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Natural Resources Law

CleanLaw — Monumental Decisions  

Sara Dewey chats with Andy Mergen about presidential authority under the Antiquities Act and what Supreme Court actions might mean for the future of our monuments

With: Sara Dewey


EELP Senior Staff Attorney Sara Dewey speaks with Andy Mergen, faculty director of the Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School and former chief of the Appellate Section of the Environment & Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice. Andy and Sara discuss the origin and evolution of presidential authority to designate national monuments under the Antiquities Act, how Congress and the courts have responded to these designations over the act’s 118-year history, present day legal challenges to the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments, and what could be ahead for monuments in the Supreme Court.

Transcript

Intro:

Welcome to Clean Law from the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard Law School. In this episode, EELP senior staff attorney Sara Dewey speaks with Andy Mergen, faculty director of the Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School and former chief of the appellate section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice. Andy and Sara discussed the origin and evolution of presidential authority to designate national monuments under the Antiquities Act, how Congress and the courts have responded to these designations over the act’s 118 year history, present day legal challenges to the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments, and what could be ahead for monuments in the Supreme Court. We hope you enjoy this episode.

Sara Dewey:

Welcome to Clean Law. I’m Sara Dewey, an attorney with Harvard Law School’s Environmental and Energy Law Program, and I’m thrilled to speak today with Andy Mergen, faculty director of the Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School and former chief of the Environment and Natural Resources Division’s appellate section at the Department of Justice. Andy, thanks so much for speaking with me today.

Andy Mergen:

Good morning. I’m thrilled to be here.

Sara Dewey:

As we anticipate the September oral arguments for the Tenth Circuit challenge to Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante monuments in Utah. I think this is a great time to talk about how we got here, what to look for in oral argument and the key issues we’re following in this case and other public lands litigation. So I’d love to start with your experience working on public lands cases at the Department of Justice over your long career there. Can you talk a little bit about the Antiquities Act cases you worked on and how they shape your thinking about the challenges that we’re seeing to the act today?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, of course. So I spent 33 years at the Environment and Natural Resources Division and during that time from about 2000 on, I supervised the Public Lands Docket in the appellate section. So I was involved in the defense of the Clinton-era monuments that went to the DC Circuit during the Clinton administration. I worked on the Northeast Canyons Monument challenge more recently, and so I’ve been around the monuments issues a long time. There has been a lot of monuments litigation over the years. My colleague, Todd Kim, who is currently head of the environment and Natural Resources Division, worked on an early challenge to Grand Staircase in the Tenth Circuit. So these challenges have been around a long time.

Sara Dewey:

So before we get to the current cases, let’s talk about the statute itself. The act was passed in 1906 during the Roosevelt administration to protect, and now I’m quoting from the act, “Historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic and scientific interest.”

Andy Mergen:

Just to focus specifically on the text of the act briefly, the act says that the president is authorized in his discretion to declare by public proclamation, historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific interest. It’s this historic and scientific interest that has become very, very important in the history of the Antiquities Act. And furthermore, the act contains this phrase that is frequently a source of controversy that these objects that are protected by the monuments are intended to be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected. Now, when Congress enacted the Antiquities Act, there were two important broadenings of prior legislation. One, it expanded it to include the scientific interests, objects of scientific interests, and two, although it includes the language about smallest area compatible, it does not have a specific acreage determination. That was in earlier versions of the legislation. But at the end of the day, Congress really intended to invest a tremendous amount of discretion in the president in making a determination about the smallest area compatible with the protection of those objects.

Sara Dewey:

The origins of the act are an interesting story, so I’d love for you to share a bit of that history for our listeners.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, it’s a really interesting story and I won’t spend a lot of time on it, just to say that at various times it engaged a number of the leading public intellectuals is the time. It’s very much a statute that is a hallmark of progressive-era conservation statutes. It envisions a very robust executive, which was common at the time. Here I’m doing this podcast at Harvard Law School and just a block or two away, Frederick Ward Putman, who is a very influential American archeologist in the late-19th and early-20th century, played an important role in getting the Antiquities Act started. He worked with a famous American geologist of the period, Grove Karl Gilbert, one of the most innovative geologists at the time who had worked on the Wheeler Survey in the American West and had gotten to know the richness of American antiquities.

And from that early effort, an archeologist named Edgar Lee Hewett became involved in the efforts and they engaged with a prominent Iowa Republican congressman named John Lacey, a powering figure in terms of American conservation who took it upon himself to really pull the Antiquities Act across the finish line. Now, I think when we look at the Antiquities Act through our modern eyes, we see this as investing a lot of power in the president. And I think we’ll come back to that as we talk about the act and the challenges to the act because the president alone declares these national monuments. But at the time, the ability of the president to reserve or withdraw land was not at all controversial. In fact, it was very consistent with the practice of presidents sort of pulling and setting aside land. So there would’ve been nothing sort of unusual about the power invested in the president by this act, judging by the standards of 1906.

And also the act evolved and we’ll talk about that in a little bit. So it started off with these American archeologists and folks concerned about American antiquities seeking to prevent those artifacts from being looted. These folks were very inspired by European efforts to preserve antiquities like Stonehenge, or whatever. But it evolved into something broader. As you noted, the language covers not just historic and prehistoric structures, but also objects of historic or scientific interest, and that was very deliberate. The act went through some narrower versions just tailored to antiquities and was broadened out to include these objects of scientific interests as well.

Sara Dewey:

Starting with President Roosevelt, over time, presidents from both political parties have used the act to designate, I think 163 monuments, including some vast marine areas in more recent administrations. And about half of the national parks, including some of the most beloved, the Tetons, the Olympics, Acadia, Grand Canyon started as monuments. So can you talk a little bit more about how presidents have interpreted and acted on this authority over time, starting with that kind of grounding in the legislation itself?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, so early on, some of the earliest monuments, as you notice, the Devil’s Tower, Grand Canyon, Mount Olympus, which turns into Olympic National Park. So those are some of the early ones, and almost every president, not every president, has engaged in the creation of monuments over time. Those early efforts preserved some of the crown jewels, as you note of our park system parks that everyone has visited or everyone aspires to visit because of their beauty and grandeur. And later on, presidents took this on as something cool that they could do. We talk about sort of limiting principles behind the act, and it’s important to flesh out one right at the start, which is that the president can only declare a national monument of lands that are already in federal possession or federal ownership. So that’s very much a limiting principle. And so when the president declares these lands that the federal government already manages to be a national monument, he’s elevating them.

And as you note, one of the biggest monuments was created by George W. Bush, the Northeastern Hawaiian Islands, Papahānaumokuākea National Monument. That’s a huge area because it encompasses not just Laysan Island and Midway, but all of the ocean around it. And presidents have understood this to be a good way to firm up their sort of conservation bona fides, President Obama focused on some monument designations that sort of elevated key moments in American history, some Reconstruction-era monuments, the Stonewall Monument in New York. So presidents have used this power and understood this power to advance their bona fides as conservation presidents, to direct Americans to key elements of American history. But it’s also true that monument designation has often been controversial. So we mentioned Grand Teton and the designation of Grand Teton was controversial at the time. I think most people value Grand Teton as a national park today, but it was very controversial at the time, and Congress immediately followed that monument with legislation that prohibits the president from designating a monument in Wyoming.

So when Congress doesn’t like what the president does here, they can respond. President Carter used his power under the Antiquities Act to sort of force Congress into addressing some key issues related to the state of Alaska and the management of lands in Alaska. And that was very controversial at the time, but it did prompt an amazing conservation bill, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, which preserved some of those monuments designated by President Carter and also advanced a resolution of some longstanding issues in Alaska. And that was controversial at the time, for sure. So all monuments are not accepted by all elements of American society, but by and large presidents have understood that this is a very cool power to exercise. And I would say probably most Americans don’t have too many gripes about the exercise of this power.

 

Sara Dewey:

And can you say a little bit more about why you think it’s important for the president to have this authority distinct from the congressional role in managing public lands? I mean, given this back and forth over history that we’ve seen, I think they’re in dialogue with each other, but why do you see that this kind of specific authorization is so important?

Andy Mergen:

We talk about we have three branches of government and two of those branches are political, democratic, responsive to an electorate. And when the president sets aside lands as national monuments, people have elected the president, they have an idea about what his or her agenda might be. And in that way, I think it’s a really interesting conservation tool because it very expressly ties a conservation decision to this powerful figure in our constitution. And at the time, as I said, I think what we sometimes get lost about the debates about the Antiquities Act, at the time these presidential reserves and withdrawals was a pretty common tool. It’s fallen out of use except for the Antiquities Act, which Congress has not changed since its inception over 100 years ago, has limited in the case of Wyoming monuments and has responded to presidential action in the case of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.

But by and large, I think most Americans are satisfied. And the thing about these lands, they have to be federal lands in the first instance, is that they belong to all of us. That all Americans can claim an interest in the Grand Canyon, in Devil’s Tower. And these battles about monuments that we’re going to turn to like the Utah monuments are hyperlocal focused, they’re teed into local objections. But these lands, they belong to all Americans and I think the president exercising this power is a potent reminder of that fact.

Sara Dewey:

So before we turn to present day, we’ll talk about how the Court has handled monuments controversies in the past. So there are two cases in which the act has made to the Supreme Court. The first is Cameron v. United States in 1920, which was about a mining claim on the rim of the Grand Canyon and the holder of that claim trying to charge tourists crossing over that piece of land, and then Cappaert versus United States from 1976 about water for a rare pupfish in Devil’s Hole in Nevada. And in both cases, the Court upheld the president’s Antiquities Act authority and really helped establish the bounds of that authority. So could you talk a little bit about those cases?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, and actually I would include a third case here as well, but let’s start with the Cameron case. This is the Grand Canyon case, and it does have a colorful history of a person trying to monetize their interests in the canyon. And one of the issues in the litigation there before the Supreme Court was whether the canyon itself was an object. So this has been a constant theme in challenges under the Antiquities Act, and the Court had no problem upholding the Grand Canyon designation that the canyon itself, this incredibly magnificent geologic feature was a legitimate scientific object for purposes of the act. Cappaert, it’s a really important case. I don’t think it gets the attention it deserves because it’s an important Endangered Species Act case. It’s an important water rights case, and it’s an important monuments case and at issue there was pumping that would have put in peril the Devil’s Hole pupfish, this object of scientific interest in the Death Valley National Monument, and the Court upheld the restrictions on pumping to preserve the fish.

I encourage everyone to go check this place out. It doesn’t stand out quite like Devil’s Tower or the Grand Canyon. It’s a water feature in Nevada. Most of Death Valley National Park now is in California, but this piece is in Nevada where the Devil’s Hole is, and it’s an incredibly important hydrologic feature. The groundwater there is incredibly deep. The water is very warm. When there are earthquakes in Tokyo, they can record it at Devil’s Hole. It’s an area that teaches us a lot about earth science. It’s also an area of considerable endemism, not just for fish species, although there are several species of pupfish there. So an incredibly interesting area. When the Court upholds and protects that monument in the face of the fish can’t be a scientific object, this goes too far, it infringes on water rights, it’s a really profound decision. And the brief was filed by Bork who was solicitor general at the time.

The case was argued by Ray Randolph, who’s a fairly conservative judge on the DC Circuit, and their brief is a full-throated defense of the Antiquities Act, of the Endangered Species Act of all of these great values. And the third case I just mentioned very briefly is the US v. Alaska, an original action before the Supreme Court in 2005 involving sort of the boundaries of Glacier Bay National Park, which was set aside as a national monument. A couple of things that are important there, which is that the Court recognizes that Glacier Bay is a legitimate monument. It has whales, it has wildlife, it has these geologic features. And the state of Alaska in this case was represented by John Roberts who represented Alaska in litigation for many years. And I think that in part explains Chief Justice Roberts’ particular interest and knowledge of the Antiquities Act.

Sara Dewey:

We’re now in a moment of strong legal opposition to the Antiquities Act from some parts of the right. And since Chief Justice Roberts wrote in the denial of a cert petition about the boundlessness of the act, advocates have been looking for a case to bring to narrow this presidential authority. You talked a little bit about the fact that this is federal land is one of the limiting principles. Are there other ways you’d describe the bounds of presidential authority under the Antiquities Act and how Chief Justice Roberts might be thinking about that?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, just a word about this particular controversy, President Obama declared the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument, an area here off of the East coast. It’s a pretty remote area. It has this interesting bathymetry, it has these canyons and seamounts that’s important for wildlife. As we know, underwater features can concentrate wildlife in a way that supports whales and other charismatic fauna and uncharismatic, but important sea creatures. So this monument was declared to be administrated by NOAA, the agency within the Commerce Department that deals with marine features. And it was challenged and the challenge is interesting. It was challenged by fishermen. The monument is closed to fishing. And so they alleged that they were harmed by this and some of their arguments related to the president’s authority. The Antiquities Act has traditionally been understood to apply to lands, federal lands. And so the question is when all of the features are underwater, does that count as lands?

And then also some of the monument’s boundaries are in the exclusive economic zone. So we understand also that the act applies to lands that are under federal control. And when you’re in the EEZ, is there sufficient federal control for purposes of the Antiquities Act? So some really interesting legal issues. Also, the traditional challenge, which is that the monument’s too big for the objects, et cetera, that these aren’t appropriate objects for the Antiquities Act. And the DC Circuit upheld the act, I should say that I am on the briefs in that case. And so was involved in defending that particular monument. DC Circuit upholds the monument as did the lower court, DDC and a cert petition is filed and the cert petition, the government files its response and then there’s no action. The case sits up there for a long time, which if you’re a lawyer trying to hold off a cert grant, that’s very concerning.

The longer you go without hearing from the Court, the more anxiety it produces. And so finally, this decision issues and cert is denied, but Chief Justice Roberts alone issues a statement regarding respecting the denial of cert. And Chief Justice Roberts is, I think most lawyers know is an excellent writer. He’s a really gifted communicator and he does a good job of sort of saying, “I don’t understand why the president has the powers under the Antiquities Act, because I don’t think of seamounts and canyons as antiquities.” And I don’t think that’s the dictionary definition. And then he sort of expresses some concern. The act requires that the boundaries of a monument be the smallest compatible with protection of the objects. And he sort of raises this alarm that presidents have gone too far in designating enormous areas under this authority of Antiquities Act.

And by issuing the statement, he’s sort of sending up like, I’m an old guy, I’ll just say the bat signal to folks who are opponents of the Antiquities Act or lawyers who are anxious to get a case before the Supreme Court. And they read this and they say, yes, we should be looking and challenging this act because the Chief Justice is signaling that he is interested in hearing a challenge down the line. And so that’s where we find ourselves now. And I do think it’s interesting that of all of the justices on the Supreme Court, the one justice who has actually litigated an Antiquities Act case would be the Chief Justice. So no surprise then that he’s the one who puts the marker down because he represented the state of Alaska in the Glacier Bay litigation.

Sara Dewey:

Great. That’s helpful. So before we turn to the Utah case, let’s talk about one more case in the Supreme Court, which was that earlier this year, the Court decided not to grant cert on the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument cases, and those were two favorable decisions for the government and for the authority of the Antiquities Act in the DC Circuit and the Ninth Circuit and Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch indicated that they would’ve granted cert. So what do you make of the decision not to grant cert there, and do you think it was the wrong case or a shift in the appetite to address this issue in the Court? How are you thinking about that?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, so that’s a really interesting case. And again, I should say that full disclosure, I worked on both of those cases in the DC and Ninth Circuits. And so the issue in both cases is the same. They just arise in different circuits. One out of DC and one out of the Ninth Circuit, and they relate to a particular monument in Oregon that consists in part of lands that are governed under an old statutory regime called the O&C Act, Oregon and California Act. When the West was settled, Congress especially understood that we needed transcontinental railways, that the railroads were going to boost our economy. This is all along in our history, we’ve seen technologies that become very, very important as economic engines and the railroads were that engine. And in order to subsidize the enormous amount of capital that it takes to build a railroad, railroads got public lands that they could then dispose of or utilize, as a subsidy for this work that they’re doing.

And the O&C lands were lands that are mostly now managed, I think entirely managed by the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of Interior that had initially been given to the O&C railroads and then came back into federal ownership. And what’s interesting about the O&C Act is that it says that it arguably makes timber harvest the primary purpose of the act. And so the challenge in these cases to the monument is that it’s inconsistent with the O&C Act because once the monument’s designated, timber can’t be harvested, and these are interesting cases, but they’re hyperlocal. They deal with this one particular statute in this one particular location. Now, very, very good lawyers looked at these decisions and said, “We know that Chief Justice Roberts is very interested in Antiquities Act. These are an Antiquities Act case, so we should spin them to get his attention.”

And the very good lawyers on this case were Paul Clement and Don Verrilli, both of whom had served as solicitor general, Clement for Bush and Verrilli for Obama. And so they made a pitch that these cases were the right cases to get Antiquities Act issues resolved by the Court. But they’re really not, because they deal very much specifically with this O&C Act. So maybe not a surprise, that cert is denied. Somewhat interesting that two Justices thought cert should be granted, which again, I think adds fuel to the fire that there’s some hunger on the part of the Court to hear some Antiquities Act cases, but pretty clear that the O&C Act cases were too particular to raise the sorts of issues that Chief Justice Roberts flagged in the Northeast Canyons case.

Sara Dewey:

Let’s turn now to the Antiquities Act cases in Utah and Arizona. Starting with Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante in Utah, these monuments were designated by Presidents Obama and Clinton respectively, and then drastically narrowed under Trump and restored by President Biden. They have incredible cultural, ecological, and historic value and a particular importance to many of the Tribes in the region. Could you talk about the significant role of the Tribes?

