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Environmental Justice

EELP supports comments on EPA’s Technical Guidance for Assessing Environmental Justice in Regulatory Analysis


EPA recently collected comments on its draft technical guidance telling agency staff how they should account for environmental justice-related impacts in rulemaking activities. The guidance includes important procedural questions like how the agency should engage impacted communities, how to consider cumulative impacts, and how to address EJ-related data gaps. The 2023 draft guidance updates EPA’s current 2016 Technical Guidance.

EELP convened members of the Title VI Alliance to draft comments on EPA’s updated guidance. The final letter includes seven recommendations on how the current draft guidance could be improved:

  1. Applicability: EPA should specify which regulatory actions are subject to the Guidance to ensure consistent application;
  2. Outcome-Driven: the agency’s EJ analysis should drive regulatory standards as permissible by law;
  3. Alternatives: EPA must explain when and how to consider regulatory alternatives to minimize EJ-related impacts;
  4. Data Gaps: there should be a clear plan when data needed for an EJ analysis are limited or unavailable;
  5. Risk-Based Decision-Making: The Guidance should give recommendations on how to address the acknowledged limits of risk-based decision-making;
  6. Considering Cumulative Risks: The Guidance should account for recent developments in assessing cumulative risk and non-chemical stressors, including climate change-related impacts; and
  7. Meaningful Engagement: The Guidance’s meaningful engagement requirements should reference and be consistent with EPA’s Meaningful Involvement Policy.

Read the comments filed by members of the Title VI Alliance.


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Environmental Justice Inflation Reduction Act

Breaking Down the Environmental Justice Provisions in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act


The Inflation Reduction Act’s (IRA) environmental justice (EJ) provisions represent the first time the Biden administration’s EJ agenda has been expressly included in a statute. However, the IRA leaves it to federal agencies to define key terms, processes, and criteria, which will determine how these benefits reach intended communities.

The IRA will direct billions of dollars to communities based on various EJ-related criteria, including income, energy burden, and demographics. Experts at the Just Solutions Collective estimate that the IRA includes $40 billion in direct benefits for communities with EJ concerns, as compared to $29 billion the Biden administration  allocated under the Justice40 Initiative as of May 23, 2022. While the IRA’s requirements apply to states and other funding recipients, federal agencies have discretion to define key language, processes, and requirements for grants that must be implemented within a short timeframe.

Several coalitions and organizations have argued that the Act’s EJ benefits are outweighed by other provisions under the IRA, especially provisions that may drive investment in coal, oil and gas, nuclear, hydrogen, and biofuels that disproportionately impact frontline communities.[1] Other organizations  have expressed cautious support for the IRA, but call for more aggressive executive action to offset the impacts of further investments in fossil-based fuels and technologies, including changes to the federal permitting process, improved language access and engagement policies, and the passage of H.R. 2021, the Environmental Justice For All Act. [2]

In this blog, I focus on key considerations for agencies as they work to implement the IRA’s EJ provisions. Many of these provisions explicitly target “disadvantaged communities”, mirroring language from the administration’s Justice40 Initiative, which requires federal agencies to direct 40 percent of federal “benefits” from various climate-related programs to “disadvantaged communities”. Biden established the Justice40 Initiative and other EJ goals via executive order. This means federal agencies have had to rely on their existing authorities to implement the Initiative, while states and other non-federal entities are not required to comply. Now, however, several of the IRA’s EJ programs require states and local governments implementing those programs to prioritize “disadvantaged” and other communities with EJ concerns. There are few legal levers advocates can pull to hold states and local governments accountable. However, the law shifts the burden onto funding recipients to justify spending that conflicts with these provisions.

Agency Considerations for Implementing the IRA’s EJ Provisions

As discussed in our blog on the IRA’s broader climate impacts, the IRA provides some guidance on how EJ funds should be spent, but federal agencies and states have a significant role in deciding how these programs are designed, implemented, and monitored. There are several factors that will determine how benefits reach communities with EJ concerns, including:

  • How beneficiaries are identified and defined (e.g., “disadvantaged communities”)
  • Who is eligible to apply (e.g., state and local governments versus community-based nonprofit organizations)
  • If applicants must pay before accessing benefits (e.g., tax credits or post-purchase rebate programs) or pay a portion of a project’s total costs
  • If grants are distributed using competitive processes, and who defines the criteria for selecting successful applicants

These unanswered questions give federal agencies significant discretion in deciding how to implement the IRA’s EJ-related programs. The IRA does not define “disadvantaged” or “overburdened” communities. Agencies will likely develop definitions based on spatial mapping tools, similar to the Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) Climate & Economic Justice Screening Tool (CJEST), developed to identify “disadvantaged” communities under the Justice40 Initiative.[3] To implement the IRA, agencies could rely on the CJEST’s definition of “disadvantaged” or establish their own definitions to include criteria specific to their mission or grant program. For example, while the CJEST is in beta, the Department of Energy (DOE) developed its own definition of “disadvantaged communities” based on cumulative burdens[4] associated with various indices, including households’ energy burden (i.e., the proportion of a household’s income that is spent on energy costs), dependence on fossil fuels, and internet access.

For a comprehensive overview of the IRA’s EJ provisions and these criteria, see our table. This table summarizes who can apply for those these benefits, if and how key EJ terms are defined under the IRA, and other important criteria.

Agencies also have significant discretion in designing the application process, which will shape who applies for and receives federal funding. In order for communities to access federal benefits, they must have the administrative capacity to compile, submit, and administer grant applications. The more complex and onerous the application criteria, the more difficult it becomes for communities and local or state governments with limited staffing, resources, and expertise to apply.[5] The IRA includes significant funding for technical assistance and implementation of these grant programs, which, if leveraged quickly and effectively to target low-capacity regions, could help address this gap. Also, the vast majority of the IRA’s EJ provisions do not require applicants to pay a portion of the proposed project’s costs (i.e., a non-federal cost share). This enables communities with less access to financing to apply for infrastructure and energy projects that might otherwise be inaccessible if the program included a cost share requirement.[6]

Federal agencies will also have to grapple with the IRA’s short timeframes. For example, the IRA includes $2.8 billion in environmental and climate justice block grants for community-based nonprofits and other eligible partners. However, EPA must spend that money before September 30, 2026, and the awarded grants can only last up to three years. Establishing and disbursing grant programs of this size requires significant administrative support and resources, particularly where the intended beneficiaries may not have capacity to receive and immediately implement multi-million-dollar projects. To meet this challenge, agencies will likely rely on tools the Biden administration has already developed to implement its EJ agenda, including agencies’ equity plans, new staff positions, agency offices created to address EJ-related issues, and public feedback on how agencies can reduce the administrative burdens of applying for and implementing federal grants.

After President Biden signs the IRA, agencies will begin the critical process of designing processes and criteria to implement the law’s EJ programs. Early, frequent, and meaningful stakeholder engagement will be essential to designing processes that enable the IRA’s significant benefits to reach communities with EJ concerns.

We will continue to monitor agencies’ implementation of the IRA and the Biden administration’s EJ agenda, and highlight opportunities for stakeholder engagement.

For more on EJ across the federal government and at specific agencies, visit EELP’s Federal EJ Tracker.


[1] For examples, see statements and analyses from the Climate Justice Alliance (CJA), the Indigenous Environmental Network, and The Black Hive – The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL).

[2] For example, see statements from WE ACT for Environmental Justice, the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, and GreenLatinos.

[3] For more on Justice40 and the CJEST, visit our Federal EJ Tracker.

[4] The current versions of CEQ’s CJEST and EPA’s EJSCREEN do not account for cumulative impacts.

[5] Headwaters Economics recently published a “rural capacity index” rating counties and municipalities based on their ability to compete for federal funding.

