claims/.

NYU State Energy & Environmental Impact Center. Attorney General Actions. Retrieved from https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/ag-actions.

Peloso, M. (2018) Adapting to Rising Sea Levels: Legal Challenges and Opportunities. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press.

Ramirez v. ExxonMobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2018).

Ruppert, T. (2018). Castles—and Roads—in the Sand: Do All Roads Lead to a “Taking”? Environmental Law Reporter, 48(10), 10914.

Ruppert, T. and Grimm, C. (2013, Nov.). Drowning in Place: Local Government Costs and Liabilities for Flooding Due to Sea-Level Rise. The Florida Bar, 87(9), 29.

Saphir, A. (2019, Jan. 29). Fed has a role in combating climate change, says Powell. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-climatechange/fed-has-a-role-in-combating-climate-change-risk-powell-says-idUSKBN1ZT031.

Securities and Exchange Commission. (2010, Feb. 8). Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/02/08/2010-2602/commission-guidance-regarding-disclosure-related-to-climate-change.

Securities and Exchange Commission. (2019, Nov. 7). Meeting of the Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Advisory Committee Agenda. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac110719-agenda.htm.

Sillman, Ari. (2020). Legal Dilemmas Rising with the Seas: Coastal Avulsion, A Survey of Coastal States. Harvard Law Environmental & Energy Law Program White Paper.

Strauss, D. (2019, July 1). Listed UK companies and pensions face mandatory climate reporting. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/59086538-9c24-11e9-b8ce-8b459ed04726.

Stiroh, K.J. (2020, March 4). Climate Change and Risk Management in Bank Supervision. Retrieved from https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/sti200304.

Sustainable Accounting Standards Board. Current Standards. Retrieved from https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/download-current-standards/.

Tarlock, A.D. and Chizewer, D.M. (2016). Living with Water in a Climate-Changed World: Will Federal Flood Policy Sink or Swim? Environmental Law, 46, 491.

UK Financial Conduct Authority. (2020, March 6). CP20/3: Proposals to enhance climate-related disclosures by listed issuers and clarification of existing disclosure obligations. Retrieved from https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/consultation-papers/cp20-3-proposals-enhance-climate-related-disclosures-listed-issuers-and-clarification-existing.

UK Financial Reporting Council. (2019, July 2). FRC statement on the Government’s Green Finance Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.frc.org.uk/news/july-2019/frc-statement-on-the-government%E2%80%99s-green-finance-st.

UK Financial Reporting Lab. (2019, Oct. 22). Climate-related corporate reporting. Retrieved from https://www.frc.org.uk/news/october-2019/investors-seek-clearer-reporting-on-climate-relate.

UK Government, HM Treasury. (2019, July 2). Green Finance Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/green-finance-strategy.

Vizcarra, H. (2019a). Climate-Related Disclosure and Litigation Risk in the Oil & Gas Industry: Will State Attorneys General Investigations Impede the Drive for More Expansive Disclosures? Vermont Law Review, 43(4), 733-775.

Vizcarra, H. (2019b, April 30). Energy EOs In Depth: Infrastructure EO Section 5, More Bluster than Substance? Retrieved from https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/energy-eos-in-depth-infrastructure-eo-section-5-more-bluster-than-substance/.

Vizcarra, H. (2019c, Dec. 12). Understanding the New York v. Exxon Decision. Retrieved from https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/understanding-the-new-york-v-exxon-decision/.

Vizcarra, H. (2020). The Reasonable Investor and Climate-Related Information: Changing Expectations for Financial Disclosures. The Environmental Law Reporter, 50 (2), 10106.


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Offshore Energy Students

Offshore Wind Development: Federal Permitting Program Challenges


Offshore wind has the potential to generate enormous amounts of energy and change the American energy sector. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates that America’s offshore wind energy potential exceeds 4,000 gigawatts (GW) nearly four times the total capacity of the nation’s electric power system.[1] Off the Atlantic coast, wind can generate over 1,300 GW.[2] Many coastal states have committed to purchasing offshore wind developed in federal waters. For instance, in 2019 Connecticut requested proposals for developing up to 2,000 megawatts (MW) of offshore wind power;[3] New Jersey awarded a purchase agreement to a 1,100 MW project;[4] Massachusetts approved an agreement to purchase 800 MW from Vineyard Wind;[5] and New York finalized contracts with two offshore wind developers for 1,700 MW.[6] These states have recognized that developing offshore wind will not only provide benefits in terms of greenhouse gas reductions, but will also lead to subindustry booms as leases and proposed developments move into construction and operation.[7] States are now in active competition to reap these economic development benefits.