Andy Mergen:

I think one of the things that’s really important when we talk about federal public lands, lands that are under federal management, which these lands are, we’ve noted that only federal lands can become available as national monuments, is that we have written out of the history of our lands in a very profound way the Native Peoples who lived here. All of these lands were occupied at contact and they continue to be occupied and utilized by vibrant Tribal societies today. But so much of what we call natural resources law or public land law has erased the people from the landscape, even though they’re still here living consistent with their cultural values and utilizing the lands in the same ways that they have since time immemorial. And the Bears Ears monument is particularly interesting. Here at Bears Ears, we have the sort of traditional cliff dwellings and prehistoric sites that the drafters of the Antiquities Act were concerned about.

And early on, the Bears Ears region was identified as a place that would qualify as a national monument, but it did not become a national monument until the Obama administration. And what brought the Bears Ears area over the line as a national monument is the participation of the Tribes. And there are five Tribes for whom this area is particularly important. That would be Hopi, the Navajo Nation, the Pueblo of Zuni, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, and the Ute Tribe all have strong cultural ties to this area. And they really pushed forward this monument, which is, if you think about it truly profound in that so many of the other monuments were sort of focused on the past to the extent that they dealt with areas that were of traditional cultural importance to the Tribes. The initial monuments were focused on these structures belonging to the quote, unquote, “ancients.”

But with Bears Ears, the Tribes themselves moved and persuaded the federal government that a monument here was important and persuaded the Obama administration. And that’s very much captured in both the Obama and Biden proclamations for this monument, which lay out in considerable detail the cultural connections, the sacredness, the historical connections to these lands. And I think what’s really, really profound about Bears Ears in particular is that this is a time in which the federal government is specifically recognizing the current ties to these lands, the vibrant communities that have had a traditional attachment and continue to have an attachment to these lands.

Sara Dewey:

Thanks, Andy. In the Tenth Circuit case challenging these monuments, oral argument will be held in September and in district court, a judge dismissed the lawsuits from the state of Utah and counties and private landowners saying that the court didn’t have authority to review the designations. And now here we are with the state of Utah leading this appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The government is arguing that the monument designations are not reviewable by courts, and also that petitioners lack standing. Let’s start with the sovereign immunity argument. Can you say more about this argument and what you make of it?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, no, I mean, first I just sort of say hopefully there are some law students listening to this podcast and the issues in this case show why all of us here who teach environmental law or natural resources law at Harvard encourage you also to take federal courts, because buried in this case are a lot of really interesting federal jurisdiction questions. And the first of which you’ve raised is this issue of sovereign immunity, the notion that this at the end of the day is an action by the president, not by an agency. Law students and lawyers know that agency actions are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, a game changer in 1946, which introduces what I think is understood to be a presumption of reviewability for agency action. But the president is not an agency and presidential action has long been understood to be immune in a wide variety of circumstances.

And so here the government has pressed in the district court and presses again in the Tenth Circuit, a fairly aggressive sovereign immunity argument. This is one of the elements of these cases, which will be argued as you note on September 26th at the University of Colorado Law School. So open to the public in the courtroom at University of Colorado in Boulder. And this sovereign immunity argument is interesting because in previous challenges to the monuments like the Northeast Canyons and the Clinton-era monuments that were challenged in the DC Circuit roughly contemporaneously with their creation, the courts allowed for review. It’s a pretty narrow review. It’s sort of like, does it look like the president adhered to the statutory commands? But in the Tenth Circuit, the government is arguing, not even that review is available. Now, I will say, having worked on the DC Circuit cases, that there’s a body of case law in the DC Circuit that would have made the argument that the government’s advancing in the Tenth Circuit very difficult.

There’s a case called Reich from the Clinton era that allows for a non-statutory review of presidential actions in certain circumstances. To my knowledge, there is no equivalent case in the Tenth Circuit. So the government is free to make this argument. And this is interesting in part because the government has, I think, some 41 amicus in the case, 41 groups supporting the creation of these monuments, which I think also underscores the general popularity of these monuments. But these amicus, none of them are supporting the government’s sovereign immunity argument for the obvious reason that they’re worried that there might come a president who’s not favorably inclined to monuments and they want to be able to obtain judicial review. But it also allows for an opening for the plaintiffs here to argue that what the district court did is completely wrong and nobody agrees with the government’s argument, which is somewhat unfortunate as a former government lawyer.

Sara Dewey:

And what other issues will you be watching most closely in this case?

Andy Mergen:

Well, I think the standing arguments are powerful. One of the things too, we go back to the notion that the opponents of the monuments always say that these monuments are dramatic and unheralded, et cetera, et cetera. But at the end of the day, we’re talking about federal lands. So if you’re grazing on federal lands, you’re doing that with the government’s permission. If you are mining on federal lands, you are doing that with the government’s permission. So I think in a lot of regards, it’s very hard to show standing, and I think the government has decent standing arguments. And for an environmental lawyer, the 23-24 Supreme Court term was something of a disappointment. But as a lawyer who thinks that standing is a doctrine that has utility, the Court has rendered some decisions that should put some wind in the government’s sails. In so far as standing is concerned, and we’ll pay a lot of attention to those issues. The opponents to these monuments basically argue as if those arguments are completely frail and without force, they want to get to the merits as quickly as possible.

Sara Dewey:

And in oral argument in particular, what will you be listening for?

Andy Mergen:

I’ll definitely be interested to see how seriously the panel takes the sovereign immunity arguments. I mean, I do think there are serious arguments. I think that folks have sort of said, well, the DC Circuit rule is the better rule, and I understand why people make that argument. But the DC Circuit rule very much is derived from DC Circuit precedents, existing precedents. So it’ll be interesting to see how seriously they take that. And if they disagree, if the panel disagrees with the government’s sovereign immunity and standing arguments, then I think the right result is to remand back to the district court. The district court said, no waiver of sovereign immunity, not reviewable. If the Court disagrees, it should send it back, but that’s not what the opponents want. They have briefed this up to get it to the merits, to the panel. And so I’ll be very interested to see what the panel thinks about if they disagree with the government on sovereign immunity, what the right remedy is.

And how people feel about that will depend entirely on whether they think it’s a good panel or not. Because if it’s a good panel for the government and for the monument boosters, for the Tribes, for the environmental groups, then people will be sort of content maybe to allow the panel to reach the merits. For the opponents, I don’t think it matters very much because I think their goal is to get it to the Supreme Court, and they will keep knocking at that door. So if there’s a remand, they may nonetheless try to get it to the Supreme Court because that’s where they understand their allies are. And this case has always been, it is being briefed and argued as a Supreme Court case. That’s where the opponents want to end up at the end of the day.

Sara Dewey:

Well, that gives us lots of good things to watch for in September. Andy, can you talk a little bit about the role of environmental groups as interveners in this case?

Andy Mergen:

I think the role of the environmental groups is to remind us that these are everyone’s lands. I mean, I’ve spent a lot of time in Grand Staircase. I was involved in some litigation that required me to spend a lot of time in that area. I got to know some of the people who are very upset about this monument declaration, Grand Staircase. And when President Clinton declared the monument, he did it from Arizona, not from Utah. The monument is in Utah, but they did the ceremony with Secretary of Interior Babbitt, et cetera, in Arizona because they knew that there was so much local opposition. Now, whether that local opposition really persists today, I wonder, because if you go to Grand Staircase, you’ll see, unsurprisingly, an enormous business community established to serve the many, many visitors from the US and all over the world that come to enjoy that area.

But at the time, it was very controversial. And I think what the national environmental groups and the local environmental groups remind us is these lands belong to all of us. There were federal lands before, they’re federal lands now, and they belong no less to people in Roxbury than people in Utah. And I’m excited to note that I’ve only been at Harvard a very short period of time, but one of my students is on the brief for the Native American Rights Fund, so that’s exciting.

Sara Dewey:

Very cool.

Andy Mergen:

One of my students is on the amicus brief for the paleontologists who make a very strong point about the incredible paleontological resources in this area, resources that can tell us a lot about Earth history and our past. It’s very exciting to have our students engaged, and the role of these groups is really important.

Sara Dewey:

So let’s turn to the Arizona case that’s challenging the ancestral footprints of the Grand Canyon Monument in District court. These lands are beyond the boundaries of the Grand Canyon National Park, and they have incredible cultural and spiritual significance to numerous Tribes as well as incredible ecological value. And in this case, challenges were brought by the Arizona legislature, the state treasurer, counties and towns, and a rancher seeking to declare the monument or the Antiquities Act itself unconstitutional. And the federal government is arguing that the plaintiffs lack standing. And I should also mention that the Arizona governor and AG have intervened in the case in support of the monument designation. Like with the Utah case, there are state and local government actors and private landowners challenging the designation. And so in this case, what do you make of the petitioners’ standing arguments?

Andy Mergen:

I mean, one thing that’s notable about the Arizona Proclamation is that it recognizes that some of these rights can persist. In certain circumstances, grazing rights can persist, mining rights can persist. The proclamation is very clear that it is not intended to upset existing water rights regimes. So all of those things I think make the standing arguments more difficult in this case. And so the arguments related to standing seem speculative, and that’s what’s going to be sorted out. And then again, a plug for federal courts, there’s this other really interesting issue related to the intervention of the governor who’s basically arguing that you have in Arizona, I think what people would call a purple state. Sometimes it leans red, sometimes it leans blue. It has a pretty conservative legislature, it has a Democratic AG and a Democratic governor who are essentially arguing that they’re the only people who have standing to challenge this designation. And I think that adds another layer of complexity to this case that makes it definitely worth following.

And again, I sort of come back to the notion that one of the things that criticisms of this act is that it invests enormous power in the president to do these things. And Paul Begala, who was an advisor for President Clinton once quipped that this is an act that with a stroke of the pen, the president could do something really dramatic. But these are federal lands at the end of the day, they’re lands that belong to everybody. And then also, unlike some other areas where we sort of say, well, there’s the backstop of Congress, in the Antiquities Act, Congress has never changed the act and the backstop has been applied. It was applied in Wyoming where the president is without the power to declare a monument, and it was applied in the Alaska lands circumstance.

So Congress is a backstop here. I think that’s the way that these issues should be resolved. Their general performance in this area has been to take incredibly popular national monuments and turn them into national parks. That’s where Congress has been the most active. But Congress has also said, “Too much. You’ve gone too far.” And I think that in our system is the right way to settle these things out. And so I’m not surprised that there are robust standing arguments here because I think that, again, these are federal lands. There’s a lot of stuff built into the Arizona proclamations that are going to make the standing arguments difficult and people who are unhappy have recourse through Congress.

Sara Dewey:

So looking ahead, if either one of these cases in Utah or Arizona wends its way to the Supreme Court, what concerns you most about that? Or what will you be watching for?

Andy Mergen:

I feel strongly, and this is going to come as a surprise to nobody, because I will own my priors as somebody who spent a part of my career defending these designations. So I think that they are lawful. I’m really glad you asked this question because this has been a momentous term in the Supreme Court. We’re still sort of sorting it out. And one of the things that we talk about is sort of like originalism focus on statutory text. And I think the people who are challenging these monuments think they have winning arguments on the text, and they’re focused on objects and the language in the act that says it has to be the smallest area compatible with the protection and preservation of those objects. And so they feel like they’ve really got strong textual arguments. But one of the things that we’ve learned a lot this Court’s term is that, one, I think those arguments are less powerful than they think because we have the legislative history that we’ve discussed as to how we got to objects.

With the smallest area compatible, the Congress rejected precise limits on that and invested in the president a lot of discretion in terms of how big that area is. And that’s discretion that I think should be unreviewable. And I think conservatives should probably embrace that view. And then the other part of it though, is that as we talk about interpretation and textualism and originalism, great force has been placed on the contemporary understanding of legislation. And here, this is where monument defenders have a really, really good record to fall back on. You have the example of the Devil’s Tower. You have the example of the Grand Canyon. You have the example of Mount Olympus, which in part was focused on particular wildlife features.

So the haters, that’s what I’m going to call the people who want to take down the monuments, they say, “Well, you can’t have animals and ecosystems are too broad, and it’s really just about an object, which is like a singular, particular thing.” But I think that’s pretty firmly rebutted by the contemporary understanding of the act. And the Court has told us, and on several occasions, that contemporary understanding of the act matters a lot. And so I would urge the Supreme Court to deny cert in all of these cases.

Sara Dewey:

So one final question, Andy, what do you think a narrowed Antiquities Act authority could look like for land conservation in the future if the Court did take one of these cases?

Andy Mergen:

Well, one, I don’t even want to contemplate that possibility, but if I had to, I just sort of think that what we would get is very lengthy proclamations that would detail a large number of objects, and I would hope that the president could accomplish the same goals. It’s just unfortunate that would be a longer, more complicated document to do it. I think these bland preservation enactments, they’re really important because Congress can erase any one of them in any time it gets its act together and agrees to do it. And when we talk about Devil’s Hole pupfish, which is in the Devil’s Hole area, which is in the Ash Meadows National Wildlife Refuge, that area is now a focus of lithium mining, which can be a very big consumer of water, so those threats don’t go away.

The proclamations, monument proclamations, they do go a long way in preserving the landscape. But the threats, they’re sort of omnipresent. Remarkably on August 20th, the state of Utah filed a complaint before the Supreme Court, which a state can do in exceptional circumstances where it’s suing the United States, alleging that all of the lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Utah should be managed by the state, and that the United States is without authority to possess those lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management. I think this lawsuit, which has gotten a lot of press, is very farfetched, but it, I think, well demonstrates the never-ending antagonism on the parts of a few people to public land management.

But the president having the foresight to protect areas like Grand Teton, Acadia, Grand Canyon, it really gives a hope for a whole generation of people to enjoy these things. And the threats never go away, and Congress can erase it, but without the president’s action, I’d query whether we would have a Grand Teton Park or an Acadia Park, et cetera, et cetera.

To end on a hopeful note, on August 16th, President Biden designated a National Monument at the site of a 1908 race riot in Springfield, Illinois. A heavy subject to be sure, but that monument will help tell a painful but important story of the civil rights movement because out of that riot, the NAACP is born. And the president in his proclamation makes plain that it’s important to tell these stories. Stories about resilience and change coming out of tragedy and changes that are positive for all Americans. And they tell us a lot about the vibrancy of our cultures. Just as the Bears Ears National Monument sends a strong signal about the vibrancy of the Native cultures that have utilized Bears Ears since time immemorial. These painful moments in our history often result in important positive changes. And monuments are a great place to teach those moments of history. And I think that it’s important to end on the president using his powers under the Antiquities Act to designate a monument that tells an important story of our past.

Sara Dewey:

Yeah. Well, Andy, thank you so much for speaking with me today. I really enjoyed our conversation.

Andy Mergen:

Thank you.

 


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Administrative Law

Applying Corner Post to Significant Environmental Statutes that EPA Administers


On July 1, 2024, the US Supreme Court held in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that the default federal six-year statute of limitations under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2401(a) begins running when a regulation injures a plaintiff, rather than when an agency issues a regulation. For statutes that use this federal default, plaintiffs may now challenge long-established regulations, and many expect test cases to emerge with new organizations created to challenge long-established regulations to leverage the new standards of review emerging under separate Supreme Court cases, including Loper Bright.

However, many key environmental statutes that EPA administers (including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) contain statutes of repose. Unlike a statute of limitations, which is typically based on when the claim accrued, these provisions set limitations based on the date of the agency’s action.[1] Corner Post should be distinguishable and should not apply to regulations promulgated under these statutes.

In this piece, I explain the relevant facts and the Court’s decision in Corner Post and review the judicial review provisions for significant environmental statutes that EPA administers. I also include a summary table (Table 1.) showing how Corner Post could apply to these statutes. I conclude with what we are watching as test cases emerge applying and distinguishing Corner Post.

Summary of Corner Post

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

In the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress directed the Federal Reserve Board to set standards for the fees paid by merchants to the payment network (i.e. Visa or Mastercard) that processes the transaction each time a merchant accepts a debit card as payment by a customer.[2] In 2011, the Federal Reserve Board issued Regulation II, which established the maximum fee that payment networks can charge merchants.[3] Later that year, a retail trade association and retailers challenged Regulation II as outside of the board’s statutory authority. The D.C. Circuit upheld the rule in 2014.[4]

Corner Post is a convenience store that opened in 2018. It accepts debit cards and pays the processing fee to the payment networks.

In 2021, two North Dakota retail associations challenged Regulation II on Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grounds. The Federal Reserve Board moved to dismiss the suit as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs then amended the complaint to add Corner Post as a petitioner.[5]

The District Court of North Dakota dismissed the suit as barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.[6] The Eighth Circuit held that for facial challenges to regulations, the statute of limitations begins running when the agency finalizes the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit.

The Court’s Opinion in Corner Post

 The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began running when Corner Post opened (2018) and was injured by Regulation II. Writing for the majority, Justice Barrett points to three interacting statutory provisions that establish these timelines. First, APA Section 702 requires the plaintiff to be injured by an agency action. Second, under APA Section 704 “[u]nless another statute makes the agency’s action reviewable… judicial re­view is available only for ‘final agency action.’”[7] Third, where the statute does not otherwise provide a statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 2401(a) requires complaints against the federal government to be filed “within six years after the right of action first accrues.”[8] Reading these provisions together, the majority holds that Corner Post’s “right” could not have “accrue[d]” before Corner Post was injured and had a cause of action. The Court, therefore, concludes that the statute of limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 2401(a) should be determined by the plaintiff’s injuries, meaning that the clock begins running when the plaintiff could potentially bring a case. In this case, Corner Post could not have been injured before it existed.

Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion, and Justices Jackson, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissented.[9] For the dissent, Justice Jackson writes that “this case is the poster child for the type of manipulation that the majority now invites—new groups being brought in (or created) just to do an end run around the statute of limitations.”[10] The dissent also points out that when combined with Loper Bright, this decision could be “profoundly destabilizing for both Government and businesses.”[11]

Application to Statutes that EPA Administers

Though Corner Post could invite challenges to longstanding federal regulations,[12] several of EPA’s authorizing statutes are distinguishable from Corner Post in two important ways:

  1. Congress included specific time limits for challenges to EPA’s actions; therefore, the federal default language found in § 2401(a) is unlikely to apply.[13]
  2. The majority in Corner Post compares statutes of limitations’ “plaintiff focused-language” with statutes of repose, which “run when agency action becomes final.”[14] The time limits in the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act all run based on EPA’s action.

Below, I analyze statutes of repose that apply to EPA actions, including a short summary of the context for Congress enacting the statutes to compare Congressional intent and history with the Durbin Amendment.

The Clean Air Act (CAA)

 In 1970, Congress adopted the Clean Air Act (CAA), which authorizes EPA to promulgate rules to regulate emissions from stationary and mobile sources. Congress most recently made significant amendments to the Act in 1990.[15]

The CAA contains a statute of repose. Thus, Section 2401(a) and Corner Post should not apply to regulations promulgated under the CAA. In order to be eligible to file a petition for review of any “appliable regulation”[16] or final action taken by EPA under the CAA, the plaintiff must file the petition for review “within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register” unless the petition is “based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day.”[17] Courts have held that this 60-day time bar is jurisdictional, meaning that courts do not have jurisdiction to address claims brought outside the 60-day window.[18] Additionally, the issue for judicial review must have been raised in a comment.[19]

The Clean Water Act (CWA)

In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to enact what is now known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).[20] The CWA prohibits discharge of pollutants into Waters of the United States without a permit and gives EPA (and, in some cases the US Army Corp of Engineers and states) authority to promulgate and enforce standards.

The CWA contains a statute of repose. Therefore, similar to the CAA, Section 2401(a) and Corner Post should not apply to regulations promulgated under the CWA. In fact, the majority in Corner Post cites the CWA’s statute of repose as an example of “a more specific statute” that “displaces” the federal default.[21] A plaintiff must file the petition for review of EPA’s action “within 120 days from the date of such determination, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such date only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose after such 120th day.”[22] This provision applies only to national standards of performance,[23] determinations of source categories,[24] effluent standards, prohibitions, or pretreatment standards,[25] effluent limitations,[26]  determinations of state permit programs or issuing or denying permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System,[27] or information and guidelines issued pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1314.

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)

Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) in 1980 to provide funds to clean up major hazardous waste sites. Congress authorized EPA to administer the fund and authorized the D.C. Circuit to review challenges to regulations that EPA promulgates. CERCLA provides a statute of repose that allows a plaintiff to challenge “any regulation promulgated under th[e] chapter” for “ninety days from the date of promulgation of such regulations.”[28] Thus, Corner Post can be distinguished and should not apply to facial challenges of CERCLA regulations.[29]

Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA)

Congress passed the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976. RCRA authorizes EPA to regulate solid hazardous and nonhazardous waste. A plaintiff may challenge EPA’s promulgation of a regulation under RCRA “within ninety days from the date of such promulgation or denial, or after such date if such petition for review is based solely on grounds arising after such ninetieth day.”[30] Corner Post should not apply to regulations that EPA has promulgated under RCRA.

Looking Ahead

As we discussed in our podcast and other analyses, it is important to consider the effect of the Supreme Court’s term as a whole. For example, we will be watching whether petitioners try to use Corner Post and Loper Bright to expand administrative instability for regulations.

We will continue tracking any significant challenges to both new and longstanding environmental regulations.

 

Table 1. Applicability of Corner Post to EPA Statutes

Statute Agency Judicial Review Provision Statute of Repose[31] Is Corner Post likely to apply to facial challenges?
CERCLA EPA 42 U.S.C. § 9613 “within ninety days from the date of promulgation of such regulations” No
CAA EPA 42 U.S.C. § 7607 “within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register” unless the petition is “based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day.” No
CWA EPA 33 U.S.C. § 1369 “within 120 days from the date of such determination, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such date only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose after such 120th day.” No
RCRA EPA 42 U.S.C. § 6976 “within ninety days from the date of such promulgation or denial, or after such date if such petition for review is based solely on grounds arising after such ninetieth day” No

 


[1] “[A] statute of limitations creates ‘a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued… A statute of repose, on the other hand, puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action. That limit is measured not from the date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2014).

[2] Corner Post slip op. at 2, citing 15 U. S. C. §1693o–2(a)(3)(A).

[3] Corner Post slip op. at 2, citing Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394 (2011).

[4] NACS v. Board of Governors of FRS, 958 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95-96 (D.D.C. 2013); NACS v. Board of Governors of FRS, 746 F.3d 474, 477 (2014).

[5] N. Dakota Retail Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 55 F.4th 634, 638 (8th Cir. 2022).

[6] Id.

[7] Corner Post slip op. at 6, citing 5 U.S.C. § 702.

[8] Section 2401 establishes the default statute of limitations for cases against the government. See Corner Post Slip Op. at 7-8, citing 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a).

[9] Corner Post slip op. at 4 (Jackson, J. dissenting). She explains that “[f]or many kinds of legal claims, accrual is plaintiff specific because the claims themselves are plaintiff specific. But facial administrative-law claims are not. This means that, in the administrative-law context, the limitations period begins not when a plaintiff is injured, but when a rule is finalized.” Id. at 6.

[10] Corner Post slip op. at 4 (Jackson, J., dissenting)

[11] Id. at 2. Indeed, in amici, the Small Business Associations argues that the regulatory uncertainty that this case invites will make it more challenging for businesses to plan and make investments. Amicus Brief for Small Business Associations Supporting Respondent at *10, Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 22-1008 (2024), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-1008/293837/20231220125019472_2023.12.20%20FOR%20FILING%20-%20DF%20Corner%20Post%20Brief.pdf.

[12] For as-applied challenges, Corner Post is not likely result in any significant changes; the statute of limitations for as-applied challenges has been and will continue to be determined by when the claim arises or the plaintiff is injured.

[13] When two statutory schemes conflict, courts generally apply the more specific language. The D.C. Circuit has held that this principle is “no less true with respect to statutes of limitations.” Howard v. Pritzker, 775 F.3d 430, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

[14] Corner Post slip op. at 9-10.

[15] The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 added new grant programs to the Clean Air Act and established a methane waste fee but did not make significant revisions to EPA’s existing regulatory authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 7432-38.

[16] This provision specifies that judicial review is available in the D.C. Circuit for National Ambient Air Quality Standards, emissions standards for stationary sources, standards for hazardous air pollutants, nationally applicable standards for vehicles, nationally applicable fuel standards, but also includes “any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken. Local and regional actions including implementation plan approvals may be challenged in the appropriate circuit court. 42 U.S.C. § 7607.

[17] There is a long history of courts struggling to define what constitutes circumstances arising after 60 days, and the D.C. Circuit chose to not review the question in 2019. See Alon Ref. Krotz Springs, Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 936 F.3d 628 (D.C. Cir. 2019), citing Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1995), citing Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

[18] Growth Energy v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 5 F.4th 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2021); Med. Waste Inst. & Energy Recovery Council v. E.P.A., 645 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

[19] 42 U.S.C. § 7607.

[20] EPA, Summary of the Clean Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act (last visited July 8, 2024).

[21] Corner Post, slip. op. at 5.

[22] 33 U.S.C. § 1369.

[23] Under 33 U.S.C. § 1316.

[24] Under 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(c).

[25] Under 33 U.S.C. § 1317.

[26] Under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1345.

[27] Under 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

[28] 42 U.S.C. § 9613, though note that under National Association of Manufacturers. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, significant amendments may renew this clock. 134 F.3d 1095, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[29] CERCLA sets longer statutes of limitations for challenges to contribution claims (3 years) and remedial actions (6 years).

[30] RCRA provides that Review of promulgation of regulations or denials of petitions for promulgations must be filed within 90 days of promulgation or denial in the D.C. Circuit. It further provides that “review of the…issuing, denying, modifying, or revoking any permit under section 6925 … or (2) in granting, denying, or withdrawing authorization or interim authorization under section 6926 of this title…shall be made within ninety days from the date of such issuance, denial, modification, revocation, grant, or withdrawal, or after such date only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth day.” 42 U.S.C. § 6976.

[31] Note that for any of these statutes, there may be different statutes of limitations for as-applied challenges.


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Administrative Law

CleanLaw — Suite of Supreme Court Decisions Undermine Administrative Law

Jody Freeman and Andy Mergen break down the ‘Quagmire Quartet’ of recent Supreme Court decisions


EELP Founding Director and Harvard Law Professor Jody Freeman speaks with Andy Mergen, faculty director of the Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School and former chief of the Appellate Section of the Environment & Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice. Jody and Andy break down what they call the “Quagmire Quartet” of recent Supreme Court decisions that overturn the Chevron doctrine and undermine administrative agencies. They discuss the new challenges that federal agencies will face as they work to protect the public, the ways in which the Supreme Court has centralized power in the judiciary, how courts can continue to uphold important federal rules, and why they have hope.

Transcript

Intro:

Welcome to CleanLaw, from the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard Law School. In this episode, EELP Founding Director and Harvard Law Professor Jody Freeman, speaks with Andy Mergen, Faculty Director of the Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School and former chief of the Appellate Section of the Environment & Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice. Jody and Andy break down what they call the “Quagmire Quartet” of recent Supreme Court decisions that overturn the Chevron doctrine and undermine administrative agencies. They discuss the new challenges that federal agencies will face as they work to protect the public, the ways in which the Supreme Court has centralized power in the judiciary, how courts can continue to uphold important federal rules, and why they have hope. We hope you enjoy this episode.

Jody Freeman:

Welcome to CleanLaw. Today, we will be discussing the blockbuster administrative law cases from the Supreme Court’s recent term. They include Ohio v. EPAJarkesyLoper Bright, and Corner Post. These four cases have important implications for agencies broadly across the federal government, but also particularly for environmental law.

And we are here today with me, Jody Freeman, your host, and Andy Mergen, who directs our clinic at Harvard Law School. Welcome, Andy.

Andy Mergen:

Great to be here.

Jody Freeman:

We’ve seen a lot of coverage in the media of especially the overturning of Chevron, which was what Loper Bright did. I think most Americans now actually know what Chevron means as a result of the saturation of media coverage. But these other cases I mentioned, the Ohio case, the Jarkesy case, the Corner Post case, they also are important. And I thought we’d go through each one and talk about what the Court did, what the Court didn’t do, and how agencies might be reacting, and what the implications are both in the short term and the long term.

So before we get into each of these cases in detail, I just wanted to do a little bit of framing for the discussion, and especially if somebody starts listening to the podcast and decides to drop off after a short time. I want to make sure our key takeaways from the term are clear. My takeaway from the term is that the Supreme Court has made it harder for agencies to do their jobs in every respect, at every stage of the regulatory process.

So, harder to adopt rules that solve contemporary problems in a modern society and economy. Harder to implement those rules at every step. Harder to enforce those rules the way that they have traditionally done through administrative process and penalties, and harder to defend the rules against legal challenge. And I think if you add up these four cases, what you see is a collection of constraints, limitations, obstacles that the Supreme Court has put in place to agencies doing their jobs.

And the other theme, which I know you share and that we’ve talked about, is that in doing all of this, the Court winds up centralizing power in itself to make not just legal decisions that we all might agree are legal decisions, but also to make a lot of policy calls. And it’s sort of amassing and accumulating a concentration of authority that I think throws off the separation of powers that it claims to be defending. And if you see these cases in light of those two themes, I think you really can appreciate their importance. Andy, I know you’ll speak to this when we get into each of the cases, but we’ve talked about this a lot between us, but would you agree with that, and what would you add?

Andy Mergen:

I think that you’ve stated the problem extremely well. I think the bigger theme of these four cases, which I have sort of, in my own mind, called it the Quagmire Quartet, and I think that the quagmire is that they’re all focused on keeping agencies from doing their jobs. And the jobs that we’re talking about are jobs that they have been charged with doing by Congress. And the other part of this, the non-quagmire part, is the sort of judicial imperiousness and hubris of the Supreme Court.

The one other thing, which I think was implicit, and I’ll just underscore it, is that one of the potential consequences of these decisions is a lot of litigation that my former colleagues at DOJ will have to deal with, that the agencies will have to support. And that, too, just makes it harder for government to do its job. For these folks, they’re pulled away from other tasks to support litigation, and a lot of this litigation that’s going to be prompted from these cases that we can talk about is going to be frivolous. And it’s just a really unfortunate consequence of the way that the Court has decided some of these issues.

Jody Freeman:

The other thing we’ve talked about a lot is the idea of churn and uncertainty and unpredictability, and sometimes you hear this referred to in the media as chaos. There will be chaos. I don’t think we need to go quite as far as chaos to say we will see a lot of conflicting decisions coming out of district courts and circuit courts.

The Supreme Court may not resolve all those conflicts, because it only takes, what now, 60 cases a year, something like that. So tell us about that from your perspective. It’s going to lead to a lot of, I would just call it churn. And you’ve also mentioned to me, we talked a lot about forum shopping, which only adds to the feeling of uncertainty.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. I mean, I think the churn thing is really important in terms of the agencies have missions. They take those missions very seriously, and all of this makes it harder for them to do their job. So there’s going to be necessarily more hand-wringing and a lot of time trying to figure out what the heck is going on, and that’s going to take them away from doing their work. There’s also, as you and I have talked about a lot, the instability this creates for industries that rely on clear signals from the regulators, from the agencies. Right?

It creates instability and uncertainty. And I don’t think the business community is monolithic, but I think there are a lot of people who want agencies to act in a consistent way, to want established rules to stay in place and not be subject to being reopened. And I think we’re going to see a lot of folks… As we talk a little bit more about these cases, there’ll be a push to revisit a lot of regulations, and that push will be focused on courts that people think are going to be most susceptible to those challenges.

And I think that a lot of the judgments that are made there are correct, that there are courts that are really virulently anti-regulatory. And I think that takes away from our faith in our judicial institutions, our faith in the rule of law, when everybody is focused on a few courts to move their own agenda.

Jody Freeman:

And I often say that the business community should be careful what they ask for, because while there may be a general feeling among many industry players that regulation goes too far, it’s too expensive, too costly, if you create this kind of uncertainty, unpredictability, openness to challenge in the legal system, it may go too far and create a kind of instability that makes it hard to do business, hard to rely on the rules to make long-lived investment decisions.

And so, there’s a question about, is this really what the business community wants in the end? The final theme before we dive into the cases is, what should the agency posture be in reacting to these four decisions, and even to earlier cases that are related, like the major questions case from a couple terms ago? What should agencies do?

And the more I talk to folks, the more I think about it, the more my view is they should keep going. Now, that doesn’t mean they should be reckless. Of course, they need to assess litigation risks. They need to be sure that their rules are well-designed, and they need to be sure that their enforcement policies will be constitutional. They have to make sure to comply with these decisions. But my attitude is, don’t somehow over-constrain yourselves, agencies. Don’t do the work of petitioners for them. Don’t be so litigation risk-averse that you stop doing the important work of implementing your statutory mandates.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. I agree 100%. There’s a lovely poem by the poet Mary Oliver called The Wild Geese, and it sort of says, “There’s a time for despair, but the world goes on.” And I think that for all of the reasons you’ve said, the agencies should just keep on doing their mission. I think that the majority of Americans, may be not represented by the majority of the Supreme Court, understand that public health, consumer safety, all of these things, food safety are incredibly important.

And you speaking to the folks in the government, who might listen to this podcast, what you do is incredibly important. And just keep doing the job with the probity and the care, the dedication to mission, the attention to the direction that Congress has given you, that you have been doing all along. Do not fall onto the trap of thinking that all is lost here. It’s not.

Jody Freeman:

Clearly, we don’t think the sky is falling. These are serious cases. They pose some real challenges for the government’s work in public health, safety, consumer protection, et cetera. But we are not of the mind the sky is falling and the administrative state has been dismantled. And with that in mind, let’s dive into, first, the Ohio case.

This is a case in which the Supreme Court granted an emergency stay, stopping in its tracks an EPA air pollution rule that is known as the Good Neighbor rule. Give us the basics of what happened here. It’s quite a complex set of facts. So first, for the civilians out there who may not know the ins and outs of the Clean Air Act, what happened here?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. So it’s a really extraordinary case. I think it’s profoundly important that we draw people’s attention to it. To set it up a little bit, this is a Clean Air Act case. The Clean Air Act is an example of cooperative federalism. It charges both the states and the federal government with taking actions to prevent, mitigate, cut down on air pollution.

But because air pollution doesn’t abide by state boundaries, what the states and the federal government do needs to account for the fact that some states create pollution that flows downwind to other states. And so, what the Clean Air Act contemplates is that states, in the first instance, will come up with rules and a plan to curtail air pollution within their borders. EPA has final say about whether those plans do what’s necessary to make sure that air quality is good across the United States.