[6] For example, under Section 60501 creating the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) new Neighborhood Access and Equity Grant Program, states, local governments and other applicants must pay at least 20% of the project’s costs. However, for projects in “disadvantaged or underserved” communities (likely to be defined by the FHWA Administrator or Department of Transportation (DOT) Secretary), the IRA increases the federal cost share to up to 100%.


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Environmental Justice Federal Policy Analysis

DOJ Revives Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) as Part of EJ Agenda


*Updated on Feb. 1, 2023

For more on the phase-out of SEPs at DOJ and EPA under President Trump, see DOJ Phases Out Supplemental Environmental Projects in Environmental Enforcement and EPA Changes its Settlement Practices.

For decades, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have relied on the discretionary use of supplemental environmental projects (SEPs) in settlement agreements to redress the impacts of environmental violations on communities. Unlike civil penalties, which go to the US Treasury, SEPs allow companies to voluntarily support projects that can provide important health benefits to impacted communities, including investments in enhanced monitoring or remediating the effects of illegal emissions or discharges.

EPA’s SEPs policy, last updated in 2015, applies to administrative enforcement actions. Prior to the Trump administration, DOJ had not issued a rule addressing third-party payments, but DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had upheld the use of certain third-party payments, including SEPs, in civil environmental actions. Under President Trump, DOJ abruptly reversed course and phased out the use of SEPs and other third-party payments through internal guidance and a rule finalized in December 2020. On May 5, 2022, Attorney General Garland issued a memo and an interim final rule, published on May 10, 2022, that restored DOJ’s authority to enter into SEPs and other third-party payments in nearly all federal civil and criminal cases, subject to new guidelines and limitations.

That same day, the Biden DOJ also announced two significant environmental justice (EJ) initiatives: the opening of an Office of Environmental Justice within the Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD), and a new “comprehensive environmental justice enforcement strategy” co-developed by ENRD and EPA. Both initiatives respond to mandates in Biden’s executive order 14008, which also required DOJ to “ensure comprehensive attention to environmental justice” throughout the department. According to DOJ’s interim final rule, reviving the use of SEPs in particular helps to “remedy[] the harms to communities most directly impacted by violations of [environmental] laws.” While DOJ’s new policy does not include explicit EJ provisions, EPA’s SEPs policy includes guidance prioritizing approval of SEPs that advance EJ concerns and integrate community input.

In this blog, I review the history of SEPs in federal environmental enforcement, respond to legal arguments made by the Trump DOJ alleging that SEPs and other third party-payments violate federal law, and compare DOJ’s and EPA’s policies.

Background: SEPs in Federal Environmental Enforcement

EPA defines SEPs as “projects included as part of an enforcement settlement that provide a tangible environmental or public health benefit.” SEPs are voluntary, and EPA cannot require or compel a defendant to perform a SEP. Furthermore, SEPs are projects that “are not otherwise legally required . . . and thus provide benefits that go beyond compliance obligations.” For example, in 2006, EPA reached a settlement with the University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez to address self-reported violations involving hazardous waste, discharge into waterways, and emission of hazardous air pollutants. Under the final agreement, the University committed to spend almost $400,000 to set up an environmental management system to properly store, handle, and dispose of hazardous materials used on campus, in addition to paying $100,000 in civil penalties. The University also committed to share its experience with other federal, Commonwealth, and municipal agencies to prevent similar violations. The SEP thus allowed the University to invest in a long-term solution to clean up the contamination and prevent future discharges, in addition to paying a civil penalty to the US Treasury.

Because SEPs are projects that could not be otherwise ordered by a court, they are distinct from injunctive relief, including mitigation. According to a 2012 EPA memo, there are three key differences between SEPs and mitigation: (1) the legal basis for each, (2) the nexus to the underlying violation, and (3) the impacts on the size of civil penalties. Mitigation is relief a court could order to “restore the status quo ante,” and, therefore, has a direct connection to the past or ongoing harm from the violation. SEPs are voluntary and can have a less direct tie to the violation itself. Under EPA’s SEPs policy, SEPs may also lead to a reduction in civil penalties.

According to EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database, since 1993, nearly 2,800 federal environmental settlements have included a SEP. The chart below shows the total value of those SEPs per year compared to the annual number of federal environmental settlements with SEPs.

Graph showing trends in SEPs starting in 1993 with peaks in 2005 and 2012 and dropping slowly until 2017 then precipitously to near zero in 2021

Data Source: EPA’s ECHO Database

Starting in 2017 under the Trump administration,[1] DOJ issued a series of policy memos to curtail the agency’s authority to include SEPs in settlement agreements, cementing the approach in a March 2020 memo and final rule published on December 16, 2020. The Trump administration’s final rule prohibited any settlement agreement “that directs or provides for a payment or loan to any non-governmental person or entity that is not a party to the dispute”, with four narrow exceptions. In the March memo, Trump officials argued that SEPs in particular exceed agencies’ budgetary authority stating “in-kind payments in exchange for a reduction of a penalty are as problematic as direct cash payments to third parties.” EPA did not revise its SEPs policy, instead relying on agency discretion to halt the use of SEPs in administrative settlements consistent with DOJ policy.

The March 2020 memo and December 2020 rule replaced earlier guidance from the Trump administration—a January 2018 guidance memo from then acting Assistant Attorney General for ENRD Jeffrey H. Wood—that would have allowed ENRD to use SEPs where payments “directly remedy harm to the environment” and are in proportion to the harm that occurred. For example, in a Clean Air Act case involving a stationary source, the 2018 guidance would allow a “lawful payment” addressing harm from excess sulfur dioxide emissions within the same airshed as the source. Thus, the Trump DOJ did allow SEPs in environmental settlements until March 2020, albeit under limited circumstances.

For more, see DOJ Phases Out Supplemental Environmental Projects in Environmental Enforcement.

President Biden identified the Trump 2020 rule as a priority for review under executive order 13990, and DOJ revoked the March 2020 memo prohibiting the use of SEPs on February 4, 2022. Because EPA never revised its SEPs policy but rather relied on internal guidance to limit the use of SEPs, the agency could immediately resume including SEPs in administrative enforcement. However, because the Trump DOJ finalized its SEPs prohibition in a rulemaking, the Biden DOJ was required to revoke and replace the Trump rule to reinstate the use of SEPs in civil actions.

DOJ’s New Policy

On May 10, 2022, DOJ published an interim final rule revoking the Trump rule, effectively reviving the use of SEPs consistent with Attorney General Garland’s memo issued on May 5. The Biden rule, like the Trump rule, is internal and, therefore, exempt from notice-and-comment requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The rule is effective immediately, but DOJ also accepted public comments.

The new rule preserves DOJ’s discretion to prescribe settlement practices through internal guidance. According to DOJ, “policies [about settlements] have traditionally been addressed through memoranda from Department leadership rather than through regulations.”[2] By returning to this tradition, the Biden DOJ enables a future administration to immediately amend the third-party payment policy through new guidance, making the policy vulnerable to reversal.