There is only one offshore wind farm in operation today in US waters: a 30 MW facility in Rhode Island’s state waters composed of five turbines generating power for 17,000 people.[8] A second small pilot project is expected to begin construction in 2020 thirty miles off the coast of Virginia.[9] There are currently fifteen active leases in federal waters, which have spurred a spate of state power procurement solicitations, such as those described above.[10] While construction has not begun on any of these leased waters, active bidding in response to state requests for proposals indicates that there will be many new projects moving into the permitting process in the near future.

Further, developments in Europe highlight the potential of offshore wind as a power source. The International Energy Association predicts that offshore wind could be the largest single source of electricity for the European Union by 2040 given current investment and technology trends.[11] Additionally, Europe is leading the way on offshore wind technology—floating turbines are already in operation off the coast of Scotland and will soon be deployed in Spain.[12] These floating turbines will be necessary for offshore wind to succeeded in parts of the American Outer Continental Shelf with particularly deep waters, such as the Pacific northwest.

If the industry is proving viable elsewhere, what might be holding back its growth in the US? Among the factors that have vexed offshore wind development, an unstable regulatory landscape and financing challenges exacerbated by regulatory delays have proven particularly difficult to overcome.

Cape Wind Project

An unstable regulatory landscape has plagued wind energy development. For instance, the Cape Wind Project interacted with three different lead federal agencies over the course of its nearly 17-year proposal life. After the initial 2001 project proposal, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) took responsibility for the Cape Wind Project as the lead federal agency under the Rivers and Harbors Act.[13] After the Energy Policy Act passed in 2005, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) assumed federal responsibility for all offshore wind projects.[14] Then, in 2010, the Department of the Interior initiated a reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) that ultimately created three separate sub-agencies independent of each other.[15] This included the establishment of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) in 2011, which took responsibility for offshore wind leasing and permitting.[16]

This changing regulatory landscape contributed in part to rising costs, delay, and litigation from which Cape Wind never fully recovered.[17] After working with the Corps for over two years to produce an draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), jurisdiction over the Cape Wind Project transferred to MMS under the Energy Policy Act.[18] MMS then undertook its own NEPA review that began in 2006 and was not completed until 2009.[19] After these environmental reviews were completed, Cape Wind signed the first commercial offshore renewable energy lease in the US in 2010[20] and submitted the final version of its development plans in 2014.[21]  Because of this drawn-out regulatory process, opponents of the Cape Wind Project had the opportunity to engage in a torrent of litigation, including 32 court cases and administrative hearings,[22] which one judge described as a “a vexatious abuse of the democratic process.”[23]

Additionally, financing issues hindered Cape Wind. Because of costs and delays incurred as a result of litigation, Cape Wind missed payments to two utilities that had promised to purchase 75% of its power.[24] These utilities then terminated their agreements with Cape Wind, which had depended on the power purchase agreements to secure financing.[25] Additionally, when Massachusetts passed legislation in August 2016 requiring the procurement of 1,600 MW of offshore wind energy it defined offshore wind energy generation to exclude Cape Wind by excluding projects within ten miles of inhabited areas.[26] The combined loss of both financial viability and political viability facilitated Cape Wind’s demise despite the company successfully navigating all BOEM’s permitting requirements.[27]

Vineyard Wind Project

After the Cape Wind saga, the finalization of regulations governing BOEM’s Renewable Energy Program in 2009[28] along with a subsequent update of those regulations in 2014, promised to bring regulatory certainty to the wind leasing process.[29] However, Vineyard Wind, the next major offshore wind proposal after the Cape Wind Project, has similarly languished. After BOEM issued a draft EIS under NEPA for the Vineyard Wind Project in 2018,[30] BOEM announced in August 2019 that it would conduct additional environmental studies before issuing a final EIS.[31] This study proposes to evaluate the cumulative impacts of a series of planned projects along the east coast.[32] Industry observers have expressed concern that the cumulative study is an attempt to delay the project’s completion.[33] Excessive delays may endanger Vineyard Wind’s contracts with utilities, which required the company to begin delivering energy by January 15, 2022.[34]