And if the state plans don’t do that, so-called state implementation plans, then the federal government and EPA can develop an FIP, a federal implementation plan. This is sort of a very general description of what’s going on here. Here, the EPA determined that the state plans were not going to be sufficient, especially with regard to pollution in these downwind states. And it’s a complex litigation history here, but what is that issue in the Supreme Court case is a challenge to the federal implementation plan.

Jody Freeman:

So, Andy, let’s talk about the majority opinion in this case and what your main takeaways are, and then I’ll add a few comments of my own.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. So I think there are two really important aspects to this case, and one sort of relates to the law issue and how the Court looks at the legal issues, and I’ll turn to that in a second. But the first is the extraordinary relief that the majority has granted by staying this rule. And I think for people who have some legal training, it’s equity and law, equity being sort of the issue of what’s fair in this particular circumstance, and the law being sort of, how do we look at the legal issues?

And so, in deciding whether you’re going to get this, quote, unquote, “equitable relief” of a stay, the Court has traditionally applied a four-factor test. And the first part of this is, how does injury relate here? Are the people seeking this relief injured in the here and now? And the second part of the test is whether they’re likely to win their case. And the third part of the test is, how does it affect other people? And then the fourth part of the test is, how does this really serve the public interest?

Jody Freeman:

So, Andy, when I read this case, I was struck by how little most of those factors mattered to the Gorsuch opinion. The way I read it, what mattered was, are the petitioners likely to prevail on the merits? One aspect of that test, one element, and that’s what the Court cared about most. And their conclusion was, “There is a likelihood of success, and so we’re going to grant the stay.” Have I oversimplified that?

Andy Mergen:

No, I think that’s exactly right. And to me, as a lawyer who spent 30 years dealing with requests for emergency relief, either stays or injunctions, this is really remarkable. And it’s not something a lot of people commenting on the decision have focused on, but this idea that it now comes down to likelihood of success on the merits is, I think, really rather dramatic, because normally, the first thing that you look at is sort of how are people injured in the here and now, and then you start thinking about who’s going to win.

And in the Supreme Court, this is a particularly difficult area, because the Court has complete discretion over the cases that it hears. So sometimes we also talk about the cert worthiness of a case. Is this the kind of case that the Court, which doesn’t hear everything, should spend its time on? Everything has dropped out of this issue except likelihood of success on the merits.

And the reason that Justice Gorsuch is able to do that is because earlier this year, they said in a sort of emergency decision that in a lot of these cases, as they perceive it, and particularly with regard to environmental rules, injury is at a wash. On the one hand, you have the harms that the rule is supposed to protect, which, in this case, is serious public health concerns.

And then the other is the imposition on the regulated community of taking the necessary steps for their power plants, for their emission facilities, and the costs that they would accrue. And the Court has sort of said, without any analysis, these things are a wash. And therefore, the only thing that matters is getting to likelihood of success on the merits.

Jody Freeman:

And in this instance, with the Good Neighbor rule, it’s not just that there’s harm to individuals because of air pollution. Right? We have states here, the downwind states that are suffering from air pollution wafting downwind from the upwind states that make it harder for them to meet the air quality standards that they’re obligated to meet. So you have states here on both sides of the case, and it’s fascinating that the Court didn’t seem to give much weight to the imperative of the downwind states in this analysis. Did that strike you at all, or is there anything else about it that was sort of surprising?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. I mean, the Gorsuch opinion uses the phrase sovereign interest, because there’s two kinds of parties to this case. There are the sort of industry parties, the pipeline companies, et cetera, the American Paper, a whole bunch of commercial actors, and then there are the red states who are challenging this rule. And when Gorsuch talks about the red states’ interests, he talks about their sovereign interests, and he says those interests are important.

Well, the downwind states, which are mostly blue states, also have sovereign interests, and their interests are related to the public health of their citizens. And the way that the Court deals with this is just to say, “Well, it’s all a wash. Let’s move briskly on to the legal merits,” which I think is very, very troubling.

Jody Freeman:

Let’s talk, too, then about this second question of moving on to the legal merits. Why is it that Justice Gorsuch writes the petitioners are likely to succeed? I mean, what is it that EPA has done here that leads him to that conclusion? This really I found quite alarming in terms of the sort of intrusiveness of the analysis, the flyspecking of the agency record. Tell us about it, Andy.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. So I’m going to do my best, and I’m going to defer a little bit to you, because you teach administrative law regularly. So I know that you’ll clean up what I’m going to say.

Jody Freeman:

I’ll chime in. Yeah.

Andy Mergen:

So what we’re talking about here is APA, sort of what we call arbitrary and capricious review, right? The statute says that. The agency’s actions are generally reviewed under, I don’t want to say deferential, but a standard that gives a lot of credit to what the agencies are going to do. But they can flunk that standard in two ways. One, they can say something that doesn’t make any sense. It fails as a substantive matter, or they can sort of overlook an important part of the problem, or not fully explain themselves. And that’s a failure of explanation, not so much as a failure of substance.

What Gorsuch leans in on is a perceived failure of the agency to respond to a comment. And that comment boils down to this, which is, the federal rule, the federal plan needs to be able to explain why it’s still worth doing, why it still works, if some of the state plans are in effect. And what Gorsuch says is, “The states raised this issue, the parties raised this issue, and you failed to explain yourselves.”

And there’s two things that are really important about that. One is, the Barrett dissent, which we’ll talk about in a second, is very compelling, and Justice Barrett says, “You’re giving them way too much credit. They didn’t really raise this comment. You are doing the work for them.” And I think that another thing that’s worth noting is that EPA answered this question during the course of the litigation.

Jody Freeman:

EPA actually specifically said that if some of the SIPs were disapproved and others were not, if there was any problem and the federal implementation plan didn’t cover all of the states, they still believe the federal implementation plan would operate as anticipated. Is that about right? And so, they actually addressed the problem already.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. They addressed the problem between oral argument and the Court rendering the decision, and Gorsuch says, “That doesn’t matter, because it’s not part of the record that was before the Court.” He says, “I’m not even looking at that, because they needed to deal with this before.” And I find this as somebody who litigated in the federal Courts for a very long time, defending agency records.

I find this aspect of it really, really remarkable, because normally, we presume, as you and I have talked about in other occasions, that agencies are doing their work in good faith. They’re entitled to a presumption of regularity.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah.

Andy Mergen:

And here, they’ve done the work, and they’ve said, “This is fine.” And what Justice Barrett says is all of this is discernible from the record. You don’t actually need this new statement from EPA, because if you look at the way the rule is structured, it doesn’t matter for them because of the way the rule is getting at particular emitters. And that is not really going to change whether all of the states’ SIPs have been approved or not approved.

Jody Freeman:

I think you and I would agree. We recommend the Barrett dissent to people, because it’s really excellent, and it goes through step-by-step the flaws in the majority’s reasoning. And I think there’s something about this that once you read this dissent, it’s hard to imagine that the chief or the chief in Kavanaugh didn’t change their minds. Right? It’s such a compelling taking-apart of the reasoning in the Gorsuch opinion that I personally was surprised. Did that strike you as a surprising thing, that they actually stuck with issuing this stay?

Andy Mergen:

To me, as somebody who litigated similar-type cases, this is mind-blowing, because it is exactly sort of what the executive branch usually pushes back against in a million cases. The work doesn’t have to be perfect, but here, it was really good. And Barrett shows that the agency’s explanations and pathways are very, very clear. And so, the Court has really, really flyspecked this, and I think that’s a generous term for what has happened here.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah. So a couple takeaways. I read this case as yet another indication that the Supreme Court is really open to and prepared to stay important rules. And we used to think that these stays were extremely rare, until the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan.

And many of us sort of think the Court has developed a willingness to grant stays more often, largely in reaction to failing to do so in an earlier case called the Mercury and Air Toxics rule, whereby the time it worked through the litigation, that rule had already been implemented, and everybody had already complied, and the Supreme Court has decided, “Well, we’re not going to let that happen again.” So what I’m kind of saying is, there may be an attitude now on the Court that says, “We’re not going to make business suffer and comply with these rules by not issuing a stay.”

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. And I think if you are representing industry or states that are hostile to these efforts, you’re going to seek emergency relief in every single case, and we’re already seeing that in cases. Right? The power plant rule, there’s a stay request in. I think the methane rule, there’s a stay request in. The Supreme Court has sort of said, “We’re open for business on staying the implementation of these rules.”

One of the things that I think is really important, and what we have lost here, is by not focusing on injury. The Court is not paying attention to what’s really going on. These rules have real public health benefits. Smog is very, very dangerous to human health, especially pediatric health. There is no discussion of that anywhere in the Gorsuch opinion.

The control technologies that are at issue here are established. EPA is not breaking any ground. Industry can do this. They don’t want to do it. And EPA has paid considerable attention to cost, to not make it overly burdensome. Right? I think there are a lot of people in the public health fields would say, “This rule does not go far enough.” And the reason it doesn’t go farther is because EPA is acutely aware of cost to the regulated entities. So this is really a tragedy.

Jody Freeman:

And in addition, there’s just a lag time here before anybody gets injured. Once EPA issues the Good Neighbor rule, there’s time for the states to develop implementation plans. There’s time for them to get into compliance. So this is something, I think, the Court is either ignoring on purpose or downplaying, because it doesn’t really understand how the act operates, but they’re prepared to overlook it one way or the other to grant the stay.

Andy Mergen:

And we could talk about it in terms of courts itselves, but I think it’s really about the Supreme Court, because in sort of interrupting this process, they’re saying to the D.C. Circuit, “We don’t trust you to get this right. We have to come in and fix this.” And I think that’s a terrible state of play, because in the 30 years that I’ve been doing this, courts have always extended the utmost comity and respect for each other, and followed a deliberate process on the belief that each court would do its job. And the Supreme Court, in interrupting this process here, is sort of sending a message to the D.C. Circuit that, “We don’t trust you.”

Jody Freeman:

But let’s move on to talk about what got most of the coverage, the Loper Bright case. You and I have done a podcast on it before. For listeners who didn’t listen to that, we were anticipating the Court either severely limiting or overturning the Chevron principle. This was six to three. Unlike Ohio, it was six to three, and all the other cases we’re going to talk about today were six to three.

And the Chief Justice said, “Chevron was wrong. It’s for judges to interpret the law. That is what the Administrative Procedure Act requires of us, that courts determine all relevant questions of law. And Chevron, in offering deference to agencies to fill in the gaps and ambiguities in statutes, errs, because it conflicts, clearly, with our Administrative Procedure Act duty.” That was the essence of the majority opinion.

Andy Mergen:

Right.

Jody Freeman:

We also saw a long Gorsuch concurrence and a vehement dissent by Justice Kagan. What’s your takeaway from Loper?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. So a couple of things. I think it’s really important that the chief writes this decision, because he writes it in a particular way, which you and I have discussed previously. A lot of admin law professors and environmental law professors have reacted to this decision in a whole spectrum of opinions about what comes next.

But the decision does not go as far as some would have liked. Right? It’s not a constitutional decision. It’s not a question of whether what Chevron deference violated, or the Chevron doctrine violated the Constitution by imbuing this interpretive function into agencies. He bases it on the APA, and I think that creates, for me personally, some awkwardness. The APA has been in place for a very, very long time, and I think it’s the majority’s decision that upsets the applecart.

Jody Freeman:

Right. Since 1946, we’ve had the Administrative Procedure Act, and now, suddenly, it makes it impossible to grant this sort of presumptive deference to agencies.

Andy Mergen:

Right.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah.

Andy Mergen:

Which struck me as very odd reading it. I didn’t realize that there are admin law professors who believe this is correct, and that this was an argument that has recently come to the fore as a criticism of Chevron deference. But the thing that’s good about basing it on the statute is that we don’t have to deal with this as being a constitutional limitation. And at the same time, the Chief Justice leaves open the possibility of something Skidmore-respect or something Skidmore-like going forward, which I think is important. It means that what agencies have to say about their implementing statutes is not irrelevant. Right? It may not be entitled to deference.

But the Chief, I think, is saying that it can be important in some cases. It’s just not an abdication of interpretive authority to the agencies. It’s rather, I think Dan Deacon at Michigan has said, “What the agency says is like a dictionary. You would be foolish not to consult a dictionary about the meaning of a statute.” And some of what the agency can say is similar to that. And I think that should be helpful to the agencies going forward. But make no mistake, I just want to say one last thing. I find it very dramatic that the opinion says Chevron has been overruled.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah. There are people who went to law school and have practiced their entire careers using the Chevron framework as a way to understand how to approach court’s handling of statutory interpretation in cases where Congress wasn’t perfectly clear. And the assumption has always been where Congress hasn’t been clear and where traditional tools of interpretation don’t give you a single right answer, where some people say the law runs out, let’s say, then the agency gets the benefit of the doubt to fill the gap, and that’s been established for all these decades.

I wanted to focus on the Chief’s tone and tenor here. I mean, there are some quotes that are really striking, right? “It was fundamentally misguided,” Chevron was. “It was a marked departure from historical practice.” “Statutes, no matter how impenetrable, have a single, best meaning.” “Every statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment.”

And then this great line, “If it’s not the best, it is not permissible,” meaning there’s one correct way to interpret the law. We, the courts, are responsible for determining it. And there’s no notion of a zone of ambiguity or a zone of reasonableness into which an agency can make a choice to interpret it one way and then later change its mind.

And so, the notion that agencies will have that kind of presumption or latitude is gone. But at the same time, Andy, as you pointed out, the Court clearly believes… I mean, the majority opinion reads, very clearly, to say, “There are instances where Congress will have delegated discretion to the agency.” And the Court can decide that that has occurred. Discretion to the agency to define a statutory term, they may delegate that. Congress may delegate to an agency the authority to fill in the details of a statutory regime.

And so, there’s still these openings, where the Court may decide, “Oh, in this statute, they gave that matter to the agency.” And so, it’s possible the Court will still defer in those cases. But it’s just not clear how often that will happen. It’s just not clear what standard of review the Court will use, and how much respect it will give to agencies in the normal course of reading statutes.

You see the Chief saying, “Well, they’re owed due respect.” And I’m not sure what due respect amounts to. The Court cites Skidmore, this old case that many of us know, and Skidmore refers to a standard of review that says there are many factors that the Court should consider when deciding how much deference to give to the agency, including the long-standingness of the interpretation and the persuasiveness of the agency’s reasoning, and all the other factors that give an agency view, the power to persuade.

Well, that’s a very open-ended test, Skidmore is. And it’s not clear that the Court has said, “We’re going to use Skidmore,” because it also cited State Farm, the arbitrary, capricious standard, which has a slightly different set of factors. And the Court said, “We look for reasonableness, the agency’s ability to explain itself as reasonable.”

So one can leave the opinion, and I don’t know if you agree with me, leave the opinion wondering, “So wait a minute. What’s a reviewing Court supposed to do? Is it supposed to embrace Skidmore? Is it supposed to embrace arbitrary, capricious review, or is it supposed to decide to just give the agency due respect?” And that means every federal district court judge will read statutes like the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Securities and Exchange Act, and so on, and bring to it whatever those judges feel is the right interpretation, using whatever methodology they want to use, and then decide how much respect to give the agency. What do you think is the takeaway for what the standard of review is now going forward?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. Before I answer your question, can I just vent for one second-

Jody Freeman:

Yes, please. Please go ahead.

Andy Mergen:

… and just sort of say, this is what I find very aggravating about the case. I mean, the people who sought this result and sought to overrule Chevron felt that agencies were too aggressive, that they were getting way out ahead of Congress and aggrandizing power to themselves, faceless bureaucrats, et cetera, et cetera. I guess in my 30 years, I saw very little evidence of that. I’m not going to say that agencies aren’t ever ambitious in the ways that are maybe too ambitious, but by and large, not a problem in my view.

I think that this is just a lot of rhetoric. And if you wanted exhibit one here, I would say the case itself, which we’ve sort of stopped talking about, involves a rule that was unlikely to ever be implemented to the detriment of the regulated community, in a very obscure federal statute where industry has an incredible amount of say about what the rules look like.

Jody Freeman:

Right. I mean, Loper Bright itself, which, of course, this all falls out of the case, because the Court only took the question whether Chevron is still good law. But you’re right. It’s a fisheries conservation case, and the issue is whether the agency can require the owners of the fishing vessels to pay for the onboard monitors when those monitors are required to be on board, and there are good arguments for why absolutely, this is just like any other regulatory requirement for which the regulated parties have to pay. Right, Andy? I mean, it’s debatable, but there are good arguments.

Andy Mergen:

Right. So the Court decided to tear down and overturn Chevron. And then you did an amazing job of describing the many pieces of the Chief’s opinion, which is sort of like, as one of those kids who start writing a bad term paper sometimes say, “This poem means many things to many people.” And I feel that’s exactly the same thing with this opinion, that you can read it in a variety of ways to get to a different result.

And is this better than Chevron? I don’t think so. I think this is what a lot of admin law professors said in their amicus briefs. If you tear it down, what have you got that’s better? And I don’t think the Chief… I mean, I feel for him, because I realize he’s got a bunch of people he’s got to work with, but I don’t think that this really gives a lot of clarity. And so, just one last thought here. The people who are anti-regulatory know that all that matters for this opinion to the judges that they’re going to go to is it says Chevron is overruled.

Jody Freeman:

Right.

Andy Mergen:

And so, while there’s a lot for judges to work with, who are concerned, who are modest, and care what the agency might have to say about something that they don’t know anything about, that they were not trained in amino acids, and they might care about what the agency has to say about that. Well, those judges may not get to hear these cases because of the way that forum shopping is working in our courts right now.