DOJ’s policy includes new restrictions limiting the scope and potential impact of third-party payments, including SEPs, and directly addresses several of the legal arguments the Trump administration had advanced (discussed below). These limitations include:

  • The “nature and scope” must be defined “with particularity.”
  • There must be a “strong connection to the underlying violation,” including by advancing at least one of the objectives of the underlying statute.
  • DOJ will not propose the selection of a third party or specific entity to receive payments or implement a project, though DOJ can specify the type of entity. DOJ can disapprove a third party proposed by the defendant if the disapproval is based on objective criteria.
  • The settlement must be executed before a ruling in favor of the US, and DOJ will not retain any post-settlement control over the funds or projects, except to ensure parties comply with the settlement agreement.
  • Senior DOJ officials (deputy AG or associate AG) must approve the proposed settlement, with some exceptions.[3]

DOJ’s New Policy is Consistent with Federal Law

In the Trump 2020 rule, DOJ restricted third-party payments based on section 3302(b) of the MRA, which requires any federal official “receiving money for the Government” to deposit those funds in the Treasury “without deduction for any charge or claim.”[4]  However, the Trump DOJ did not argue that the MRA bars most third-party payments. Rather, the rule restricted most third-party payments based on “the policy reflected in the [MRA]”.[5] This reading is consistent with an internal memo acquired via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, in which the Trump DOJ, speaking through its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), affirmed that the prohibitions included in the 2020 final rule were a policy choice rather than a result compelled by statute. In the memo, Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s OLC, Steven A. Engel, wrote to Attorney General Barr that while “the [final rule’s] prohibition on third-party payments is consistent with the policy underlying the [Miscellaneous Receipts Act] . . . the proposed Order does not reflect an interpretation of the statute itself and thus prohibits certain payments to third parties that this Office has concluded that the MRA otherwise allows.”

AAG Engel’s reading of the MRA as allowing “certain payments to third parties” is consistent with decades of OLC practice. In 1980, OLC interpreted the phrase “receiving money for the Government” under the MRA to include “the ‘constructive receipt’ of money ‘if a federal agency could have accepted possession and retains discretion to direct the use of the money’.”[6] OLC has therefore “consistently advised” that third party-payments included in settlement agreements satsify a two-step test: that (1) settlements be executed before an admission or finding of liability in favor of the US, and (2) the US does not have post-settlement control over the “disposition or management” of the funds or related projects, except to ensure parties comply with the settlement.[7]

OLC applied this two-step test in a 2006 decision, Softwood Lumber, which AAG Engel cited in his memo as evidence that the MRA allows “certain payments to third parties”. The Softwood Lumber decision addressed a trade dispute settlement between the US and Canada that directed $450 million to an escrow account to fund “meritorious initiatives in the US” including “charitable causes” in affected communities, “low-income housing and disaster relief,” and other “public-interest projects.” The fund was administered by a foundation, run by a board of directors not “subject to direction and control by any federal official.” The OLC found that “there is little basis for attributing any of the $450 million to the United States,” and even if there were, the foundation’s arrangement and transfer of the funds “would easily satisfy both of the MRA’s requirements [in the two-step test].”

The Biden DOJ’s new policy, outlined in the May 5, 2022 memo, and EPA’s 2015 SEPs policy explicitly address this two-step test and include additional safeguards to ensure compliance with the MRA. DOJ’s policy explicitly requires the settlement to be executed “before an admission or finding of liability in favor of the US,”[8] and both policies prohibit the agency from controlling or managing SEP funds or related projects. Both policies also prohibit the agencies from proposing a particular party to receive payments or implement a SEP, further limiting the agencies’ influence over the selection of a SEP project and its beneficiaries.

Reconciling DOJ’s and EPA’s Policies

EPA’s SEPs policy, last revised in 2015, differs from DOJ’s third-party payment policy in a few key ways. EPA’s policy offers specific guidance on how to prioritize EJ concerns in the creation and approval of SEPs in settlement agreements and prohibits all cash donations to third parties, whereas DOJ’s guidance allows restricted cash donations. EPA’s test for whether a SEP is sufficiently related to the underlying environmental violation is slightly more flexible than DOJ’s. EPA also generally assumes government officials have the authority to approve SEPs as part of approving the settlement agreement, whereas DOJ’s policy requires the deputy AG or associate AG to approve all settlements that include third-party payments.

EPA’s SEPs policy also provides additional guidance on how to develop SEPs that account for EJ concerns. Under the policy, “defendants are encouraged to consider SEPs in communities where there are EJ concerns” and “strongly encourages defendants to reach out to the community for SEP ideas and prefers SEPs proposals that have been developed with input from the impacted community.” The policy includes guidance on how to integrate community input in the context of ongoing settlement negotiations. It also explicitly states that in assessing proposed SEPs, EPA will prefer projects developed with “active solicitation and consideration of community input” and that “mitigate damage or reduce risk to a community that may have been disproportionately exposed to pollution.”

The table below compares key provisions of DOJ’s and EPA’s policies. Where the two policies differ, the more restrictive provision is marked by two asterisks (**). In a case where EPA’s policy is more restrictive, it is unclear from DOJ’s policy whether ENRD will reject SEPs that fail to comply with EPA’s 2015 policy. For example, if ENRD evaluates a proposed settlement agreement on behalf of EPA, it is not clear if ENRD must disapprove a SEP that includes a restricted cash donation to a third party because EPA’s policy prohibits such donations, even if DOJ could approve that donation if acting on behalf of another agency that does not have a conflicting policy. It is also important to recognize that states are not subject to DOJ’s or EPA’s policies and could, therefore, include SEPs in a parallel agreement that would not be subject to these federal restrictions. However, in that case, the defendant likely would not receive a reduced civil penalty, which EPA allows for in its SEPs policy.

Comparison of Key Provisions in DOJ’s and EPA’s SEPs Policies (more restrictive provision marked by **)

SEP Policy Provision DOJ (2022) EPA (2015)
Project Scope Type and scope must be defined “with particularity” Type and scope must be “specifically described and defined”
Nexus to Underlying Violation ** Project must have a “strong connection” to the underlying violation, advance at least one of the statute’s objectives, reduce the effects of the underlying violation AND reduce the likelihood of similar violations in the future Project must have a “sufficient” nexus to the underlying violation and must advance at least one of the statute’s objectives. It must also reduce the adverse impact or overall risk of the underlying violation to public health or the environment OR reduce likelihood of similar violations in the future
SEP Approval ** All SEPs must be approved by the deputy attorney general or associate attorney general No special approval required except in certain cases (e.g., where SEPs don’t comply with EPA’s policy or include third-party compliance projects)
Cash Donations Prohibits “unrestricted” cash donations to third parties with some exceptions ** Prohibits all cash donations to third parties with some exceptions
Third Party Selection Agency can specify the type of organization to receive the SEP, but cannot propose or select a particular third party to receive payments or to implement or receive SEP
Third Party Disapproval Agency can disapprove selected SEP beneficiary or implementers (e.g., contractors) based on “objective criteria” to assess qualifications and fitness
Decrease in Civil Penalty Not addressed Inclusion of SEPs may warrant decrease in penalty based on various factors and subject to EPA discretion, but the final penalty amount cannot be lower than minimum calculated according to policy methodology[9]
Timing Settlement must be executed before admission or finding of liability in favor of the US SEP cannot begin until EPA has identified a violation (policy is for settlements only, not hearings or trial)[10]
Post-Settlement Control Over Funds, Projects DOJ and client agencies have no post-settlement control over disposition or management of funds or projects carried out under the settlement EPA cannot manage or control funds set aside for a SEP or manage or administer the SEP itself. EPA may conduct oversight to ensure the project is implemented pursuant to settlement provisions

We will continue to track the development of this and other EJ-related policies at EPA and DOJ. For more information, visit those agencies’ pages on our Federal EJ Tracker.


[1] DOJ issued a memorandum on June 5, 2017, which barred the agency from entering into settlement agreements that include “payments to non-government, third-party organizations as a condition of settlement with the United States,” but allowed a “lawful payment or loan . . . that otherwise directly remedies the harm that is sought to be redressed, including, for example, harm to the environment.” Memorandum from Attorney General Jeff Sessions on Prohibition on Settlement Payments to Third Parties (June 5, 2017) (available at https://perma.cc/4MS6-AHYK).

[2] 87 Fed. Reg. at 27937.