Like Cape Wind, the Vineyard Wind Project may similarly face the crunch of lost financial viability and political support. Vineyard Wind has relied on an investment tax credit, which provides 24% savings on the $2.8 billion Vineyard Wind has spent on capital costs.[35] Apart from costs savings, this credit allowed Vineyard Wind to contract for lower energy prices with the state of Massachusetts.[36] However, the credit was to expire at the end of 2019[37] before being extended for an additional year in December 2019.[38] Given delays in Vineyard Wind’s environmental approvals, this one year extension is critical to ensuring that the project remains solvent.[39] However, the one year extension creates uncertainty because any further delays that push construction past 2020 may jeopardize the financial health of the project.[40] Not only is beginning the project within the year critical for tax credit purposes, it is also critical for honoring underlying power purchase commitments requiring energy production by January 2022.[41]

Conclusion

The experiences of both Vineyard Wind and Cape Wind demonstrate how regulatory delays can interfere with the financing of offshore wind energy projects. In order to attract investors and financing, offshore wind developments must provide proof of an assured revenue stream.[42] One form of assured revenue streams are long term power purchases agreements with credit worthy buyers, such as the State of Massachusetts.[43] Recognizing this, the Massachusetts Green Communities Act requires renewable energy developers enter into long term contracts to facilitate project financing.[44] However, extended permitting delays, whether caused by regulatory instability or lengthy environmental reviews, can jeopardize these underlying contracts and therefore threaten financing for capital-intensive wind energy projects.

The recent trend of major oil companies shifting resources into offshore wind energy development may ameliorate the need for some projects to navigate this financing dance.[45] For example, Shell New Energies has shifted employees from the Gulf of Mexico to the northeastern US to capitalize on the growing wind market and has won multiple bids for wind leases in northeastern state waters.[46] Major oil companies usually self-finance, possibly increasing their tolerance for permitting delays because project solvency would not be dependent on outside financing. Even so, power purchase assurances and tax credits may be key indicators of a project’s viability regardless of the entity providing financing. In addition, self-financed projects will still need to deliver power in accordance with the agreements they make with state purchasers.

The Cape Wind and Vineyard Wind experiences demonstrate the challenges of creating an effective regulatory process that provides adequate reviews without significantly hindering the development of a new industry. As discussed at the beginning of this piece, the demand exists for offshore wind but enthusiasm could wane if projects can’t reach the steel in the water stage.

For an explanation of the current BOEM leasing and permitting process, see the Appendix below.

Appendix:  Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s Offshore Wind Leasing Program

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) has a four-step process for permitting offshore wind development on the outer continental shelf. In short, BOEM (1) identifies suitable offshore areas for wind energy development (2) issues leases for development (3) requests and reviews a site assessment conducted by the leasehold and (4) reviews the leasehold’s construction and operations plan. At each stage of this process, key stakeholders have an opportunity to provide input and suggestions to BOEM.

To instigate the identification process, BOEM has discretion to publish a Request for Interest (RFI) in the Federal Register; this will help determine whether there is competitive interest in leasing a given area of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).[47] BOEM will then publish a call for information and nominations, during which BOEM may request information on (1) areas that should be considered for leasing and (2) geological, socioeconomic, biological, and environmental information relevant to the proposed leasing site.[48] After the call, BOEM will identify appropriate areas for wind leasing in consultation with states, local government, tribes, and other affected federal agencies.[49] It concludes the identification phases by conducting an environmental assessment pursuant to NEPA.[50] This environmental assessment does not focus on any specific project proposals, but rather the environmental impact of simply surveying the OCS.

After identifying Wind Energy Areas (WEAs), BOEM can issue leases. The agency does this either competitively or noncompetitively.[51] As a default, BOEM will issue leases on a competitive basis by publishing a proposed sale notice (PSN).[52] During the PSN, BOEM requests public comments on the area available for leasing, the proposed and final lease provisions, and conditions, the auction details, and the criteria BOEM will use in evaluating competing leases and provisions, among other factors.[53] Any parties that wish to hold a lease must demonstrate their legal, technical, and financial qualifications.[54] At least 30 days before the lease sale, BOEM will publish a final sale notice (FSN).[55] The FSN will include the final terms and conditions[56] and identify qualified bidders. Bidding then proceeds in either a sealed process, an ascending process, a two-step combination of ascending and sealed bidding, or a multi-factor process.[57] The winner of the auction will be granted the lease.