Jody Freeman:

Now, if Chevron‘s overturned, judges will feel emboldened. And you’re saying judges, in particular, who will be targeted will be, I think you’re trying to say, a more conservative set of judges, because of forum shopping. They will be invited to say, “You decide what the law means, and you don’t owe any respect whatsoever to these agencies, no matter how expert or experienced they may be. And no matter how much this legal question we’re bringing to you involves policy discretion and facts and technological information and science, you can ignore all that if you want, judge, because the Supreme Court said, ‘judges must decide.’”

And so, this is worrying, if you think about food and drug cases, where the Food and Drug Administration is regulating medical devices, and dealing with AI, and how it’s connected to medical… I mean, think of the complexities in so much regulation, and the notion of judges without a ton of experience deciding that they don’t have to pay any mind to the experts is what’s so disturbing.

There’s a variety of commentary on the case, Andy. Some of it is saying the sky is falling. And so, my colleague, Adrian Vermeule, wrote a really interesting post saying, “Look, everybody, take a breath. There will still be lots of opportunities for courts to defer, and now they’ll just be doing it under a different rubric. They’ll first say, ‘We, the judges, under the Administrative Procedure Act, have the duty to interpret the law,’ but they will go on in many cases to defer. So what’s the big deal?” How do you react to that?

Andy Mergen:

So I think in the short term, I expect a lot of instability and uncertainty. And then I think that because of the way the chief wrote the decision, there is some possibility that this will settle out, and also because there are a lot of good judges appointed by all presidents in the federal system who will accord the agencies’ judgments respect out of a sense of judicial humility.

But I think one of the cases that I… not really an admin law case, that I find very disturbing is the bump stock case. And that case was, the majority, in the dissent, focus on an entirely textual read of whether the bump stocks are covered by this 1934 machine gun law. And you look at that, and you think to yourself, “How can there be one clear meaning here when both sides have done such a great job?” Right? And I think in those cases, we’re still going to have a problem. I think I’m not convinced by the majority, and the fact that they have to include a heck of a lot of diagrams of firing mechanisms doesn’t help me be convinced.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah. It’s interesting you cite that case. What troubles me is not just what feels like a disregard or a mood of disrespect toward the agencies that I think the Loper Bright case embodies. For me, it’s not so doctrinal, the impact. It’s about announcing an attitude. And the attitude is, these agencies aren’t very important to decision-making, to deciding what statutes mean, even though they’ve been tasked with implementing them.

And it’s that disrespect, I think, that is so troubling when you pair it with textualism. The Supreme Court can’t agree on textualism at the moment, but they have various versions of it that the different Justices embrace. But they do agree on some things, and among them are the irrelevance of legislative history. And so, if you are now reading statutes and you say, “We’re not interested in what Congress thought it was doing when it adopted this law, and we’re not interested in the purpose of these statutes. Purposivism is not important. What matters is the dictionary, our canons of construction, our consideration of what the statutory provision means in context comparing it to other provisions.”

Justice Stevens once accused the textualist judges of putting on their thick grammarian spectacles and opening up their dictionaries to decide. That methodology, which leaves so much out and is so ascetic and so narrow, that’s what worries me, when you pair it with this attitude of disrespect for expert agencies operating in the real world. So I view Loper that way, not so much as, will it make a big difference to how much deference you get in a particular case? The government might still win, right? The government can still make good arguments and win.

Andy Mergen:

100%. The government can make good arguments and win, and I think they will win a lot of cases. To my former colleagues in the government, you’ve got this. You know how to write rules that will survive under the standards of Loper. But I completely agree with you about the disrespect that’s been shown to the federal agencies. And I think that, going back to Ohio for a second, I mean, Barrett, not the most liberal judge on the Court, so emphatically shows that the agency showed its work here in a way that the rule should be sustained. This is a public health rule, and there’s no sort of respect being accorded to the agency here.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah. Okay. Let’s move on to our last two cases. I’m going to do Jarkesy first. It’s a little bit different than the other two cases we just described, because it’s about agency adjudication. So Jarkesy held that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s internal administrative process for assessing civil penalties violates the Seventh Amendment, which requires a jury trial for all suits at common law.

So the enforcement of an anti-fraud provision in the statute is not properly conducted by in-house tribunals. It’s unconstitutional. The defendant is entitled to a jury trial. And it’s a complicated case that turns on a long-standing dispute about what kinds of issues Congress is allowed to assign to administrative law judges or internal tribunals within the agencies, and what kinds of disputes must require the opportunity for a jury trial.

And that turns on a distinction between what’s called public rights and private rights. We don’t need to get into it in tremendous detail here. But this case is a real change in announcing that the SEC can’t move forward with fraud proceedings in-house and must offer a jury trial, in part because it goes well beyond the SEC. There are a lot of enforcement agencies, including the EPA, FERC, the health and safety agencies like OSHRC, the Occupational Safety Health Review Commission, the mining enforcement body, a variety of enforcement agencies that administer penalties.

They basically say to people, who violate their statutes, whether those individuals are engaged in fraud or fail to protect privacy, or fail to disclose information, or they mislead and deceive consumers, or they expose workers to dangerous working conditions that result in their death or their injury. In all these situations, there are penalty assessments, and this goes for violators of environmental laws too. You violate the Clean Water Act. You fill wetlands when you’re not supposed to. Right? You injure or harm an endangered species when you’re not supposed to. There is a potential for civil penalties.

And what this case, Jarkesy, seems to say is, if what the agency is enforcing has a common law analog, so it’s part of the statute, yes, but it has a common law antecedent that preexisted the statute, then enforcing that provision, whether it’s fraud or any other common law claim that has an analog to what the agency is doing, requires the opportunity for a jury trial.

I’m summarizing a hard, complicated case. I hope that’s clear enough. Andy, what do you think of the legs of this decision? Do you think it’s going to have a broad impact, as I alluded to, as I suggested it might? For a lot of enforcement agencies, it will require them to offer the defendants jury trials, or do you think it’s more limited in its impact, as some commentators are saying, “This is really just about the SEC”?

Andy Mergen:

Well, I hope it’s just about the SEC. Right? We know that the Court thinks pretty highly of itself, and I think they’ve all long understood that part of their job is to provide clarity to the lower courts about how things work. And I don’t think that this case succeeds on that metric, because we have so many questions about how the public rights doctrine would apply to the work of these other agencies that just go unanswered.

And so, the bottom line is that I don’t know what to advise my colleagues at DOL or EPA, or elsewhere, about how this is going to work, or what the courts are going to say. And I do feel, as we’ve talked about previously, but that’s part of the game, just to make it really hard for the government to do its job. I mean, it’s really hard to be disappointed in government when it looks like it’s not doing anything. It’s taking your tax money and not doing anything. And I think we should focus, illuminate the fact that the Court makes it very hard for agencies to protect consumers, to protect workers, to protect the environment.

And so, they are culpable in failures of government. And I really, really hope that the agencies can take a hard look at this and press forward, because I think, as Sotomayor’s dissent makes very clearly, it’s a really important tool for the modern world. And just one last thought. I always thought going to law school, which I did a very long time ago, that the genius of the common law was that it could evolve. But the Court’s conception of the common law is that we’re locked in, whether it’s standing in TransUnion or the private rights doctrine here.

The common law doesn’t ever change. It’s just what it was so long ago. And that’s why I think we’ve long understood that the protection of the environment, the protection of health requires statutory commands, and these are commands from Congress. Congress set this up, and the Court is really discounting Congress’s hard work here.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah. It’s interesting, because in Jarkesy, when you see there are fraud prohibitions included in the securities laws, the Court treats that as Congress incorporated the common law into the securities laws, and therefore always preserved a Seventh Amendment jury trial, and therefore cannot assign the adjudication of statutory violations to the agency, to the administrative process.

So think about this in applying it to environmental cases. Right? You can think of enforcing the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act and assessing civil penalties. That’s, by the way, what this concerns. Right? This is about imposing fines on violators. So it looks like injunctive relief, compliance orders, and such aren’t covered by Jarkesy. One could analogize what the defendants are doing in those cases, polluting air, polluting water, polluting the ground that leads to exposure to toxics, to lead paint, and so on.

You could imagine somebody saying, “Well, those are just negligence cases. Well, those are just nuisance cases.” They have a common law antecedent. And, “Yeah. Congress included this as part of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act and TSCA and RCRA and so on,” but they’re still common law claims. And so, if you’re going to enforce them and try to impose penalties, which EPA does, right? I think it’s got somewhere between 1,500 and 3,000 civil enforcement cases every year, and most of them settle, but many of them are penalty cases.

Somebody is going to argue, “Well, you’re going to need to offer a jury trial. You can’t just assess these penalties in-house.” And when those arguments happen, that may lead the EPA or other agencies similarly situated to say, “Well, we just can’t process these penalty claims. We need to go to the Department of Justice, and they’re going to have to go into federal district Court and impanel a jury and so on.” And what does it mean, for example, for the Department of Justice that may be bearing the burden of a lot of enforcement agencies now, saying, “Hey, listen, can you take this over and go pursue a jury trial?”

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. No. I mean, I think you’re exactly right. And what does it mean for the Department of Justice? Well, to prosecute any case, civil or criminally, is a choice in terms of allocation of agency resources. Right? FTEs, the people, and the time that these things are going to take. And the Department of Justice and the U.S. attorney’s offices that compose DOJ, they have a lot on their plate. Right?

Jody Freeman:

Yeah.

Andy Mergen:

Having to prioritize these things is very, very difficult in the world that they’re acting on. And I think it made sense for Congress to invest in these agencies the ability to bring these sorts of penalty actions, and I think that’s what Sotomayor is getting at. The Court doesn’t live in a modern world, and I’m not quite sure why.

Jody Freeman:

And I think Sotomayor’s dissent is also great, because it reminds us over and over again that these administrative processes for imposing penalties, administrative law judges, then there’s usually an internal appeal within the agency to the top of the agency, whether it’s an appeals board or a commission or something like that, and then there’s judicial review.

Andy Mergen:

Right.

Jody Freeman:

So it’s not like the defendants are stuck, as Jarkesy was, with a $300,000 penalty then has nowhere to go. It’s just that in the first instance, it’s allowed to be pursued by the agency. I think where this all leads, and I’ll take us now to our final case, Corner Post, but I think where this all leads is to a situation where agencies are scrambling and reassessing and de-risking their enforcement policy, just like they need to be de-risking their approach to issuing rules.

And in some sense, of course they can do that, but they will be pursuing, in some instances, fewer cases than they would otherwise. They’ll be saying, “This isn’t worth the jury trial, so we won’t pursue this enforcement action.” And so, on balance, it’s less enforcement. And on balance, they have to make hard trade-offs. And it will shake out, but it’s a real burden. And I think, overall, it will lead to some chilling for at least some time for some agencies of enforcement actions.

So let’s move now to Corner Post. This was the last case of our four cases today decided this term. It came out the same day as the presidential immunity decision. And to a very significant extent, it was drowned out, of course, by a discussion of the Court’s sweeping decision granting near-total immunity to presidents for official acts. But Corner Post is really important, as another one of these impositions on the normal operation of the administrative state.

Corner Post essentially holds that the default six-year statute of limitation on challenging agency rules and actions is not applicable, and that, in fact, petitioners can continue to challenge agency rules, even long-settled rules that have already been challenged and upheld, far into the future, perennially, forever. And the default statute I’m referring to refers to the accrual of a cause of action, and the Court says the accrual of a cause of action is plaintiff-specific. It focuses on the plaintiff.

And when their injury arises, that’s when they are entitled to begin the clock running, the six-year clock running. And the bottom line is, you can create a new company, let’s say, merely for the purpose of challenging a long-standing rule, which is exactly what happened, I think, in Corner Post. And that means that we can never rely on at least some subset of agency rules. We can never rely on them being final, because somebody can always come along and challenge them. Do I have it about right?

Andy Mergen:

I mean, I think this too, again, is a massive sea shift in where the law has been. It promotes a tremendous amount of instability. And I would say that I find this case incredibly remarkable. I was very surprised that the Court wanted to take this up, because it does seem like it’s open season on regulations. Most of these regulations, many of them may have been challenged previously. And if they haven’t been challenged heretofore, then maybe there’s no reason to challenge them. But for sure, we know that there are already law firms and organizations going through the CFR-

Jody Freeman:

Old rules.

Andy Mergen:

… which just seems like incredibly a terrible way for us to do our business. Right? And there were always exceptions to this rule. There was sort of a doctrine in the Ninth Circuit, a case called Wind River, that sort of allowed for as-applied challenges. You can get this in the enforcement context. So I see no reason for this radical sea change, and I think the only reason to do this is to sort of destabilize the administrative state.

And my understanding of this case is that it was originally brought by entities that could have challenged the rule when it was initially promulgated, and Corner Post, the small business, was added later to sort of clear this hurdle. It’s hard for me to understand what it is that we are accomplishing here.

Jody Freeman:

I wish listeners could see you instead of just hear you right now, because what I love to see is your utter exasperation at this ruling. And it’s a little mystifying. I agree, but I wanted to be a little contrarian about it for a minute and say, maybe in the end, Corner Post doesn’t have quite as sweeping an impact as it might first appear.

And I say that because in Barrett’s opinion for the majority, she distinguished between statutes of limitation, which I think she’s trying to refer to statutes where there’s a time clock that starts running that is specific to plaintiffs and statutes of repose, which I think refers to a sort of jurisdictional requirement that petitioners have to take an action, like seek a rehearing, within a certain time period. And after that time period, if they don’t take that action, then the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider a petition for review.

There are lots of statutes of repose, if I’m understanding it correctly, in the U.S. Code. So the Clean Air Act, for example, the Clean Water Act, there are lots of examples we could cite where the entitlement to bring an action, the time clock starts running, triggered by something the agency does.

So that isn’t covered, I don’t believe, by Corner Post, because Corner Post refers to the accrual of a cause of action. You have six years. Well, we have a specific provision of the Clean Air Act that refers to a certain amount of time in which you can challenge a rule period, and it’s keyed off of when the agency does something, that is issue a rule or, say, issue a permit, or does something else.

So for those reasons, one has to go statute by statute, and every agency, I’m quite certain, is already doing it, to figure out if they are subject to this default six-year statute of limitation that is covered by Corner Post, in which case, right, their rules can be challenged forever, or whether something in their statute says, “No, no, no. You have a certain amount of time in which to challenge the rule, and after that, you’re out of luck.” And so, they’re kind of exempt from Corner Post. And I think that assessment is going on across the agencies, and it may be that Corner Post has less of an impact than we initially might think. I don’t know what you think of that, Andy. Is that too optimistic?

Andy Mergen:

Well, I think I want to end our excellent conversation on an optimistic note. So I hope that that’s right. I mean, I do think that the statutes that set up review of EPA rules and orders from particular agencies like the FAA and STB and FCC, all that are channeled into the courts of appeals, that Corner Post doesn’t reach them.

Sometimes parties rely on an equitable tolling argument that might apply in those circumstances. But by and large, I tend to agree that there’s a whole area of government activity that Corner Post won’t apply to. I think it’s interesting that the Corner Post comes out the same day as the immunity decision. And the immunity decision, in talking about the president, who is the head of the executive branch, the majority falls back on, I think it’s Federalist 70, where Hamilton talks about the need for an energetic executive, a president who is going to get things done.

And what I find aggravating about this quartet of cases that we’re talking about is that they all seem to make it harder for agencies to do things. So while I share your optimism, I do think there’ll be some time spent defending regs and new lawsuits. That could be where I would like the energy of the executive branch to be spent on something besides what I think are going to be many frivolous lawsuits.

Jody Freeman:

Yeah. I mean, I agree. All told, these four cases, if you really take the full impact of them into account collectively, they are a real challenge to the modern consensus about how the government should operate, and the freedom it needs to get the work done that Congress has assigned to it. I mean, it’s as simple as that. And they have to bulletproof their records to an even greater extent than they already do, and they have to contend with judges who feel newly emboldened to just assert their own view of the best meaning without any presumption of deference to fill in ambiguities.

If you imagine that they also have to now scour through their statutes to see if there’s an exception, essentially, to Corner Post, they have to scour their statutes to see if they have the option of offering a jury trial instead of just pursuing penalties administratively. Some statutes don’t let them offer that option. So what do they do? If you picture them trying to sort that out now, do they have to go to Congress and ask for that addition to their enforcement powers? If you picture them then dealing with the potential for emergency applications for stays, like in Ohio, and knowing that that’s going to be a much more common threat to important rules, and that the Supreme Court is open to those emergency stays.

I mean, if you add this all up, you could be feeling quite grim if you’re in the executive branch or one of the independent agencies. This is a bunch of nips and cuts and bumps and bruises, and the Supreme Court is doing real damage. And it’s rhetorically doing a lot of damage, too, to respect for what the administrative agencies do every day. It doesn’t seem to think that it’s important that these agencies are carrying out the wishes of Congress to protect civil rights and protect worker safety, and protect consumers from fraud, and protect the food and drug supply, and protect environmental health and safety.

It seems not to think those missions are very important. But at the same time, I think our message is, you do the work. You do the work. You do the work. You don’t do the challengers’ work for them. You don’t sort of give up too much by deciding you don’t have a hope of success in the courts. I think you just gird yourself for battle. I mean, that would be my message.

Andy Mergen:

Yeah, I agree. I think you really well stated, and I would just add to this, to the extent that there are law students or students thinking about going to law school listening to this podcast. The Supreme Court has erected a lot of challenges here to the function of government, and that means that government needs you more than ever. And so, if you are a superstar law student or somebody thinking about being a scientist, go to the government and take this challenge on. I think you’re not going to be bored, and your skills are going to be really, really needed.