[3] No approval is required for: (1) lawful payments or loans that provide restitution or compensation to a victim to directly remedy the harm being addressed; (2) in cases of foreign official corruption, payments to a trusted third party when required to facilitate the repatriation and use of funds; (3) payments for legal and other professional services rendered in connection to the case; and (4) payments expressly authorized by statute or regulation.

[4] 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b).

[5] 85 Fed. Reg. at 81410 (emphasis added).

[6] Effect of 31 U.S.C. 484 on the Settlement Authority of the Attorney General, 4B Op. O.L.C. 684, 688 (1980). In this case, OLC disapproved a proposed settlement agreement between the US, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and a trucking company for environmental damage resulting from an oil spill. The agreement included a provision requiring the company to donate money to “a waterfowl preservation organization to be designated jointly” by Virginia and the Department of the Interior. The OLC found that 31 U.S.C. § 484, the predecessor to § 3301(b) of the MRA, bars cash payments to third parties where the federal government “could have accepted possession and retains discretion to direct the use of money.”

[7] Application of the Government Corporation Control Act and the Miscellaneous Receipts Act to the Canadian Softwood Lumber Settlement Agreement, 30 Op. O.L.C. 111, 119 (2006). OLC had previously transmitted this guidance to U.S. Attorneys’ offices in 1996. See, Memorandum for the Files, from Rebecca Arbogast, Attorney-Adviser, O.L.C., Miscellaneous Receipts Act and Criminal Settlements (Nov. 18, 1996).

[8] EPA’s SEPs policy is to be used in settlements only and is “not intended for use by the EPA, defendants, courts, or administrative law judges at a hearing or in trial.”  Memorandum from Assistant Administrator Cynthia Giles, Issuance of the 2015 Update to the 1998 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (Mar. 10, 2015). Therefore, EPA’s SEPs policy does not address the first prong of the MRA test that settlements must be executed before an admission or finding of liability in favor of the US.

[9] Under EPA’s policy, settlements that include SEPs must include a penalty. That penalty must equal or exceed either (a) the economic benefit of noncompliance plus 10% of the gravity-based penalty, or (b) 25% of the gravity-based penalty, whichever is greater. The gravity penalty reflects the environmental and regulatory harm caused by the violation(s).

[10] EPA’s SEPs policy is to be used in settlements only and is “not intended for use by the EPA, defendants, courts, or administrative law judges at a hearing or in trial.” Thus, the DOJ’s limitation that settlements must be executed before an admission or finding of liability does not apply to EPA’s SEPs policy.


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Disaster Response Environmental Justice Students

Equitable Disaster Relief: An Analysis of FEMA’s Legal Authority to Integrate Equity under the Stafford Act


The Biden administration has committed to addressing environmental and racial injustice across the whole of government, including in federal disaster mitigation and response programs. This commitment is long overdue. Low-income communities and communities of color are often the most exposed to disasters, and the least able to recover after disasters strike. Research also suggests that assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) exacerbates wealth inequality, especially along lines of race, homeownership, and education, even after accounting for the impacts of the disaster itself. As climate change makes these disasters more frequent and severe, FEMA has a crucial opportunity to ensure its programming does not exacerbate these inequities and that federal disaster assistance is distributed in an effective and equitable way.

On April 22, 2021, FEMA issued a request for information seeking public comments on how to reform the agency’s programs and regulations to advance equity and bolster resilience to climate change. Over 300 states, tribes, community groups, and organizations responded to the RFI recommending ways FEMA could make its programs more equitable. Within this large group however, few assessed whether FEMA has the legal authority to implement these reforms, and if so, what the scope of that authority is.

In this report, we argue that the Stafford Act’s nondiscrimination provision provides the statutory authority for FEMA to redesign its programs in an “equitable and impartial manner,” including reforming programs that currently disproportionately exclude low-income communities and communities of color. Furthermore, the act’s discretionary function exception gives FEMA extraordinary flexibility in deciding how to integrate equity considerations by shielding most FEMA rules, policies, and other decisions from judicial review.

Read the full report.


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Disaster Policy Environmental Justice Students

A New Approach to Disaster Relief Funding? The Disaster Recovery Reform Act’s Promise for Pre-Disaster Mitigation


Introduction

2020 was another historically costly year for natural disasters in the U.S. 22 events caused more than $1 billion each in losses, surpassing the previous annual record of 16 events in 2011 and 2017.[1] Forest fires on the west coast invited comparisons to “nuclear winter”[2] while a derecho in Iowa was the costliest “thunderstorm disaster in U.S. history.”[3] The human toll of these disasters has been tremendous—the Red Cross reports that “families in the U.S. have spent more nights in emergency lodging in 2020 than in any other year over the past decade.”[4] Indeed, Hurricane Laura forced thousands of Louisiana residents from their homes,[5] and many remained displaced for weeks after the storm.[6]

Climate change is likely to increase the frequency and cost of natural disasters in the U.S., underscoring the importance of a robust and proactive federal natural disaster response. Fortunately, legislation enacted in 2018 provides a pathway for tribes, states, territories, and localities to respond more proactively to dangerous storms, floods, and fires. The Disaster Recovery Reform Act (“DRRA”) provides a number of tools for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) and other federal and state actors to better respond to natural disasters. Importantly, the DRRA provides a dedicated funding stream for proactive disaster mitigation. This dedicated funding will allow FEMA to empower local communities to build resilient defenses before disasters strike, saving money and lives. Resilient infrastructure and disaster planning are particularly important in the context of sea level rise, where such damage is incremental but increasingly predictable.

Stafford Act

Federal disaster response is governed by the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”). Passed in 1988, the Stafford Act is by nature reactionary and, as recent years have illustrated, dependent on the discretion of the President.[7] The Act defines a “major disaster” as “any natural catastrophe” deemed by the President to “warrant major disaster assistance . . . to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations.”[8] Thus, by the Act’s design, the federal government is meant to support, not lead, disaster response efforts, and FEMA (among other agencies, including the Small Business Administration and the Department of Housing and Urban Development) is responsible for coordinating the federal response. Only once a state, territorial, or tribal government has formally petitioned the federal government for assistance can the President make a major disaster declaration.[9] After a major disaster has been declared, the federal government can provide funding for states, localities, and individuals, as well as for future hazard mitigation.[10]

Importantly for sea level rise, the Stafford Act’s definition of “major disaster” only includes sudden-onset events, with the exception of drought.[11] Incremental, but still destructive, processes such as sea level rise are not included in the enumerated list of natural disasters, except where they generate sudden events such as flooding. The Stafford Act has thus historically been unhelpful in assisting communities to adapt to sea level rise even though rising seas, and their associated damage, are largely predictable. Fortunately, changes to the Stafford Act, as discussed below, provide a potent tool that FEMA can use to address sea level rise.

Funding issues have also historically impaired federal disaster response and mitigation efforts. The Stafford Act’s Pre-Disaster Hazard Mitigation (“PDM”) Program authorized the President to disperse funds to state and local authorities “to assist in the implementation of predisaster hazard mitigation measures that are cost-effective and are designed to reduce injuries, loss of life, and damage and destruction of property.”[12] These funds, however, were appropriated on an ad hoc basis into a pre-disaster mitigation fund,[13] and have been “unpredictable, and historically much smaller than post-disaster allocations.”[14] From 2013 to 2015, for example, the PDM Program received only $25 million annually in appropriated funds.[15] In 2016, the PDM budget rose to $100 million.[16]

Such an ad hoc approach to disaster mitigation funding makes little sense given that such funds are estimated to “save $6 per $1 spent.”[17] Post-disaster funding, in contrast to pre-disaster mitigation, fails to save lives and mitigate economic damage. Resource allocation in the aftermath of a disaster is often rushed due to pressing need and a desire “to restore normalcy.”[18] These pressures lead communities to rebuild over and over without addressing underlying vulnerabilities, or engaging in meaningful consultation with community members and organizations. Focus on pre-disaster mitigation, by contrast, can be done more deliberately, leveraging research and community input along the way.