Alternatively, BOEM will conduct a non-competitive leasing process if it determines that there is no-competitive interest for a wind energy area, either through a PSN in a planned BOEM lease or in an RFI after BOEM receives an unsolicited request to lease a wind energy area. In a non-competitive process, BOEM awards a lease without conducting an auction. It will conduct NEPA review for unsolicited bid requests for areas that have not undergone environmental scrutiny.

After BOEM grants a lease, the lessee must submit a Site Assessment Plan (SAP) and a Construction and Operations Plan (COP). These may be submitted simultaneously, otherwise the SAP should be submitted before the COP.[58] For both an SAP and a COP, BOEM encourages a lessee to conduct pre-survey meetings with BOEM and relevant stakeholders to develop lease stipulations.[59]

An SAP describes the initial activities necessary to characterize a lease site, resource assessment surveys, or technology testing activities that involves the installation of bottom-founded facilities.[60] SAPs must include data from physical characterization surveys, such as geological and hazard surveys, and from baseline environmental surveys, such as biological or archaeological surveys.[61]

After BOEM receives a lessee’s SAP, it will determine if the SAP is complete and sufficient.[62] It will then determine if the site is complex or significant; complex or significant sites may be subject to further regulatory requirements.[63] Finally, BOEM will conduct supplemental NEPA review if necessary. BOEM commits to a policy of issuing a final SAP decision (approval, approval with conditions, or denial) within 90 days of BOEM’s determination that a received SAP is complete and sufficient.[64]

A COP describes all proposed activities and planned facilities that a lessee intends to construct and use for a project under a commercial lease.[65] The COP must include a description of all planned facilities, including onshore and support facilities, as well as anticipated project easements needed for the project.[66]

After BOEM receives a lessee’s COP, it will first review it to determine if it contains all the information necessary and sufficient to conduct technical and environmental reviews.[67] It will then prepare an appropriate NEPA analysis and, if the COP is submitted after lease issuance, will coordinate with the applicable state agency on Coastal Zone Management compliance.[68] NEPA analysis at the COP stage is project-specific and would most likely take the form of an EIS, providing additional opportunities for public involvement.

If BOEM approves the COP, it will specify terms and conditions to be incorporated into the COP.[69] If they deny the COP, BOEM will provide the reasons for disproval and allow for an opportunity to resubmit a revised plan addressing the concerns; BOEM may also suspend the terms of the lease if appropriate.[70]

Before beginning any construction activity, whether under the COP or related to site surveying outlined in the SAP, lessees must submit more specific details in a Facility Design Report[71] and Fabrication and Installation Report.[72]

[1] U.S. Nat’l renewable energy lab., dep’t of energy, doe/netl-2012/1536, role of alternative energy sources: wind technology assessment 7 (2012)

[2] Id.

[3] David Iaconangelo, Conn. cracks open door for 2GW of offshore wind, E&E News (July 3, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060687787/search?keyword=vineyard+wind and Connecticut Department of Energy & Environmental Protection, Notice of Request for Proposals for Offshore Wind Facilities (August 16, 2019), https://www.dpuc.state.ct.us/DEEPEnergy.nsf/c6c6d525f7cdd1168525797d0047c5bf/ccf12ec6cdf19ca7852584580072434d/$FILE/2019.08.16_Final.OSW.RFP.pdf.

[4] Heather Richards, N.J. picks developer for major offshore wind project, E&E News (June 21, 2019),https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060640885/ and Press Release, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Awards Historic 1,100 MW Offshore Wind Solicitation to Ørsted’s Ocean Wind Project (June 21, 2019), https://www.bpu.state.nj.us/bpu/newsroom/2019/approved/20190621.html.

[5] Department of Public Utilities, Department of Public Utilities Approves Offshore Wind Energy Contracts (Apr. 16, 2019) https://www.mass.gov/news/department-of-public-utilities-approves-offshore-wind-energy-contracts.

[6] New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), Governor Cuomo Announces Finalized Contracts for Empire Wind and Sunrise Wind Offshore Wind Projects to Deliver Nearly 1,700 Megawatts of Clean and Affordable Renewable Energy to New Yorkers (Oct. 23, 2019) https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/About/Newsroom/2019-Announcements/2019-10-23-Governor-Cuomo-Announces-Finalized-Contracts-for-Empire-Wind-and-Sunrise-Wind-Offshore-Wind-Projects.