Jody Freeman:

Right. I mean, good lawyering is always in demand, but think of now the demand. Think of what it means to now have to march into federal district court and advance all the best textualist arguments you can for why your reading of the law is the right reading. We may have to think of creative ways to communicate to district court judges about how statutes operate, and show them. I don’t know. You were joking with me earlier about photos and other kind of visuals that can help illustrate the operation of these laws. Were you kidding, or do you think we can do that in district court?

Andy Mergen:

Yeah. I think there’s stuff that we can do in the rulemaking process to lay out why the agency’s reading is absolutely the best reading.

Jody Freeman:

So as we were saying, good lawyering will be in more demand than ever. Thank you, Andy. It’s always such a treat to get to talk about these cases with you.

Andy Mergen:

Thank you so much, Jody. It’s been great.


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Administrative Law EELP News

Supreme Court Overturns Chevron Doctrine, Expands Power of Judiciary


On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its decision for two consolidated cases, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v. Department of Commerce, brought by commercial fishing groups challenging a National Marine Fisheries Service rule. In the decision, the Court overturned the 40-year-old Chevron doctrine, which stood for the principle that where Congress has left ambiguities in a federal statute, agencies may interpret the statute in implementing rules, as long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

In overturning the Chevron doctrine, the Court overrules a four-decade precedent, which, in the context of recent decisions by the Court confirms its intent to limit federal agencies’ authority to address public health, safety, financial, and environmental protections.

The majority’s opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, overturns the Chevron doctrine and directs courts to review agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act to ensure that an agency has acted within its statutory authority while respecting agency expertise consistent with Skidmore v. Swift & Co. The dissent, authored by Justice Kagan, calls the decision “Hubris Squared” for the Court’s willingness to overturn Chevron and, in doing so, dismiss stare decisis, inserting the judiciary in the “commanding role” with respect to regulation.

This analysis provides an overview of the majority decision and dissent. 


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Clean Air Power Sector

The Supreme Court Pauses the Good Neighbor Plan


In this piece, we review the decision, which continues an alarming trend of the Court issuing decisions under its emergency docket about important public health rules without the benefit of full briefing and engagement with the technical record, including evaluations of the health and economic impacts.

The decision temporarily halts the implementation of the Rule for the “applicants…pending the disposition of the applicants’ petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.”[3]

In deciding to stay a rule, the Court asks “(1) whether the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, (3) whether the stay will substantially injure the other parties inter­ested in the proceedings, and (4) where the public interest lies,” as articulated in Nken v. Holder. However, the majority does not carefully consider each element of this four-factor test. Instead, the Court cites a recent concurrence by Justice Kavanagh in Labrador v. Poe stating that in cases dealing with federal regulation, “the harms and equities [will be] very weighty on both sides.” The Court does not evaluate the significant public health consequences of the stay or the timing of any costs.[4] For example, the opinion does not consider that in the early years of the program, power plants are largely only required to operate pollution control equipment already installed and industrial sources have until 2026 or later to comply. The Court notes:

On one side of the ledger, the federal government points to the air-quality benefits its FIP offers downwind States … On the other side, the States observe that a FIP issued unlawfully (as they contend this one was) necessarily impairs their sovereign interests in regulating their own industries and citizens — interests the Act expressly recognizes … The States observe, too, that having to comply with the FIP during the pen­dency of this litigation risks placing them at a “competitive disadvantage” to their exempt peers…The States and the private applicants also stress that complying with the FIP during the pendency of this litiga­tion would require them to incur “hundreds of millions[,] if not billions of dollars.”

Rather than engage with these complex considerations, including public health impacts, the Court dismisses these questions and concludes without having a fully briefed record before it that,“[b]ecause each side has strong arguments about the harms they face and equities involved, our resolution of these stay requests ultimately turns on the merits and the question who is likely to prevail at the end of this litigation.”

The Court focuses on the question of whether the costs to install emission controls were reasonable regardless of the number of states subject to the Rule. The Court finds that some comments on the Rule raised with “reasonable specificity” the concern that EPA failed to consider how its cost-effectiveness methodology might yield different results if some of the states were to leave the program. The Court concludes that EPA’s failure to address these concerns in the Rule means that it was not “reasonably explained.” The Court states:

An agency action qualifies as “arbitrary” or “capricious” if it is not “reasonable and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U. S. 414, 423 (2021). In reviewing an agency’s action under that standard, a court may not “‘substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513 (2009). But it must ensure, among other things, that the agency has offered “a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983)[…]. Accordingly, an agency cannot simply ignore “an important aspect of the problem.” Ibid.

The Court finds a likelihood of success based on EPA’s alleged failure to reasonably respond to comments.

The dissent, written by Justice Barrett and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, strongly criticizes the majority’s decision to issue the stay without “fully engaging with both the relevant law and the voluminous record.”[5]First, the dissent explains that no one raised the procedural argument that EPA failed to sufficiently explain its response to the agency. Second, Justice Barrett dives into the administrative record to argue that the majority “dresses up” commenters’ arguments to conclude that at least one comment raised the concern that the exclusion of some states from federal program would “undermine EPA’s cost-effectiveness analyses and resulting emissions controls.” Justice Barrett makes clear that “those words are the Court’s, not the commenter’s.” She notes this criticism was developed during oral argument, giving EPA no opportunity to respond. Finally, setting aside the procedural arguments, the dissent looks to the merits and concludes that the record supports EPA:

[T]he rule and its supporting documents arguably make clear that EPA’s methodology for calculating cost-effectiveness thresholds and imposing emissions controls did not depend on the number of covered States. The rule applied EPA’s longstanding “4-step interstate transport framework” to create emissions limits that will prevent NOx sources in upwind States from significantly contributing to ozone pollution in downwind States.

The dissent also considers the practical implications of granting a stay, including the public health harms: “Given the number of companies included and the timelines for review, the Court’s injunction leaves large swaths of upwind States free to keep contributing significantly to their downwind neighbors’ ozone problems for the next several years.” Justice Barrett highlights that this public health harm will occur when the only error identified by the majority is failing to respond to a comment that the dissent argues the Court itself—not commenters—first articulated. She notes that the majority “does not conclude that EPA’s actions were substantively unreasonable.”

Ohio v. EPA decision confirms a troubling inclination for the Supreme Court to stay public health regulations under its emergency docket without full briefing on the facts underlying the regulatory record. It will be important to assess EPA’s response to this decision and the ongoing merits litigation for the Rule as well as EPA’s denial of the SIPs, but the near-term practical implication is that downwind states will face increased challenges to meet the public health air quality standards if upwind sources are not required to operate and install pollution control equipment.

Justice Barrett also warns against the dangers of using the emergency docket in this way, suggesting in the dissent that the Court “should proceed all the more cautiously in cases like this one with voluminous, technical records and thorny legal questions.” As a result of this case, parties may seek to appeal additional D.C. Circuit stay decisions. For example, the D.C. Circuit recently denied a motion to stay EPA’s chloroprene emissions rule.[6] Additionally, parties have requested that the D.C. Circuit stay EPA’s methane rule for the oil and gas sector as well as EPA’s greenhouse gas rule for power plants. While each rule has a distinct record and involves different public health harms and cost considerations, the Supreme Court’s willingness to stay the Good Neighbor Rule is likely to encourage parties to seek a review of any D.C. Circuit denial.

We will continue to track the related merits litigation for this Rule as well as stay motions for other EPA rules. Follow EELP’s Regulatory Tracker to stay updated.

[1] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U. S. ____ (2024).

[2] See EELP, 2023 Good Neighbor Plan (Mar. 2023), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2023/03/2023-good-neighbor-plan/.

[3] Utah v. EPA et al., Docket No. 23-01102 (D.C. Cir. Apr 13, 2023).

[4] Sean Donahue and Megan Herzog, “Bonfire of the Equities: Judicial Stays of Federal Environmental Regulations,” Harvard Journal on Legislation Vol. 62 (2024), https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jol/wp-content/uploads/sites/86/2024/06/FINALDonahueHerzog.pdf.

[5] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U. S. ____ (2024) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

[6] Denka Performance Elastomer LLC v. EPA, No. 24-1135 (D.C. Cir. Jun. 26, 2024).


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Administrative Law EELP News

Jody Freeman and Andrew Mergen Op-Ed: Will the Supreme Court Show a Little Humility?


Environmental & Energy Law Program Founding Director and HLS Professor Jody Freeman and Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic Director Andrew Mergen wrote an op-ed for the New York Times on how two cases argued at the Supreme Court yesterday could restrict the authority of federal agencies and upend decades of precedent.

“Overturning the well-established Chevron framework would invite litigation over virtually every decision, big and small, that agencies must make in their day-to-day work, decisions that are in part legal, but which also call for expert policy judgments.”

Read Jody and Adrew’s response to David French’s NYT op-ed on Chevron.

Read our Chevron doctrine roundup page.


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Administrative Law

CleanLaw — The Loper Bright Case and Fate of the Chevron Doctrine with Jody Freeman and Andy Mergen


In this episode, Harvard Law Professor and EELP Founding Director Jody Freeman speaks with Andy Mergen, director of Harvard Law’s Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, about a case the US Supreme Court will hear this fall, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, in which petitioners have asked the Court to overrule the Chevron doctrine — a legal doctrine that governs when a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a law. The case arises under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which authorizes requiring commercial fishing vessels to carry onboard observers but doesn’t specify that the fishermen should pay for those observers.

Jody and Andy talk about how the Supreme Court might cabin or overrule the Chevron doctrine, and what the case might mean for other environmental regulations and federal regulation more broadly.

 


Quotes:

The Chevron case involved a reading by the Environmental Protection Agency in the Reagan administration that was actually helpful to business, and allowed them some flexibility in updating facilities without having to get new permits under the Clean Air Act. Those were the facts of Chevron. It was viewed as a flexibility-enhancing interpretation, a deregulatory, business-friendly interpretation.” –Jody Freeman [6:00]

“I think that the folks who are advancing an anti-administrative state agenda are just worried that Congress has created a pretty robust environmental statutory regime, a pretty robust human health and safety regime, and the agencies are proceeding in good faith to implement Congress’s goals there. I think that at this point in the game, folks who are anti-regulatory would rather detooth the professional staff in those agencies rather than abide by what really does appear to be a neutral doctrine on its face.” –Andy Mergen [29:20]

“This is a profoundly important tool for the lower courts, to get their handle on issues that they’re confronting every day from agencies. It’s a really, really important framework for promoting stability and rule of law values. I think we would lose a lot if we were overturning Chevron.”  –Andy Mergen [48:10]

“Even if you overturn Chevron, you can’t avoid the fundamental problem, which is that Congress is giving agencies a job to do, and they need to have some flexibility interpreting their mandates” –Jody Freeman [53:55]

 

Transcript

Intro:

Welcome to Clean Law from Harvard’s Environmental and Energy Law Program. In this episode, Harvard Law Professor and EELP’s Founding Director Jody Freeman, speaks with Andy Mergen, director of Harvard Law’s Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, about a case the US Supreme Court will hear this fall, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, in which petitioners have asked the Court to overrule the Chevron doctrine—a legal doctrine that governs when a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a law. The case arises under the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which authorizes requiring commercial fishing vessels to carry onboard observers, but the statute doesn’t specify that the fishermen should pay for those observers.

Jody and Andy talk about how the Supreme Court might cabin or overrule the Chevron doctrine, and what the case might mean for other environmental regulations and federal regulation more broadly. We hope you enjoy this podcast.

Jody:

Welcome to Clean Law. Today, we’re joined by Andy Mergen, the director of our environmental law clinic, the Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, and a 30-year veteran of the Department of Justice, where Andy was an appellate litigator, litigating environmental cases.

We’ll talk to Andy about a case that will be heard this fall in the Supreme Court called Loper Bright, which involves a very important question of whether a famous case called Chevron might be overturned by the Supreme Court or severely cut back. Before we get any further, let me introduce Andy, and let him tell us a little bit about his career at DOJ before joining us.

Andy, welcome, not just to HLS, we’re delighted to have you on the team, but also to our first podcast together.

Andy:

Jody, thank you very much. Very exciting for me–my first podcast ever. It might be helpful for the listeners to know a little bit about what I did at the Department of Justice. As you mentioned, I was there for over three decades, where I represented federal agencies in court. There are lots of environmental lawyers in the federal government. They represent agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, and relevant to our discussion today, NOAA Fisheries.

Those agencies and those lawyers craft regulations and policies that affect the regulated community, that are intended to promote conservation and environmental values. When those policies are challenged in court, the Department of Justice represents them. In my 30 years, I’ve made countless Chevron arguments relevant to our conversation today about the Loper Bright case.

I should say at the outset, that Loper Bright was being briefed in the Court of Appeals during my time at DOJ. I’m not entirely an unbiased observer. I supervised the Loper Bright litigation and some related litigation during my time at DOJ.

Jody:

Let’s back up before we get too far into what Loper Bright is about, and provide a little context for why this is such an important case. This word Chevron comes up a lot, and legal aficionados and experts know what it stands for, but we need to explain that to everybody. We’ll do that in some detail, but just to set the scene here, Andy, tell us a little bit about what the basic issue in the Loper Bright case is.

What is the question presented? As some of our listeners know, the Supreme Court grants cert or grants review, and accepts particular questions that it’s going to review. In this instance, what is the question before the Court, and what will the argument focus on this fall?

Andy:

Sure. The question presented by this petition, before the Court, in this case, is a dramatic one. The petitioners, Loper Bright, have asked the Court to overrule the Chevron decision, a decision that’s been out there and informing administrative law since 1984.

Alternatively, the question presented asks the Court to limit the application of Chevron, in particular, where a statute is arguably silent about a particular issue, and the agency acts to fill that gap to fill that silence.

Jody:

For our listeners who really aren’t familiar with Chevron and what it stands for, let’s just briefly review that. I’ll try to summarize it, and Andy, maybe you can jump in with some additional commentary on it. This is a 1984 decision from the Supreme Court, in which the Court held that when a statute is silent on a matter, doesn’t address a matter of statutory interpretation, they’re often statutes that are unclear, or don’t address details of a regulatory regime.

When that’s true, the agency is entitled to interpret that statutory silence, or gap, or ambiguity, and as long as its interpretation is what the Court views as reasonable, the agency gets deference. To be more precise about it, the Court established a two-part test in the Chevron case, where it said, “Look, if Congress has addressed the precise interpretive question, what the statute means, then that interpretation governs. If Congress has not addressed the precise question at issue,” and by that, the Court means if Congress has been ambiguous or silent, “Then the agency gets deference for its reasonable interpretations.”

That sounds really abstract to the average listener, but the Chevron case was about whether the EPA could read the Clean Air Act in a way that gave it some flexibility to let companies add pollution at a particular location, and subtract pollution at a particular location, and treat all of that as if it was under a bubble, and therefore didn’t need to get a new permit for adding some pollution. That concept became known as netting out or bubbling out, and it was actually a deregulatory way of reading the Clean Air Act.

The Chevron case involved a reading by the Environmental Protection Agency in the Reagan administration that was actually helpful to business, and allowed them some flexibility in updating facilities without having to get new permits under the Clean Air Act. Those were the facts of Chevron. It was viewed as a flexibility-enhancing interpretation, a deregulatory, business-friendly interpretation.

It has gone on to great fame, because it established this principle of allowing agencies to have some interpretive flexibility in the face of ambiguous statutes. Andy, does that about capture it?

Andy:

I think that’s exactly right. It’s not surprising that Chevron took form in a statute as sort of technical and as complicated as the Clean Air Act. Underlying the doctrine is the notion that the agency has some particular expertise, and might be in the best position to fill the gaps left for Congress, or to answer questions about ambiguities when you’re talking about a statutory regime as complicated as the Clean Air Act.

Jody:

In that case, this is a little bit too specific and nerdy, but since everybody talks about Chevron all the time, it’s worth understanding what it involved. In that case, the statute defined a term called stationary source. That was really the regulated entity, right? If you operated a stationary source, you had to get a permit if you emitted pollution over a certain level. The case involved the question, “Well, what’s a stationary source?”

Is every single unit that produces pollution at a particular facility, is every single unit a stationary source? Therefore, every time you add some pollution from that unit, do you have to get a new permit. Could the agency say, “Well, a stationary source could include this idea of this bubble over the facility, and so you could trade off new pollution for old pollution by retiring units, and you’d still be within your stationary source.”

I’ve oversimplified it a bit, but that’s the kind of question that can come up in a statute, where Congress might’ve defined a term, stationary source, but not thought of every possible interpretation of that term that could arise down the road. In that situation, the agency was given flexibility by the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in that case, laying out the two-part Chevron test, and it then went on to become really a cause celebre of administrative law.

There’s really no more famous case in administrative law, right, Andy? So many law of your articles written about Chevron. Can you tell us what happened in the wake of this 1984 decision? Was it suddenly seen as a transformative case, where Courts were suddenly deferring to agencies in a way they had not before? How is it interpreted by the legal community at the time it was handed down?

Andy:

Yeah, that’s a really important question, because I think that the scholars who’ve studied Chevron have suggested that Justice Stevens may not have understood the decision to be as monumental as it’s become, but Chevron has some important virtues for both the government and for the judiciary. The case itself arose in a very complicated technical area of the law.

For busy judges confronted with these sorts of questions, it gave them a framework to give a hard look at what the agency has done, but also informed by some deference to the agency’s expertise. I do think that the doctrine has been transformative, and I think it has a lot of virtues that we shouldn’t overlook. There are a lot of critics of Chevron, so it might be important to talk about what it does.