DRRA

The 2018 DRRA made several substantive changes to the Stafford Act. First, the DRRA amended the Stafford Act to provide a larger and more reliable funding stream for pre-disaster mitigation.[19] After any major disaster, the President can now “set aside . . . an amount equal to 6 percent” of the total aid awarded the previous year under traditional federal disaster programs from the Disaster Relief Fund (“DRF”)[20] for pre-disaster mitigation efforts.[21] This should amount to an average of $300–$500 million annually, according to FEMA estimates[22]—a dramatic expansion of FEMA’s pre-disaster mitigation funds, though far less than the $65.6 billion that FEMA received in supplemental post-disaster appropriations for 2017.[23] This new National Public Infrastructure Predisaster Mitigation Fund (“NPIPDM”) will be available in all states “that have received a major disaster declaration in the previous 7 years, or to any Indian tribal government located partially or entirely within the boundaries of such States.”[24] This dedicated funding stream removes “the uncertainty associated with the annual appropriations process that funded the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant program.”[25]

Second, the DRRA adjusted the language of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (“HMGP”) to permit the federal government to “contribute up to 75% of the cost of hazard mitigation measures which the President has determined are cost effective and which substantially reduce the risk of, or increase resilience to, future damage . . . in any area affected by a major disaster.”[26] The Stafford Act had previously authorized HMGP funding to reduce the risk of future hardship, but included no language permitting the inclusion of resilience into the post-hazard cleanup process.[27] The HMGP is distinct from the PDM/NPIPDM program, as funds for HMGP mitigation efforts are distributed only after a specific major disaster has occurred.[28] Thus, in contrast to PDM/NPIPDM funding, the HMGP perpetuates FEMA’s emphasis on post-disaster response. Still, the new language permitting HMGP grant recipients to consider increasing resilience in the aftermath of a disaster may lead to more proactive reconstruction efforts. The HMGP’s 75 percent cost share is also critical, as most states, tribes, or localities do not otherwise have the funds to prioritize mitigation projects.[29]

The DRRA also provides states, tribes, territories, and localities with new authority to rebuild buildings according to the latest building codes so that they are more resilient to future natural disasters. The Act provides funding for “extra hires to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of adopted building codes”[30] and sets up an expert panel to develop better procedures for cost estimates of repairs.[31] It also permits FEMA to incentivize “the adoption and enforcement of the latest published editions of relevant consensus-based codes,” and to set baseline acceptable building standards “for the design, construction, and maintenance of residential structures . . . eligible for assistance under this Act.”[32] Furthermore, FEMA is permitted to condition cost estimates for these homes upon a forthcoming definition of the term “resilient.”[33] Before the DRRA, FEMA only required that estimates for new home construction meet “codes, specifications, and standards . . . applicable at the time at which the disaster occurred.”[34] These changes should help make the rebuilding process after a disaster more cost-effective—a recent FEMA study found that updating building codes to harden structures from storms would lead to annual cost savings of more than $1.6 billion.[35]

The DRRA’s addition of language authorizing funding for projects that increase resilience is important, as it may allow states, tribes, and territories to fund natural infrastructure projects or other measures that can improve environmental health while decreasing the risk of future natural disasters. The DRRA does not define resiliency, but the law requires FEMA to develop such a definition and FEMA may choose to reuse that definition across multiple sections of the statute.[36] For example, one of the enumerated criteria for determining whether to provide NPIPDM funding is “the extent to which the assistance will fund activities that increase the level of resiliency.”[37] While FEMA has not yet developed a definition of resiliency, there are signs that it is viewing the concept holistically. FEMA recently released its National Risk Index, a geospatial mapping tool, to help HMGP and pre-disaster mitigation applicants “prioritize resilience efforts by providing an at-a-glance overview of multiple natural hazard risk factors.”[38] The National Risk Index determines a community’s risk by weighing the expected damage caused by natural disasters against a community’s “social vulnerability” and “community resilience.”[39] Considering factors such as inequality and socioeconomic differences as part of resilience represents a sea change for FEMA,[40] and holds promise for a more inclusive approach to disaster preparedness and response.

BRIC

In response to changes in the DRRA, FEMA launched the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (“BRIC”) Program, replacing the previous PDM grant program.[41] The BRIC Program will provide funds to states, territories, localities, and tribal governments for pre-disaster mitigation projects.[42] These funds will be distributed according to six “guiding principles”—“[1] supporting communities through capability- and capacity-building; [2] encouraging and enabling innovation; [3] promoting partnerships; [4] enabling large projects; [5] maintaining flexibility; and [6] providing consistency.”[43] Funding for the BRIC program will be provided through the NPIPDM, and FEMA “will provide a federal cost share of up to 75% for most funded projects, and to up to 90% per project for small impoverished communities.”[44]

In its 2020 Notice of Funding Opportunity for the initial BRIC disbursement, FEMA announced up to $500 million in available funding for BRIC applicants with “mitigation projects” and “Capability- and Capacity-Building” programs, as well as “non-financial Direct Technical Assistance.”[45] To be eligible for an award, applicants need to demonstrate that their projects generate at least as many benefits as costs.[46] Such cost-benefit analyses can also incorporate “ecosystem service benefits.”[47] Thus, eligible applicants can use funds on mitigation projects that strengthen natural or “green” infrastructure and count those environmental gains in their cost-benefit analysis.

All states, territories and tribal governments are eligible to apply for this first round of disbursements.[48] Applicants seeking funds for mitigation projects will need to demonstrate that their projects are “cost-effective,” “increase resilience,” and “reduce risk” to life and property.[49] The focus on cost-efficacy and resilience, as opposed to merely property, will provide communities that receive funding with flexibility to tackle the varied problems posed by climate change. This flexible and forward-looking approach to risk has the added benefit of providing disaster-funding for communities to mitigate and prepare for sea level rise, which otherwise would not be covered by traditional disaster response under the Stafford Act. FEMA specifically notes that applicants need to incorporate sea level rise where appropriate into their project proposals.[50] Thus communities can prepare for slow-moving disasters such as sea level rise in order to make sure that their communities are more resilient.

Though FEMA has not yet issued awards for the 2020 funding cycle, FEMA has highlighted mitigation projects that reflect the DRRA’s guiding principles.[51] These include Massachusetts’ 2018 State Hazard Mitigation and Climate Adaptation Plan, the Newtok Village relocation in Alaska, and wetlands restoration in Galveston, Texas.[52] Though FEMA also included several traditional grey infrastructure projects in this list, these three examples highlight FEMA’s new emphasis on natural infrastructure and managed retreat. Such prioritization is critical in the context of sea level rise, as traditional gray infrastructure approaches are often inadequate and overly-expensive ways to build “climate resiliency.”[53] Green infrastructure projects highlight the potential for FEMA to undertake smart, natural infrastructure-oriented pre-disaster mitigation.

Future BRIC funding could be even more ambitious. The Biden administration has reportedly been considering whether to incorporate FEMA’s COVID-related spending into FEMA’s DRF and BRIC calculations.[54] Such an approach could provide FEMA with up to $3.7 billion for BRIC projects, a massive increase in funding available for pre-disaster mitigation. This would also be consistent with the administration’s goal to “move quickly to build resilience . . . against the impacts of climate change that are already manifest and will continue to intensify.”[55]

Conclusion

The DRRA and the BRIC program will allow tribes, states, territories, and localities to prepare for increasingly dangerous and costly natural disasters, including sea level rise. With a dedicated funding stream, FEMA can help communities develop robust pre-disaster mitigation projects, while the DRRA’s language on building codes, inspections, and resilience will allow FEMA to assist communities to build back smarter. Such efforts will help avoid “decisions to rebuild in place, often made seemingly in defiance of climate change, [which] have at times left structures just as defenseless against the next storm.”[56]

[1] Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).