[7] See Heather Richards, Interior delays, costs may dim offshore wind’s prospects, E&E News (June 27, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060661149/search?keyword=vineyard+wind.

[8] Id.

[9] Heather Richards, Interior clears path for nation’s 2nd offshore wind project, E&E News (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1061297801/search?keyword=vineyard+wind.

[10] See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Lease and Grant information, https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/lease-and-grant-information.

[11] Heather Richards, Offshore wind could power most of Europe within 20 years, E&E News (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1061368469.

[12] Heather Richards, Floating wind turbine in Europe heralds ‘new era’, E&E News (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1061339023.

[13] See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Cape Wind. https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/studies/cape-wind

[14] Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).

[15] U.S. Department of Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May, 19, 2010) https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions

[16] See U.S. Department of Interior, Interior Department Completes Reorganization of the Former MMS (Sept. 30, 2011) (“BOEM will be led by Director Beaudreau and will be responsible for managing environmentally and economically responsible development of the nation’s offshore resources. Its functions will include offshore leasing, resource evaluation, review and administration of oil and gas exploration and development plans, renewable energy development, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis and environmental studies.”) available at https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Department-Completes-Reorganization-of-the-Former-MMS.

[17] Mitchell Hokanson, Avoiding the Doldrums: Evaluating The Need For Change In The Offshore Wind Permitting Process, 44 Colum. J. of Envtl. Law 181, 209-213 (2019).

[18] Id. at 210.

[19] Id.

[20] Bureau Of Ocean Energy Management, Lease No. Ocs-A 0478, Commercial Lease For Submerged Lands For Renewable Energy Development On The Outer Continental Shelf (2010), https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Renewable_Energy_Program/Studies/CapeWind_signed_lease.pdf.

[21] Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Letter to James Gordon Approving Construction and Operations Plan (Sept. 9, 2014) https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/renewable-energy-program/Studies/BOEM-Letter-of-Approval-of-Revisions-to-COP.pdf

[22] See Lawrence Susskind & Ryan Cook, The Cost of Contentiousness: A Status Report on Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States, 33 Va. Envtl. L.J. 204, 256 (2015) (“By Cape Wind’s developer’s tally, the project had faced opposition in thirty-two separate court cases and administrative hearings. Twenty-six cases of these were decided in the project’s favor, five were withdrawn by opponents, and one was decided in opponent’s favor but made moot by subsequent decision.) (citing Litigation History of Cape Wind, Cape Wind, https:// www.capewind.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Litigation%20History%C20of%C20Cape%C20Wind%C20May%C202%2̈014.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2015))

[23] See Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. Berwick, 17 F. Supp. 3d 113, fn. 26 (D. Mass. 2014)

[24] See Jon Chesto, Now it’s official: Cape Wind project dead, Boston Globe (Dec. 1, 2017) (The first devastating blow for the ambitious offshore installation for Nantucket Sound came in early 2015, when National Grid and Northeast Utilities — which had agreed to buy electricity from Cape Wind — canceled their contracts with the developer. The utilities said Cape Wind had missed a deadline to extend the contracts. Under a 2012 agreement, Northeast Utilities and NStar (now combined as Eversource) agreed to buy 27.5 percent of Cape Wind’s production, while National Grid had previously signed on to purchase 50 percent. Without those commitments, Gordon was unable to secure the financing he needed.”) https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/12/01/now-official-cape-wind-project-dead/0899me8Xd3ziWOujgkvbwL/story.html.

[25] See Stephen Lacey, Cape Wind Loses Power Contracts, Becomes Victim of Class Warfare, Green Tech Media (Jan. 07, 2015) available at https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/cape-wind-becomes-victim-of-class-warfare.

[26] The legislature defined “offshore wind developer” as “a provider of electricity developed from an offshore wind energy generation project that is located on the Outer Continental Shelf and for which no turbine is located within 10 miles of any inhabited area,” and “offshore wind energy generation” as “offshore electric generating resources derived from wind that: (1) are Class I renewable energy generating sources, as defined in section 11F of chapter 25A of the General Laws; (2) have a commercial operations date on or after January 1, 2018, that has been verified by the department of energy resources; and (3) operate in a designated wind energy area for which an initial federal lease was issued on a competitive basis after January 1, 2012.” H.B. 4568, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016).

[27] See, e.g. Burea of Ocean Energy Management, Cape Wind Project https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/studies/cape-wind

[28] Renewable Energy And Alternate Uses Of Existing Facilities On The Outer Continental Shelf, 30 CFR § 585 (2009).