First off, it doesn’t require judges to be experts. It allows judges to take a look at what the agency has done, and to, informed by the agency’s own expertise, and make a judgment about whether or not the agency’s action is reasonable. It also, generally, Chevron deference only applies to agency rulemakings, that’s the area in which the agency is formally taking a position about what the statute means.

Of course, that process is informed by considerable public participation, and notice and comment, so that the process is very deliberative.

Jody:

Let me jump in and just say, for those who aren’t experts in this, this doctrine, Chevron Deference, as it’s called, is about what should the court’s attitude be when an agency interprets the statute that they’re implementing? The idea is, what does it mean when a statute refers to a certain authority the agency has? These are legal interpretations, and people normally think, “Well, gee, isn’t it the courts who make the legal interpretations? Don’t the courts decide what the law means?”

What’s happened over time, of course, in administrative law, is that courts have had to develop an attitude toward how much deference, how much they’ll grant agencies flexibility to read the statutes they implement. If courts decided for themselves, every single interpretive question that an agency could possibly face, it would really be impossible for agencies to do their jobs. You were involved in many cases involving challenges to agency interpretations.

Can you give us a flavor of the kinds of things agencies have to decide on a day-to-day basis, that if the Court didn’t give them any flexibility, would make it impossible for these regulatory agencies to do their jobs?

Andy:

Sure. These things come up all the time. We’re talking about authority that, and this is important, as I’m sure we’ll discuss later, that Congress has delegated to the agency. Take, for example, the Endangered Species Act. We know that there are animals that are threatened and endangered. They have habitats. Those habitats are protected under the statute. The agency has to make fine-grained decisions about what sort of habitat supports an endangered animal? What are the essential elements of that animal’s habitat?

An animal has different things that goes on for it. It looks for food, it looks for a mate, it needs shelter, it needs to avoid other predators, all of those sorts of things. The people who are best situated to make decisions about what critical habitat consists of are, not surprisingly, wildlife biologists who have a real feel for those sorts of things. Congress can’t figure all of this out, so it gives the agencies authority to make those fine-grained judgements.

Those fine-grained judgements are made under a wide variety of statutes, not just environmental statutes, like the ESA or the Clean Air Act, but with regard to food, and health, and safety, and a whole variety of areas. We know that Congress can’t possibly master all of those details, nor would we want Congress to be spending all of its time figuring out what the requirements are for the spotted owl.

The agency can do that, and the agency can craft rules that govern critical habitat informed by its own expertise, and that’s part of the lift that Chevron’s performing.

Jody:

There are other examples, like the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, which says that the FDA has to determine which drugs are safe and effective. That’s a determination that Congress delegates to the agency. The agency’s got to figure out what’s safe and effective. We don’t expect Congress to make every fine-grained decision to implement a statute. It delegates authority to the agency.

Now that we’ve given you a flavor for the kinds of day-to-day, nitty-gritty, interpretive questions that the agencies have to resolve, and the reason why we want experts resolving them, let’s get back to Loper Bright. Andy, tell us the basics of this case. What statute does it involve? It’s a fisheries statute, right? What was the decision that the agency made in this rule that it issued, and why does it implicate this Chevron precedent that we’ve been talking about?

Andy:

This case arises under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, an act enacted in 1976, to regulate fishing and federal waters. Prior to 1976, there was not a sort of comprehensive federal statutory regime. The act is intended to promote sustainable fisheries, to promote the conservation of aquatic resources, so that we can continue to enjoy eating them, they can continue to be an important part of our economy, so that fishermen can continue to develop these resources and pursue their livelihoods.

It’s a complicated statute, and a controversial one, in many regards. The act is a complicated statute. It envisions a role for the regulated community in the development of the regulatory regime, a really unique role, in that fishery councils and there are regional councils for New England, for Alaska, for the Western Pacific, those councils develop the rules, and present them to the federal government, to NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Marine Fishery Service an agency within NOAA, to accept the council’s proposal.

The councils’ membership consists of state fishery officials appointed by the governor, and fishermen themselves. They come up with the rules, and present them to the federal government. The federal government makes a decision about them.

Jody:

This is a super unique statute, right, Andy? I’m glad you described it in that detail because Magnuson-Stevens actually creates a kind of participatory process, right? The council itself devising the rules under which they’re going to operate, in order to preserve and protect these fisheries, and then the agency considers their proposals, their management plans, and adopts them as binding regulations.

That’s a unique structure. It involves the people most affected on the ground by these rules in the development process, in a very robust way that’s different from other statutes, right?

Andy:

Yeah, it’s a really unique statute. It’s hard to think of a statute, another resource statute in which the regulated industry has such a unique role in the development of the regulatory regime. That has opened the statute up to criticism. Environmental groups sometimes compare it to a situation in which the fox is regulating the henhouse. Fishermen themselves often are unhappy with the regime, because not all fishermen fish in the same way.

They use different gear, they pursue different species, and the rules necessarily might impinge on some operators, and be a boon for others. This rulemaking process is one that often leaves many folks unhappy at the end of the day. This particular regulation relates to observer coverage in the herring fishery in New England. The pursued fish is the Atlantic herring, fish really good for you, not a super important economic fish, but an important one.

Jody:

Andy, in this case, the rule that NMFS adopted, the agency adopted, that had been proposed by the regional council, was a rule requiring the private fishermen themselves to pay for onboard monitors. Can you explain how that came to be?

Andy:

Yeah. First monitoring and observers, the placement of an individual to record the catch and develop information about the catch that the fishermen are taking in, has long been part of the regulatory regime. It actually predates the act. NOAA started using observers in 1972, and there’s no dispute that the statute authorizes the placement of observers in fisheries.

Often, NOAA itself will pay for the observers. In this particular case, what has made this controversial is that the rule requires the fishermen to pay the freight for the observers. The fishermen must have room for the observer on the vessel, and pay costs that are estimated to be around, everyone uses the figure of around $700 a day. That’s somewhat unusual in the sense that often, the agency itself pays the freight on the observers.

Here, the question presented is not whether you can require observers. Plainly, the statute has long contemplated that. The question is, does the statute authorize the council and NMFS to adopt a rule? By NMFS, I mean National Marine Fisheries Service, to adopt a rule that requires industry to pay for the observers?

Jody:

The reason why this is a Chevron question, if you will, and why we went into the long description of Chevron is, the statute doesn’t precisely address this question. There’s no specific provision in the law that says, “Yes, industry can be required in some instances to pay for these onboard observers.” It’s a question of, does it fit within the statutory regime?

There are other parts of the statute, right, Andy, that speak to the obligation to pay for onboard monitors, in some instances, but not this provision. It doesn’t speak to it. That’s really the interpretive question. Can the silence that Congress left on this, the ambiguity that Congress left, can that be reasonably interpreted to mean that the private party, the regulated industry itself, in some instances, would have to pay for the onboard monitor? Does that capture it?

Andy:

It does. I would just sort of say that every lower court that has addressed this issue, let’s say that there are four, two district courts, and two courts of appeals in DC in the first circuit, every district court that has looked at this issue has said that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. They’ve done that using traditional tools of statutory interpretation. There are provisions that talk about penalties for not paying observers, and that gives rise to an inference that maybe you could require observers.

Relatedly, there are a lot of regulatory requirements that fishermen pay the freight on. There are a large number of gear restrictions for certain fisheries, meaning that the agency and the council have determined that only certain types of nets or gear can be used by the fishermen, and that cost is borne by the fishermen themselves. So too are the costs for safety equipment, right? This is a dangerous business, and I think that context matters here. The cost of outfitting these fishing vessels is paid by the fishermen themselves.

The agency looks at all of that and sort of says, “We’re not doing anything extraordinary here.” The fishermen say, “This is doubly extraordinary. First, you’re putting somebody on our vessel, and second, to add insult to injury, you’re making us pay for it.” That is sort of at the heart of this dispute. Now, I want to say that what gets lost in this rule a little bit is the idea that this applies to every vessel. It doesn’t. NOAA was shooting for 50% coverage, and the rule itself provides a wide number of exceptions.

Although NOAA is requiring the fishermen themselves to pay for the observer, that $700 a day estimate, the agency pays for the training, and this requirement only kicks in if the agency has the money to do the background work, the training of the observers, et cetera. This is one of the cases that is before the Supreme Court. It’s not clear whether or not these requirements were ever going to kick in for these particular fishermen, but they were sufficiently concerned about this, that a lawsuit did emerge.

Jody:

In fact, there’s not been an instance where the federal government has required any private party to pay for one of these onboard observers yet. In fact, the Biden administration suspended the rule, because the agency did not have the money to do the training and the administrative support work for the monitor. In fact, none of this has actually been implemented yet, but as you say, it was still enough for the Supreme Court to grant review. Let’s talk about granting review, because this is a really interesting process here.

The cert petition, the petition asking the Court to take this case, says some very interesting things, and it gives you a flavor of the narrative of the case. I wanted to talk to you about the framing of this case, Andy, and why it becomes the vehicle for the Court to reconsider this Chevron decision. First of all, the cert petition leads with the sentence, “Operating fishing vessels in the Atlantic is hard work.” That sets the tone for the idea that really informs the request of the Supreme Court to please hear this case.

The idea is what you said, Andy, about this being sort of insult to injury. The idea is this rule is a horrible imposition, a terrible imposition, on the regulated industry because it saddles the vessels, it saddles the industry with having to have these unwanted onboard monitors on the vessels where they don’t belong, and there isn’t room for them. This is all the implication of the cert petition, and on top of it all, requires the industry to pay for them.

There’s a paragraph in the cert petition I just want to read, because it gives you a sense of the tone of the case, and the way it’s being pitched to the Court. The rule is being characterized as, “Authorizing the agency to force the governed to quarter and pay for their regulatory overseers without clear congressional authorization.” This notion of the government imposing itself on the regulated industry is very powerful in the cert petition.

The idea is there’s a little guy here being trampled on by the overreaching federal government. You and I talk a lot about narrative, Andy. Can you say something about this? Why is the cert petition framed in this way?

Andy:

Yeah, I think it’s important to understand that the people who care the most about the demise and elimination of the Chevron doctrine are people who are big businesses and highly regulated industries, because their goal is to render the regulators as toothless as possible. They understand that Congress can’t possibly do the fine-grained analysis, as we’ve talked about, that EPA and other regulators have an important role to fill in, in terms of applying their expertise to Congress’s goals, aspirations, intent, statutory language.

The more you weaken the regulators, the more freedom you have from regulation. The demise of Chevron is related to sort of a big business agenda, not everybody. There are many people who understand the importance of regulation, especially environmental and public health regulation, but there are many folks who would like to detooth the regulators, and getting rid of Chevron is a mechanism for doing that.

In order to develop a story about that, it really helps to focus on the little guy. Fishermen are the little guy. We see on TV shows like Most Dangerous Catch. We understand that these are really hardworking people, working super long hours in a dangerous industry, with often very low margins of return. In terms of a narrative about government overreach, the fishing industry is sort of a jackpot, right? It allows you to tell the story about government beating up on the little guy.

A lot is lost in that narrative, but it’s a very forceful one for getting the Supreme Court to review. This wasn’t lost on the lower court, either. Judge Walker, who dissented in the DC Circuit, focused in his own dissent about how difficult this industry is, the demands of fishing. He talked about Billy Joel’s song, The Downeaster ‘Alexa,’ which has to do with fishermen out in a storm. He talked about Ernest Hemingway, The Old Man and the Sea. It’s a very romantic notion, and that, I think, has given the anti-Chevron folks a huge boost by focusing on this industry.

Notably right, though, the fishermen themselves are not funding this. These challenges have been funded by nonprofits that work to further an anti-regulatory agenda.

Jody:

Back to Chevron in this case, make sure we understand how these things are connected, this is a case about, look, can a statute authorizing an agency to require fishermen to have onboard observers on their vessels, also be read to authorize the agency to require the fishermen to pay for them? That’s the question. That’s a standard interpretive question.

Does the statute allow this? Is this a reasonable view of the statute? The tension is over, well, who should decide that? Is that something the agency should get deference for, because it’s in its wheelhouse, it’s part of a regulatory regime that it implements, Congress gave it to implement? Or is that something the Court should decide?

Now, if Chevron stands for the idea that really, we should err on the side of deferring to the agency, the reason why you say people who are opposed to regulation and want to cut back the reach of the federal government, why they want to overturn Chevron, is that they’d rather have the Court interpret all the ambiguities in the statute, because they’re making a bet that the Court’s interpretation of these statutes will be less generous to regulation.

Chevron is just a marker. Chevron is just a symbol. Chevron is just a stand-in for who do we want making the interpretive call, the decision on what the agency is allowed to do under an ambiguous part of a law? If we think that the Court is probably going to favor the regulated industry, the Court’s probably going to cut back on agency authority, then we don’t want deference to the agency. We want the Court to decide. That’s all Chevron is about.

It’s funny in a way, because if you take the view that when it’s a close call, we’re not sure maybe what Congress meant. They were ambiguous or they were silent on something. If we take the view that the experts should decide, the EPA should decide, the Department of the Interior should decide, whatever the regulatory agency is, the Securities and Exchange Commission should decide, if that’s our view, that ought to favor whatever administration happens to be in power at the time.

If you’re a Republican-led administration, and your executive branch agencies are interpreting statutes, then your interpretations will favor your Republican policy agenda. You would think a legal doctrine that says, “Let’s defer to those agency experts,” would favor the Republican administration in power, just equally as it would favor a Democratic administration in power.

It’s always struck me as odd that this seemingly neutral doctrine that says, “No, no, no. Expert agencies should have some room to maneuver,” why it has become such a target of the conservative anti-regulatory agenda. Can you help explain that?

Andy:

Yeah, it’s such a great point, Jody, because if we go back to the original Chevron case, who lost that case? The Natural Resources Defense Council, one of the premier environmental organizations in the United States, went down in flames. Who won that case? The Reagan Administration, one of the most notorious or effective anti-regulatory presidencies of all time. It seems odd, because it seems like a neutral principle.

I think that the folks who are advancing an anti-administrative state agenda are just worried that Congress has created a pretty robust environmental statutory regime, a pretty robust human health and safety regime, and the agencies are proceeding in good faith to implement Congress’s goals there. I think that at this point in the game, folks who are anti-regulatory would rather detooth the professional staff in those agencies rather than abide by what really does appear to be a neutral doctrine on its face.

Jody:

It does seem like the conservative critique of the Chevron doctrine is that administrations, they’re going to take these laws and run with them, and try to fill in the gaps in these statutes, and find authority that isn’t really there. The worry is that it’s the Democrats who like regulation. They’re going to do regulatory things with statutes, whereas Republican administrations probably won’t. The idea is Chevron unequally helps the Democratic administrations accomplish their regulatory agenda.

That’s the idea, that the administrative state is dangerous to start with, and that the people most likely to use it to actually accomplish some kind of agenda to regulate the private sector are likely to be the Democratic administrations. If you kill Chevron, if you kill the idea of deferring to those agencies, you’re really disadvantaging the pro-regulatory Democrats. That sort of sound like the agenda?

Andy:

I think that’s exactly right.

Jody:

Back to the case, I wanted to ask you one more, a couple more, actually, sort of inside baseball things. This cert petition was written by Paul Clement. Paul Clement is a former solicitor general, extremely well-respected Supreme Court advocate who’s going to represent the petitioners in this case. Does it matter who represents the petitioners? Does it matter to the Court that it’s Paul Clement who’s going to be arguing this?

Andy:

I think it matters a great deal, and I think our colleague, Richard Lazarus, has written about this. There is a Supreme Court bar, sadly, mostly men who specialize in Supreme Court advocacy, who have a lot of credibility with the Court. The Court wants to hear from those advocates in particular. The fishermen, Loper Bright, by obtaining Paul Clement to represent them in this case, did a really smart thing.

Paul Clement is a very, very effective advocate. What the briefing has done here is pick on a number of themes that are maybe not directly relevant to the case at hand, but enhance the case that he’s making. Let’s talk about, for instance, what you mentioned earlier, the “quartering” of the observer, the notion that the observer is going to be on this fishing vessel. Well, that taps into the Court’s Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, the notion that your private property should be sacrosanct, that the government or in Cedar Point, union organizers shouldn’t be allowed access to private property.

Without referencing any of those cases directly, Paul Clement is picking up on some themes that are very important to the conservative Justices. He is an extraordinarily effective advocate who understands what the Court cares about.

Jody:

That’s so interesting too, because the quartering part of it, that is, having the individuals, the monitors on board the vessel, is actually not controversial. It’s literally authorized specifically by the statute. Yet the cert petition emphasizes it, to sort of poke at this idea you talk about, that this is an intrusion into private property. There are other themes in the cert petition, and we’re going to see it in the briefing when we get to the briefs, that have to do with separation of powers concerns.

There’s another theme I wanted to ask you about, which is the brief emphasizes that to require these observers to be paid for, their salaries to be paid by the private business, is really an interference with appropriations, in some way. There’s a separation of power concern that, for Congress to appropriate money to enforce regulatory schemes, that’s the idea here, if Congress chooses not to appropriate money to the agency to do its job, then the agency can’t do its job.

The idea is that’s a constraint or a control mechanism to help Congress oversee agencies. The suggestion in the cert petition is, by allowing an agency to require the regulated industry to pay for regulation, the agency is circumventing the appropriations process, somehow cheating it, and therefore, that removes a mechanism of congressional oversight.