[2] Thoms Fuller, Wildfires Blot Out Sun in the Bay Area, N.Y. Times (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/pictures-photos-california-fires.html.

[3] Bob Henson, Iowa derecho in August was most costly thunderstorm disaster in U.S. history, Washington Post (Oct. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/10/17/iowa-derecho-damage-cost/.

[4] 2020: Need for disaster lodging surges amid COVID-19, American Red Cross (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.redcross.org/about-us/news-and-events/press-release/2020/2020-need-for-disaster-lodging-surges-amid-covid-19.html.

[5] Greg Hilburn, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards: ‘Tens of thousands’ remain displaced by Hurricane Laura, Monroe News-Star (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.thenewsstar.com/story/news/2020/09/02/hurricane-laura-aftermath-tens-thousands-louisiana-remain-displaced/5690958002/.

[6] See Emma Newburger, ‘I lost everything’: In hurricane-ravaged Louisiana, people struggle to rebuild, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/31/in-hurricane-ravaged-louisiana-people-struggle-to-rebuild-.html.

[7] Scott Wilson and Tim Elfrink, Trump administration rejects, then approves, emergency aid for California fires, including biggest blaze in state history, Washington Post (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/16/trump-rejects-california-disaster-wildfires/.

[8] 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2).

[9] 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a).

[10] See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5170a; 42 U.S.C. § 5170c; 42 U.S.C. § 5174.

[11] See 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2).

[12] Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5133(b) (1988) (amended 2018),  https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title42/pdf/USCODE-2011-title42-chap68-subchapII-sec5133.pdf.

[13] See Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5133(i) (1988) (amended 2018),  https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title42/pdf/USCODE-2011-title42-chap68-subchapII-sec5133.pdf.

[14] Hanah Perls, U.S. Disaster Displacement in the Era of Climate Change: Discrimination & Consultation Under the Stafford Act, 44 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 512, 533 (2020), https://harvardelr.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2020/08/44.2-Perls.pdf.

[15] See Federal Emergency Management Authority, National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund: Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress 4 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FEMA%20-%20National%20Pre-Disaster%20Mitigation%20Fund.pdf.

[16] Id.

[17] Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: 2019 Report 1 (2019), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nibs.org/resource/resmgr/reports/mitigation_saves_2019/mitigationsaves2019report.pdf.

[18] Kevin Sack and John Schwartz, As Storms Keep Coming, FEMA Spends Billions in ‘Cycle’ of Damage and Repair, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/fema-disaster-recovery-climate-change.html.

[19] See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5133.

[20] The Disaster Relief Fund is “the primary source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs.” William L. Painter, Cong. Research Serv., R45484, The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues 1 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45484.pdf.

[21] 42 U.S.C. § 5133(i)(1).

[22] Diane P. Horn, Congr. Research Serv., IN11187, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Assistance 3 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN11187.pdf.

[23] William L. Painter, Cong. Research Serv., R45084, 2017 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: Overview 11 (2018) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45084.pdf.

[24] 42 U.S.C. § 5133(g). In practice, every state and territory should be eligible to receive NPIPDM funding as each of them has been subject to a major disaster declaration in the past seven years. See, e.g., Disaster Declarations for States and Counties, Federal Emergency Management Agency https://www.fema.gov/data-visualization/disaster-declarations-states-and-counties (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).

[25] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) ES-1 (2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/fema_bric-summary-of-stakeholder-feedback-report.pdf.

[26] 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).

[27] Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (1988) (amended 2018).

[28] 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).

[29] See, e.g., Naomi Klouda, Federal fund injection boosts effort to relocate Newtok, Alaska Journal of Commerce (May 23, 2018), https://www.alaskajournal.com/2018-05-23/federal-fund-injection-boosts-effort-relocate-newtok.

[30] 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a)(2)(D).

[31] 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e)(3).

[32] 42 U.S.C. § 5172(b)(3)(A)(iii).

[33] 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e)(1)(A)(iii).

[34] See Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e)(a)(A)(ii) (1988) (amended 2018).

[35] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Building Codes Save: A Nationwide Study ES-6 (2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/fema_building-codes-save_study.pdf.

[36] 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e)(5).

[37] 42 U.S.C. § 5133(g)(11).

[38] National Risk Index Overview, Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://www.fema.gov/flood-maps/products-tools/national-risk-index/overview (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).

[39] The National Risk Index, Federal Emergency Management Agency,   https://hazards.geoplatform.gov/portal/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=ddf915a24fb24dc8863eed96bc3345f8 (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).

[40] Thomas Frank, Riskiest Spot for Rising Seas Is 50 Miles from the Ocean, Scientific American (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/riskiest-spot-for-rising-seas-is-50-miles-from-the-ocean/

[41] Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities, Federal Emergency Management Agency https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-infrastructure-communities (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) ES-1 (2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/fema_bric-summary-of-stakeholder-feedback-report.pdf. Small impoverished communities are defined as communities of 3,000 or fewer individuals that are “economically disadvantaged, as determined by the State in which the community is located and based on criteria established by the President.” 42 U.S.C. § 5133(a).

[45] Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2020 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities 2, 4, DHS-20-MT-047-00-99 (Aug., 2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_fy20-bric-notice-of-funding-opportunity_federal-register_August-2020.pdf.

[46] “As a metric and eligibility criterion, all mitigation projects must have a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 1.0 or greater.” Department of Homeland Security, supra note 45, at 3.

[47] See Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Policy FP-108-024-02, Ecosystem Service Benefits in Benefit-Cost Analysis for FEMA’s Mitigation Programs Policy 2 (2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/fema_ecosystem-service-benefits_policy_september-2020.pdf.

[48] Department of Homeland Security, supra note 45, at 6.

[49] Id. at 7-8. FEMA further defines these terms to mean that a project must “[c]ontribute[], to the extent practicable, to a long-term solution to the problem it is intended to address” and “[a]ccount[] for long-term changes to the areas and entities it protects and has manageable future maintenance and modification requirements.” Id. at 8.

[50] Id. at 8.

[51] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hazard Mitigation Assistance Mitigation Action Portfolio 5 (2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_mitigation-action-portfolio-support-document_08-01-2020_0.pdf.

[52] See generally Federal Emergency Management Agency, supra note 51.

[53] See Greg Browder et al., Integrating Green and Gray: Creating Next Generation Infrastructure 4-6 (2019) https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31430.

[54] Christopher Flavelle, New U.S. Strategy Would Quickly Free Billions in Climate Funds, N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/climate/fema-climate-spending-biden.html.

[55] Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, The White House (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/executive-order-on-tackling-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad/.

[56] Sack and Schwartz, supra note 18.


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Environmental Justice Federal Policy Analysis

EPA Undermines its Own Environmental Justice Programs


For more on environmental justice initiatives under the Biden administration, visit EELP’s Federal Environmental Justice Tracker.

Environmental injustice is the persistent inequitable distribution of pollution and other environmental burdens on low-income communities and communities of color. Twenty years after the United Church of Christ published its landmark report Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States in 1987, a follow-up study led by Dr. Robert Bullard showed communities of color continued to bear the brunt of environmental pollution in the US.[1] In 2017, a joint study by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Clean Air Task Force, and the National Medical Association showed that African Americans are exposed to 38% more polluted air than white Americans, and are 75% more likely to live in fence-line communities, i.e. communities affected by noise, odor, traffic, and chemical emissions from an adjacent company, industrial, or service facility.