[29] Timing Requirements for the Submission of a Site Assessment Plan (SAP) or General Activities Plan (GAP) for a Renewable Energy Project on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), 30 CFR §585, 590 (2014).

[30] Vineyard Wind Offshore Wind Energy Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (December 2018) https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/renewable-energy-program/State-Activities/MA/Vineyard-Wind/Vineyard_Wind_Draft_EIS.pdf

[31] See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Vineyard Wind (“Comments received from stakeholders and cooperating agencies requested a more robust cumulative analysis. Considering such comments, and taking into account recent state offshore wind procurement announcements, BOEM is expanding its cumulative analysis of projects within its draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).”) https://www.boem.gov/vineyard-wind

[32] Benjamin Storrow, Trump admin throws wrench into offshore wind plans, E&E News (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060921573/.

[33] See Phil McKenna & Dan Gearino, Government Delays First Big U.S. Offshore Wind Farm. Is a Double Standard at Play?, Inside Climate News (Aug. 19, 2019);see also Heather Richards, Warren blasts Trump administration for offshore wind delay, E&E News (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060952487/search?keyword=vineyard+wind.

[34] Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, Order, D.P.U. 18-76; D.P.U. 18-77; D.P.U.18-78, page 25 (April 12, 2019) (“The Companies represent that Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Project have CODs of January 15, 2022, and January 15, 2023, respectively (Companies Brief at 21, citing Exhs. JU-1, at 32; JU-10-A, B, and C; Joint Supplemental Testimony of Waltman, Brennan and Glover at 2). The Companies also maintain that if either COD is not achieved by the guaranteed dates, Vineyard Wind is subject to delay damages and potential contract termination (Companies Brief at 21, citing Exhs. JU-1, at 32; JU-10-A, B, and C; Joint Supplemental Testimony of Waltman, Brennan and Glover at 2).”) https://fileservice.eea.comacloud.net/FileService.Api/file/FileRoom/10617251.

[35] Benjamin Storrow, Trump admin throws wrench into offshore wind plans, E&E News (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060921573/.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] See John Eliason et al., Production Tax Credit Extended for Renewable Projects Beginning Construction in 2020,, Foley Lardner (Jan. 3, 2020) available at https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/01/production-tax-credit-renewable-projects-2020; see also Heather Cooper et al., Senate Passes Tax Extenders Deal That Includes Extension of Renewable Energy Incentives, The National Law Review (Dec. 19, 2019) available at https://www.natlawreview.com/article/senate-passes-tax-extenders-deal-includes-extension-renewable-energy-incentives.

[39] See Karl-Erik Stromsta, Vineyard Wind Pushes IRS for Subsidy Extension on Delayed Offshore Project, Green Tech Media (Nov. 01, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/vineyard.

[40] See Iulia Gheorghiu, Vineyard Wind faces unexpected permitting delays, pushing 2022 start date for 800 MW offshore project, Utiltiy Dive (Feb. 12, 2020) available at https://www.utilitydive.com/news/vineyard-wind-faces-unexpected-permitting-delays-pushing-2022-start-date-f/572127/.

[41] Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, Order, D.P.U. 18-76; D.P.U. 18-77; D.P.U.18-78, page 25 (April 12, 2019) (“The Companies represent that Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Project have CODs of January 15, 2022, and January 15, 2023, respectively (Companies Brief at 21, citing Exhs. JU-1, at 32; JU-10-A, B, and C; Joint Supplemental Testimony of Waltman, Brennan and Glover at 2). The Companies also maintain that if either COD is not achieved by the guaranteed dates, Vineyard Wind is subject to delay damages and potential contract termination (Companies Brief at 21, citing Exhs. JU-1, at 32; JU-10-A, B, and C; Joint Supplemental Testimony of Waltman, Brennan and Glover at 2).”) https://fileservice.eea.comacloud.net/FileService.Api/file/FileRoom/10617251.

[42] Janet Besser & Chairty Pennock, Offshore Wind: Recommendations for a Coordinated Aggregated Power Procurement Mechanism for Offshore Wind Projects in New England, New England Clean Energy Council at 10 (June 2013) “The Offshore Wind Task Force focused its efforts on the need for financing and considered how coordinated aggregated power procurement models across multiple utilities and multiple states could address this need. Developers need to provide proof of an assured revenue stream, e.g. from sales of power output, in order to attract investors and financing. One way to provide this assurance is through long-term contracts executed early in the development process, to purchase a significant amount of a project’s generation.”) https://www.necec.org/files/necec/pdfs/NECEC_Offshore_Wind_Recommendations_FINAL.pdf.