There is no federal law governing environmental justice (EJ). This means that agencies, including EPA, have no authority to mandate actions or remedies addressing EJ concerns independent of their authorities under other statutes.[2] Executive Order 12898, signed by President Clinton in 1994, requires all agencies to “make achieving environmental justice part of [their] mission.” However, the order is not judicially enforceable.

EPA’s EJ efforts to date have been insufficient to address the scale and severity of environmental injustice in the US. According to Dr. Clarice Gaylord, the first director of the Office of Environmental Justice (then the Office of Environmental Equity), this minimal progress can be attributed to the office’s lack of authority to monitor and enforce Executive Order 12898. Marianne Engelman Lado, Director of the Environmental Justice Clinic at Vermont Law School, confirms that “any meaningful effort to address race discrimination in the environmental sector” will require EPA “to spend political capital. . . or for leadership outside of the agency to assume responsibility for civil rights enforcement in the context of environmental justice.”[3]

EPA defines EJ as both “the fair treatment” and “meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income” in the “development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.” EPA relies on various offices, committees, and interagency working groups to address EJ concerns, especially the Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ) and the Office of General Counsel’s External Civil Rights Compliance Office (ECRCO), both discussed in greater detail below.

Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ)

EPA’s Office of Environmental Justice, established in 1993, coordinates EPA’s internal implementation of Executive Order 12898, develops agency and interagency EJ plans, and administers a small grant program. However, the office has no authority to enforce its own guidance.

Under President Obama, the Office of Environmental Justice made significant progress in developing tools like EJSCREEN and technical guidance documents to help states and federal agencies assess EJ concerns in a consistent way. Much of that progress has now been undercut by the Trump Administration’s broader deregulatory agenda and disinvestment in EPA, including the Office of Environmental Justice and its grant programs.[4] The success of Obama-era programs like the EJ 2020 Action Agenda now hinge on EPA staff and continued congressional funding, often in spite of President Trump’s proposed cuts to, or even wholesale elimination of, EPA’s EJ program.

External Civil Rights Compliance Office (ECRCO)

ECRCO is responsible for ensuring that recipients of EPA funding comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.[5] This mandate is crucial because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, which limits private rights of action under Title VI to claims addressing intentional discrimination only.[6] The Supreme Court did not, however, impose the same restrictions on agencies implementing Title VI.[7] For example, EPA’s regulations implementing Title VI, issued in 1973 and revised in 1984, prohibit recipients of EPA financial assistance from “taking actions in their programs or activities that are intentionally discriminatory and/or have a discriminatory effect,” even if those policies are neutral on their face.[8] As a result, EJ communities are dependent on EPA enforcing its own Title VI regulations to address environmental injustice. For example, people of color disparately impacted by a state approving the siting of a polluting facility in an already overburdened neighborhood do not have the right to sue under Title VI, unless they can prove that the state intentionally discriminated. However, those same people can file a complaint with ECRCO alleging that the state, in permitting that facility, created adverse and disproportionate effects on the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of Title VI.[9]

EPA regulations grant ECRCO the authority to conduct compliance reviews of any recipient of EPA assistance, including data requests and “on-site reviews when it has reason to believe that discrimination may be occurring.”[10] EPA may also delay or deny financial assistance to grant recipients based on a pre-award compliance review.[11] However, a 2016 report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that “EPA does not take action when faced with environmental justice concerns until forced to do so. When they do act, they make easy choices and outsource any environmental justice responsibilities onto others.” Four years later, a report from EPA’s Office of Inspector General found that ECRCO does not proactively conduct compliance reviews, but rather waits to receive a complaint before collecting program data from EPA funding recipients. This practice places the burden on EJ communities to investigate, document, and enforce EPA’s Title VI mandate.

ECRCO has been consistently criticized under both the Obama and Trump administrations for failing to enforce its Title VI mandate. Since 1996, ECRCO has investigated fewer than one quarter of the Title VI complaints it has received. To address persistent backlogs and delays, the Obama EPA released a 2015–2020 ECRCO Strategic Plan, a Title VI case resolution manual, and a Title VI compliance toolkit for federal funding recipients. Under Obama, ECRCO also made its first and only formal finding of discrimination, resolving a complaint from 1992 against the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ). However, EPA did not withhold funding from MDEQ after making this finding. Under President Trump, ECRCO has resolved the office’s 61-case backlog and accepted 16 of 57 submitted complaints for investigation, but made no findings of discrimination.

For a closer look at Title VI enforcement by EPA, see Marianne Engelman Lado, No More Excuses: Building a New Vision of Civil Rights Enforcement in the Context of Environmental Justice, 22 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 281 (2019).

In the timeline below, I list EJ-related efforts at EPA, focusing on the Office of Environmental Justice and ECRCO. To learn more about the history of the Environmental Justice Movement, please see suggested resources at the bottom of the page.

Timeline of Environmental Justice Efforts at EPA

June 1, 1983 The General Accounting Office (GAO) releases a study showing three out of four hazardous waste landfills in EPA’s Region IV (Southeast) are located in communities with majority Black populations, and 26% of the population in all four communities have incomes below the poverty level.

June 1987 The United Church of Christ (UCC) Commission on Racial Justice releases Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, a first-of-its-kind report finding over 15 million African Americans, 8 million Hispanics/Latinos, and half of all Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans live in communities with at least one abandoned or uncontrolled toxic waste site.

Early 1990 The Congressional Black Caucus meets with EPA officials to raise concerns that the agency’s inconsistent enforcement and inspections fail to address the enhanced environmental risk in minority and low-income communities.

July 1990 EPA creates the Environmental Equity Workgroup to assess the disproportionate environmental burdens on racial minorities and low-income communities.

May 29, 1992 The workgroup releases its report Reducing Risk For All Communities, finding health disparities “among ethnic groups” due to “different activity patterns, cultural behaviors, diets, and physiological differences,” and recommending further study. Dr. Robert Bullard, then Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Riverside, submits comments concluding EPA “has failed to grasp the interrelationship between race, class, and environmental decision making.”

1992 EPA establishes the Office of Environmental Equity, led by Dr. Clarice Gaylord, as part of the office of human resources.

Sep. 30, 1993 EPA, under Dr. Gaylord’s leadership, establishes the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) to advise the EPA Administrator on integrating environmental justice into EPA programs.

Feb. 11, 1994 President Clinton signs Executive Order 12898, requiring every federal agency to “make achieving environmental justice part of its mission.” The order also establishes the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Environmental Justice, chaired by EPA.

Aug. 11, 2000 President Bush signs Executive Order 13166, requiring every federal agency to “examine the services it provides and develop and implement a system by which [limited English proficiency] persons can meaningfully access those services.” The same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issues policy guidance on implementing the order.

Dec. 2004 NEJAC submits its report Ensuring Risk Reduction in Communities with Multiple Stressors: Environmental Justice and Cumulative Risks/Impacts to EPA.

Obama Era

2009 EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson appoints Lisa Garcia as Senior Advisor to the Administrator for Environmental Justice and Patrick Sungwook Chang as Senior Counsel for External Civil Rights.

Dec. 2010 President Obama hosts the first White House Forum on Environmental Justice, including Cabinet secretaries, senior officials, and more than 100 environmental justice leaders.

Apr. 22, 2011 The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) makes a preliminary finding of a prima facie Title VI violation. The complaint, Angelita C., et al. v. California Department of Pesticide Regulations (CDPR), originally filed in 1999, alleged that that the California Department of Pesticide Regulations (CPDR) discriminated on the basis of race by permitting greater use of methyl bromide and other toxic fumigants near schools with Latino schoolchildren as compared to schools with fewer Latino schoolchildren. Environmental justice advocates criticize EPA for the 12-year delay, for failing to contact the complainants before reaching a settlement agreement with CDPR, and for reaching a settlement that failed to address other toxic fumigants affecting complainants and their communities. Garcia v. McCarthy, No. 3:13-cv-03939 (9th Cir. 2016).