[43] Id.; see also Paul Scwabe et al., Wind Energy Finance in the United States: Current Practice and Opportunities, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, page 25 (August 2017) (“One of the principal benefits of a PPA is that it provides electricity generation owners with long- term, contractually-obligated energy sales mechanisms in which they earn revenue and investment returns. Financiers of wind projects will typically require that the sponsor has successfully negotiated a PPA from a creditworthy buyer before providing capital for the project.”) https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68227.pdf.

[44] Section 83C of An Act Relative to Green Communities, St. 2008, c. 169, as amended by St. 2016, c. 188, § 12  (“In order to facilitate the financing of offshore wind energy generation resources in the commonwealth, not later than June 30, 2017, every distribution company shall jointly and competitively solicit proposals for offshore wind energy generation; and, provided, that reasonable proposals have been received, shall enter into cost-effective long-term contracts. Long-term contracts executed pursuant to this section shall be subject to the approval of the department of public utilities and shall be apportioned among the distribution companies.”)

[45] See, e.g., Timothy Abington & Kelly Gilblom, Shell Leads Big Oil in the Race to Invest in Clean Energy, Bloomberg Newss (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/shell-leads-big-oil-in-the-race-to-invest-in-clean-energy-tech.

[46] Julia Pyper, Shell Brings Deep-Water Expertise to Boston to Capitalize on US Offshore Wind Boom, Green Tech Media (June 17, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/shell-brings-deep-water-expertise-to-boston-us-offshore-wind.

[47] 30 CFR § 585.210.

[48] 30 CFR § 585.211(a)(1)-(2).

[49] 30 CFR § 585.211(b).

[50] Planning and Analysis, Renewable Energy, Office of Renewable Energy Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), U.S. Department of the Interior (2019), https://www.boem.gov/Planning-and-Analysis/.

[51] Wind Energy Commercial Leasing Process, Office of Renewable Energy Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), U.S. Department of the Interior (2019) (January 24, 2017), https://www.boem.gov/Commercial-Leasing-Process-Fact-Sheet/.

[52] 30 CFR § 585.201; 30 CFR § 585.211(c).

[53] 30 CFR § 585.216

[54] Qualification Guidelines to Acquire and Hold Renewable Energy Leases and Grants and Alternate Use Grants on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, Office of Renewable Energy Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), U.S. Department of the Interior (September 12, 2012), https://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/Regulatory-Information/QualificationGuidelines-pdf.aspx.

[55] 30 CFR § 585.211(d)

[56] 30 CFR § 585.216

[57] 30 CFR § 585.220

[58] SAP Guidelines at 6.

[59] Guidelines for Information Requirements for a Renewable Energy Construction and Operations Plan (COP), 6, Officer of Renewable Energy Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), U.S. Department of the Interior (April 7 2017) [hereinafter COP Guidelines], https://www.boem.gov/COP-Guidelines/.; Guidelines for Information Requirements for a Renewable Energy Site Assessment Plan (SAP), 7, Officer of Renewable Energy Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), U.S. Department of the Interior (June 2019) [hereinafter SAP Guidelines], https://www.boem.gov/Final-SAP-Guidelines/.

[60] Id. at 5.

[61] 30 CFR §585.605(b).

[62] 30 CFR § 585.613(a)(2).

[63] 30 CFR § 585.112

[64] SAP Guidelines at 9.

[65] COP Guidelines at 6.

[66] 30 CFR §585.626

[67] 30 CFR § 585.628(a)

[68] 30 CFR § 628(b)-(c).

[69] 30 CFR § 585.628(g).

[70] Id.

[71] See 30 CFR § 585.701.

[72] See CFR § 585.702.


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The Absurdity Of Trump’s Bid To Bail Out The Oil And Gas Industry

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Clean Air Supreme Court Decisions

CleanLaw: Joe Goffman Talks to Richard Lazarus about his New Book “The Rule of Five”


Joe Goffman speaks with Professor Richard Lazarus about his new book, “The Rule of Five,” which describes the drama, strategy, cast of characters, and, above all, the lawyering, by both the litigators and the Justices, that led to the seminal Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.


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