Aug. 4, 2011 Seventeen cabinet members and White House offices sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Justice, establishing the IWG’s charter, expanding its membership, and recommitting agencies to Executive Order 12898.

Sep. 2011 EPA releases its roadmap for environmental justice programming, called Plan EJ 2014, to provide guidance on integrating environmental justice into all EPA programs, including rulemaking, permitting and enforcement.

2013 EPA issues Order 4700, designating deputy civil rights officials (DCROs) in all its program and regional offices.

2015 EPA releases its Environmental Justice Mapping and Screening Tool (EJSCREEN), a public online mapping tool to identify communities that bear a disproportionate pollution burden.

May 2015 EPA issues its final Guidance on Considering Environmental Justice During the Development of Regulatory Actions.

July 15, 2015 Community organizations sue EPA for unreasonably delaying and unlawfully withholding agency action on five Title VI complaints for more than a decade. The Title VI complaints alleged that states receiving EPA funding discriminated against low-income communities of color already impacted by pollution by granting additional permits to polluting facilities. Californians for Renewable Energy et al v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-03292 (N.D. Cal.).

June 2016 EPA releases its EJ 2020 Action Agenda for advancing environmental justice for 2016–2020.

June 2016 EPA releases its Technical Guidance for Assessing Environmental Justice in Regulatory Analysis, outlining procedures for assessing environmental justice concerns associated with various agency actions.

Sep. 30, 2016 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights finds “EPA continues to struggle to provide procedural and substantive relief to communities of color impacted by pollution.” Furthermore, “EPA does not take action when faced with environmental justice concerns until forced to do so. When they do act, they make easy choices and outsource any environmental justice responsibilities onto others.”

Dec. 2016 EPA’s External Civil Rights Compliance Office (ECRCO), in the Office of General Counsel (OGC), assumes management of the agency’s Title VI program from the Office of the Administrator, with 61 backlogged cases.

Jan. 2017 ECRCO releases its 2015–2020 Strategic Plan to improve case management and the effective processing of Title VI complaints.

Jan. 2017 EPA releases its Case Resolution Manual (CRM) to facilitate the uniform investigation and resolution of Title VI complaints.

Jan. 12, 2017 ECRCO sends a letter to the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NC DEQ) expressing “deep concern” that the state’s regulation of large-scale hog farms discriminates against African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans in neighboring communities. The letter responds in part to Earthjustice’s Title VI complaint filed on behalf of community groups on Sep. 3, 2014 alleging NC DEQ discriminated on the basis of race and national origin.

Jan. 18, 2017 ECRCO issues Chapter 1 of its “Compliance Toolkit” reviewing the legal standards relevant to claims of adverse disparate impact.

Jan. 19, 2017 On the last full day of the Obama Administration, EPA issues its first and only formal finding of discrimination, finding that the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) engaged in “discriminatory treatment of African Americans . . . in the public participation process” related to the permitting of the Genesee Power Station in a primarily low-income, African American neighborhood. EPA does not, however, initiate a process to withhold federal funds from MDEQ. The St. Francis Prayer Center of Flint submitted their original complaint in 1992.

Trump Era

March 8, 2017 Mustafa Santiago Ali, Assistant Associate Administrator for Environmental Justice, resigns after 24 years at EPA.

May 23, 2017 Trump proposes eliminating the Environmental Justice Office’s $6.7 million annual budget for FY 2018. This proposal reverses President Obama’s proposed increase to $15.3 million for FY 2017.

Sep. 7, 2017 Trump officials move the Environmental Justice Office out of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance to the Office of Policy. Administration officials say the move will “improve efficiency.” Critics fear the move will politicize the office. EPA also changes the name of the Office of Sustainable Communities to the Office of Community Revitalization.

March 30, 2018 The District Court for the Northern District of California holds in Californians for Renewable Energy v. EPA that EPA failed to comply with its mandatory duty to issue preliminary findings within 180 days on each of the five Title VI complaints. The court adds “EPA often takes years to act on a [Title VI] complaint – and even then, acts only after a lawsuit has been filed.” 4:15-cv-03292 (N.D. Cal.).

Sep. 4, 2020 President Trump orders agency heads to cease trainings on diversity and inclusion in a memo from the Office of Management and Budget, calling them “divisive, un-American propaganda.” EPA postpones a training series on race and diversity the following week.

Sep. 22, 2020 President Trump issues an executive order on “Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping,” limiting the scope of race and sex-based trainings within federal agencies.

Sep. 28, 2020 EPA’s Office of Inspector General releases a report finding ECRCO must conduct “more robust, systemic oversight” to ensure funding recipients are in compliance with Title VI. The IG finds ECRCO does not “proactively” conduct compliance reviews or collect information from recipients to identify noncompliant programs.

Suggested resources on the history of the Environmental Justice Movement:

  • Robert D. Bullard, Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (1993).
  • Luke W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement (2001).
  • Dorceta Taylor, Toxic Communities: Environmental Racism, Industrial Pollution, and Residential Mobility (2014).
  • Dina Gilio-Whitaker, As Long as Grass Grows: The Indigenous Fight for Environmental Justice, from Colonization to Standing Rock (2020).
  • Environmental Justice Timeline from EPA.

Sources

[1] The study found that in neighborhoods hosting a commercial hazardous waste facility, 56% of the population are people of color. By comparison, in neighborhoods without hazardous waste facilities, 30% of the population are people of color.

[2] There are multiple proposals for a federal environmental justice statute, including the EJ for All Act (S.4401; H.R.5986); the Climate Equity Act (S.4513; H.R.8019); the Public Health Air Quality Act of 2020 (S.4369; H.R.7822) expanding fenceline and ambient air monitoring; and the Environmental Justice Legacy Pollution Cleanup Act (S.4617; H.R.8271). In September 2020, the House passed the Clean Economy Jobs and Innovation Act (H.R.4447), incorporating provisions from the EJ for All Act and the Public Health Air Quality Act of 2020.

[3] Marianne Engelman Lado, No More Excuses: Building a New Vision of Civil Rights Enforcement in the Context of Environmental Justice, 22 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 281, 307 (2019).

[4] A 2019 report by the Union of Concerned Scientists found that the number of small grants awarded by the Office of Environmental Justice fell by 70% compared to the first two years of the Obama administration, and by 79% compared to the first two years of the Bush administration. Ctr. for Sci. & Democracy, Abandoned Science, Broken Promises: How the Trump Administration’s Neglect of Science is Leaving Marginalized Communities Further Behind (Oct. 2019).

[5] 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2018). The Supreme Court has expanded Title VI to also require recipients of federal funding to “take affirmative steps” to provide people with limited English proficiency (LEP) access to federally funded programs and activities. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).

[6] See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).

[7] See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 592–93 (1983); Alexander v. Sandoval, 469 U.S. at 292–94.

[8] According to the ECRCO Toolkit, released in Jan. 2017, to establish a prima facie case of adverse disparate impact, EPA must (1) identify the specific policy or practice at issue, (2) establish adversity/harm, (3) establish disparity, and (4) establish causation. The agency’s analysis focuses on “the consequences of the [funding] recipient’s policies or decisions, rather than the recipient’s intent.” EPA, U.S. EPA’s External Civil Rights Compliance Office Compliance Toolkit 8–9 (Jan. 18, 2017).

[9] For example, EPA regulations prohibit recipients of federal funding from using “criteria or methods” that have the “effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination,” 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), or choosing a “site or location of a facility that has the purpose or effect of excluding individuals from, denying them benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin.” Id. at 7.35(c).

[10] 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(a).

[11] 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b).


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