That’s the implication in the cert petition. Can you comment on why that’s sort of ingenious by Paul Clement?

Andy:

Yeah, the cert petition and the opening brief are really cleverly crafted. This idea that this somehow violates appropriations principles and separation of powers principles is well-developed in the brief. Frankly, I think it’s a really dangerous idea for those of us who care about environmental regulation and protection. Congress doesn’t have to appropriate money for scrubbers, for EPA to require scrubbers in power plants. We don’t normally understand the agency to have to have a separate appropriation to require regulatory control mechanisms and improvements.

The fishing industry, for a long time, there are fine-grained decisions made by regulators, including down to what sort of hooks can be utilized by fishermen on long line fishing rigs. Depending on the kind of hook, it can be more expensive or cheaper to do. We don’t suggest that Congress needs to appropriate money for the regulator to require those sorts of mechanisms. I think it’s a very clever and powerful argument on its face, but very dangerous to environmental regulation in general.

I think it ignores the reality of how fishing has been regulated for decades, in terms of the imposition of certain regulatory costs on the industry itself.

Jody:

You’re talking now about the opening brief, because starting to see the briefs come. I was even still way back at the cert petition stage. The reason why I was interested in this is just getting the Court to take this case is a victory. It’s interesting how the seeds are planted in that cert petition, to try to pique the interest of the Justices, and get them to say, “Yes, this is the vehicle in which to reconsider whether we’re going to stick with the Chevron decision.”

Andy:

Yeah, it’s a really powerfully crafted cert petition that pushes so many buttons for the conservative Justices.

Jody:

One more question about it, one more inside baseball question. Why did it take the Justices five, I think it was, conferences before they decide to take the case?

Andy:

I think there are a couple of reasons. First, in general, the Court won’t grant cert after one conference anymore. The inside baseball, I think, is that they want to make sure there are no threshold sort of justiciability issues that would keep the Court from getting to the merits. As you note in the government’s response to the cert petition, the government said, “Hey, this program’s not even going to be implemented.”

No one’s ox is going to be gored anytime soon. The Court takes some time to understand whether that’s… They want to grant cert on cases where they think the merits matter. This takes some time to do that. I think one thing we haven’t mentioned is that Justice Jackson won’t be hearing this case. She was on the initial DC circuit panel. She was ultimately replaced by Judge Srinivasan, but because she had prior exposure to the case, she is likely to sit this out, so it’s only eight instead of nine Justices.

I think there’s probably some discussion about whether they want to press forward on a case as big as this one without having the full Court. One of the criticisms of the Chevron decision itself is that only six Justices took part in that decision. Here, you’re talking about overruling Chevron with only eight out of nine.

Jody:

That, Andy, is a great segue to the Justices themselves. It’s worth talking about how they think about Chevron, what they have said about Chevron in the past, and the way the new super majority, the conservative super majority, looks to be leaning on these issues. Let’s talk a little bit about that. I’ll start by saying, several of the Justices have made very clear that they would like to overturn Chevron, that they think that it’s for courts to decide what the law means in all instances, no deference to the agency.

That includes Justice Thomas, who made this plain, I think, most recently in a concurrence in the Michigan case in 2015, where he said basically, Chevron takes authority that belongs in the court and gives it to the executive branch. This notion of deferring to them is unconstitutional in Justice Thomas’s view. Then there’s Justice Gorsuch, who’s written repeatedly and powerfully, he thinks Chevron should be overturned. I think most recently, it was in the Boffington case, where he dissented from a denial of review.

He said, “Chevron should be overruled and finished, dead, polished off forever.” He wrote the same thing when he was a 10th circuit judge, of course, in a well-known case called Gutierrez-Brizuela. The chief himself has expressed a lot of skepticism about Chevron, famously in the Arlington case, where he would’ve voted to have a threshold test, asking whether Congress had delegated the matter, the specific interpretive question to the agency, so making it harder, shrinking the space for giving deference.

There are more Justices who’ve made their views known. I think Kavanaugh has also written about Chevron. Andy, can you help us understand where they’re situated?

Andy:

Yeah, I think as you point out, especially as far as Justice Gorsuch is concerned, in the administrative state, I think Justice Scalia would say, “This wolf comes as a wolf.” He has it in for the administrative state, and he is anxious to dispense with the Chevron doctrine. I think we can assume that the same is almost certainly true for Thomas and Alito. The Chief has been very skeptical about Chevron. It’s an interesting doctrine to track over time.

Justice Scalia, a revered conservative, has often been conceived as one of Chevron’s biggest boosters. He had a particular view about Chevron, which that he wasn’t ever going to need to get to step two, because using the tools of statutory construction, he could usually define Congress’s answer. In many ways, he was not a Chevron skeptic. Thomas’s views have also evolved over the doctrine over time, and the Chief seems to be very concerned about the doctrine not being overly broad, that there are several forms of the doctrine.

There’s an aggressive form and a more limited form. It’s going to be very interesting to see how this plays out. We don’t know much about where Justice Barrett falls on the spectrum, and we don’t know whether the Court will overturn, or as the petitioners ask in the alternative, just constrain the doctrine.

Jody:

It’s worth going back now, thinking about the Justices and what they might do to Chevron, whether to cut it back, or to overrule it altogether, it’s worth going back to the facts of Loper Bright. The question is whether the onboard observers can be required to be paid for by the regulated industry. Now, we’re talking about a provision that doesn’t explicitly answer that question.

Normally, Chevron would say, “You have a first step.” The court goes step one and asks, “When we read the statute using normal tools of statutory construction, can we say Congress has answered that question?” A lot of times, the Justices will say, “Yeah, we can tell what Congress meant. We can say yes or no, using just the normal interpretive techniques we use.” They never have to get to step two of Chevron, which is, the only reason you get to step two is you can’t resolve it. Congress didn’t address it.

You say, “We can’t tell what they meant, so we’re going to move to step two and ask, ‘Is the agency’s interpretation reasonable?’” That’s the normal operation. You talked about Justice Scalia being a defender of Chevron. The reason he was a defender of Chevron, as you alluded to, was he said, “I normally can figure out what Congress was trying to do at step one, so I never have to get to deferring to the agency.”

Justice Scalia explained that he liked this structure, he liked this way of approaching what the statute means, because it would be a good format that would constrain and discipline the lower courts. He thought that first asking them to say, “Has Congress addressed this?” Then saying, “Well, no, if Congress hasn’t, the statute’s ambiguous, or it’s silent, we will move to step two.” He thought that was a good structure to keep the lower courts in check.

Justice Kavanaugh and other Justices, like Justice Scalia, have admitted that they think they pretty much can answer the question at step one, so they don’t need to defer to the agencies in many instances. I get into this in detail only to say, there are options here for how to resolve this that fall short of overturning the Chevron precedent. The Court could say, “Well, there are more steps to take before you ever get to this question of whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, and therefore we defer.”

They could, in other words, create more limitations on the Chevron two-step test. Andy, it’s always so abstract to describe it this way, and I always worry that we lose people when we talk about it in this detail, but can you give us a flavor of how this case could come out, in a way that would preserve the essence of Chevron, but still cabin it somewhat?

Andy:

Yeah. I think that the question here really relates to silence, and what do you do with silence? We know that silence and ambiguity are related concepts, but different. Ambiguity means that there are some clues, but I can’t really tell. It’s not clear to me which of the options I should choose. In a case of genuine ambiguity, Chevron teaches, you take the agency’s option as long as it’s reasonable, but silence, that’s something else altogether. What do you do with something that just doesn’t answer the question at all?

I think a constrained view, a cabined view of Chevron would be, there’s no role for any deference to the agency, if what you’re dealing with is just silence. If it’s just silence, then you can’t conclude that Congress delegated any authority to the agency. Now, I personally, going back to the facts of this case, the petitioners, the fishermen, would argue, that it’s silent. There’s nothing in the statute that says it’s okay to require the fishermen to pay. In the absence of that, the agency gets no deference, and it’s simply not reasonable for all of the reasons they’ve laid out.

I think the government has a good case to make here. It’s a case that other courts have accepted in this arena, that there are all sorts of other clues, including statutory language, that would suggest that this has been delegated to the agency, and it is a reasonable construction of the statute. Imagining a scenario where the statute’s absolutely silent, you can imagine a court, and maybe this Court, saying, “There’s no role for Chevron.”

It fails at sort of, if the first step of Chevron is whether the doctrine applies, the Court could say it doesn’t apply to statutory silence, and that would be constraint of the doctrine, but not overruling it.

Jody:

Does the government in this case, would you say, Andy, have a good argument at step one of Chevron, that Congress has actually addressed this question of whether the observers, their salaries have to be paid, or could be paid, in some instances? Is there a good argument that we can collect enough clues, and use our canons of construction, and come to a conclusion that actually, this is clear?

Andy:

I think that are. One of the things that skeptics of Chevron say is that, for all of these constitutional and other reasons, deference to the agency is inappropriate. Courts know how to use the tools of statutory construction, to divine meaning and to render principal decisions. We all know that you and I could deploy the same statutory toolkit, and reach different decisions in tough cases.

Here, I think that there is a way to apply the statutory construction toolkit, in a way that the government wins at step one, but the government hasn’t won at step one so far, so it seems unlikely that they will at this point.

Jody:

Give us a flavor of what you think the government’s best arguments will be here, to try to prevent the Court from overturning Chevron altogether.

Andy:

Yeah. Let’s just focus on the big picture. There are two briefs that have already been filed in this case by distinguished administrative law scholars, one brief by Tom Merrill at Columbia, and one brief by Chris Walker at Michigan. Both of these gentlemen fall into a conservative camp. They’re not liberal or progressive scholars. They’re more conservative than that. Both argue strenuously that to overturn Chevron is destabilizing, in a way that’s unhelpful to the Courts.

For different reasons, and for some similar reasons, they argue, exactly as you indicated earlier, alluded to earlier, Jody, that Justice Scalia understood the framework to be very helpful to the lower courts. It is helpful to the lower courts. At step one, it asks them to deploy the tools that they’re very used to using to discern congressional intent. At step two, it admits that they can’t be experts in the Clean Air Act. They can’t be experts in the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, and that there’s a role for deference to the agencies there.

If you’re a busy district court judge, or a busy court of appeals judge, that framework is going to help you make the right decision nine out of 10 times. Now, what Paul Clement argues is that we know Chevron is bad, because the Supreme Court hasn’t applied it for something like six years, but the Supreme Court hears 70 cases a year. It’s not hearing hundreds and hundreds of cases buried in the weeds of the Clean Air Act or the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.

That analogy just doesn’t work. This is a profoundly important tool for the lower courts, to get their handle on issues that they’re confronting every day from agencies. It’s a really, really important framework for promoting stability and rule of law values. I think we would lose a lot if we were overturning Chevron. I think that case is made very profoundly well by these conservative scholars who say, “What’s the alternative? This is a framework that has worked well.”

The Court has some skepticism, but the Court only hears these big ticket items and has other tools in its toolkit to deal with situations where it feels like the government is engaged in overreach.

Jody:

The other thing that’s interesting is the rationale here for why you preserve Chevron, to keep things controlled in the lower courts, has to be accompanied by an argument, doesn’t it, that says, “You, the Supreme Court, have plenty of ways around Chevron when you want to get around it.”

Isn’t that the other piece, Andy, that the briefing is going to suggest to the Justices, “You don’t have to worry about Chevron, you don’t have to apply it. In fact, you don’t.” As the last several years of shown, and as you said, the Court just doesn’t cite Chevron much anymore. That’s partly because litigants don’t cite it anymore, because they know the Court’s not very friendly to it.

Can you talk a little about that dynamic? Litigants not citing it, Court not citing it, and how it’s sort of gone into disuse, in a way, in the Supreme Court?

Andy:

Yeah, it’s definitely gone into disuse in the Supreme Court because we know enough about the Justices and where they land on this issue that the government is not going to cite Chevron to the Supreme Court. It has other ways of making its point, by sort of focusing on traditional statutory construction analysis, which is what it has done in some of the HHS cases, the Becerra cases from the last couple of terms.

My former colleagues in the Solicitor General’s office have been very wary of making Chevron arguments to this Court, because they don’t want to see it overturned, and that’s because it still has utility in the lower courts. I think the government is probably being very cautious about how it deploys the doctrine, but I don’t think it should step back from deploying the doctrine where courts have again and again said on a particular issue, “This is exactly the kind of issue in which the agency gets Chevron deference.”

Since the doctrine’s been around since 1984, there are plenty of cases that are around like that, where the courts have said sort of like, “No, this is a reasonable construction by the agency. Whether you call it Chevron or not, it’s fine.” I think the doctrine is still deployed in the lower courts in that way, and I think that the lower courts benefit from that application of the doctrine. I think the last thing lower courts want to have to do is master the details sort of de novo of the Clean Air Act.

I think they want to understand that what the agency has done is reasonable. What’s happened since 1984, and I think this is really important, is that the litigation is so much more sophisticated. In the 1980s, there were public interest groups on the environmental side, like NRDC, pressing their agenda. There was Ralph Nader and his litigation components. Now, there’s a whole bunch of major players. The Chamber of Commerce is very sophisticated.

There are organizations like the organization here, Cause of Action Institute, that are policing government overreach, that are constantly looking for examples of those cases where the government needs to be reined in. In that circumstance, I don’t think the Court needs to overturn Chevron to know that the cases on the margins, those cases that they’re worried about, where bureaucrats are running amok, that there will be people there to call the government out. You can rest assured that that’s the case without overturning this doctrine.

Jody:

It’s interesting, because I don’t think there’s an administrative law case that has attracted more attention. The last 40 years, the law reviews have been filled with articles, pages and pages discussing Chevron, what it means, who ought to decide these cases, does the power belong in the judiciary? Has the judiciary abdicated its role by giving too much deference to the agencies?

There are scholars who say, “Look, let’s say you go overturn it. Let’s say the Court says, ‘We’re no longer going to abide by this principle, that agencies can fill in the gaps and ambiguities,’ and they’re not going to get any deference for legal interpretation. Where would that leave you? You’d have to go back and reconstruct some legal principles around when an agency’s expertise counts for something, and when the Court’s going to supplant it.”

You can’t escape this question, which is, how much room are you going to give the agencies to implement statutes that regulate consumer protection, the financial integrity of the markets, the safety of the food and drug supply, whether the air and water is clean enough to breathe and to drink? These questions, the nitty-gritty details of statutes with so much complexity, at some point, the courts have to decide whether they’re going to give the agencies a little bit of room to maneuver, to accomplish their statutory missions that Congress delegated to them.

Even if you overturn Chevron, right, Andy, you can’t avoid the fundamental problem, which is that Congress is giving agencies a job to do, and they need to have some flexibility interpreting their mandates. Does that sound right to you?

Andy:

I think that’s exactly right. I think your point is extremely well taken, that if Chevron were overruled, the courts would continue to find instances where deference should be accorded to the agency. Good judges act in the spirit of not complete confidence. I think there’s a famous Learned Hand quote to something of that effect, “The spirit of liberty is a spirit that’s not too sure of itself.” In those cases, I think you would see courts anxious to defer, or concluding that it is appropriate to defer.

I think in all of the academic literature about Chevron, what’s meaningful to me, and I say this as a former three decades as we started, government lawyer, that the scholars who are advocating for the preservation of the doctrine, like Tom Merrill, like Chris Walker, were litigators themselves. Tom was in the Solicitor General’s office. Chris was in the Appellate section of the Civil Division, where he confronted tons and tons of these cases. I would say that, to some extent, their scholarship is informed by the practical realities of what happens in the courts every day.

To go back to your excellent point about Justice Scalia, this framework is one that courts can use that promotes rule of law values. It matters a lot to me that the scholars who are endorsing it are the scholars who have been in the courtroom and have seen that for themselves.

Jody:

There’s tremend ous anticipation waiting for this case, because the stakes are much higher than this being about one fisheries case, right? Whether or not it turns out that the statute here, Magnuson-Stevens, can be read to let an agency require private industry to pay for the onboard observers, that’s an important question, but it’s not why everyone cares about this case. They care because we’re waiting to see what the Justices do around this question of deference.

It’s become a kind of trope, right? It’s a stand-in for where the Court is headed in terms of its interest in reining in the administrative state. It’s part of a much bigger picture. We’ve seen some decisions in recent years, the last few terms from the new six Justice supermajority, in which it’s quite clear that there is some deep skepticism about regulation. There is deep concern about what the Court seems to view as a tendency to regulatory overreach.

There’s these themes that the Court keeps hitting on, and I think this case plays right into those themes. Concern about what the Court would say is an unaccountable bureaucracy trampling on liberty. You see this language laced throughout decisions, and I think that puts in context why everybody is waiting with bated breath to see what’ll happen in Loper Bright. Do you see it in that same framework?

Andy:

Yeah. I think the case is somewhat extraordinary in terms of the briefing. The Loper Bright’s brief, its merits brief, is mostly devoted to overturning Chevron. There’s very little discussion of this actual controversy that arises under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This is a concerted effort to cut back on the administrative state, and it is plain as day that is what’s happening here.

One thing that makes me sad is that these observers, this sort of coverage, exists to meet conservation goals. One of the things that both the Fishery Management Councils and the regulator, National Marine Fisheries Service here is bycatch of other species, river herring, shad. The observers help further a conservation goal, help to manage the fishery in a scientific way. You’ll see no discussion of that in the opening brief by the fishermen.

There’s no mention of the conservation goals. There’s no mention of the need to manage these fisheries for sustainability. That, I think, tells you a lot about this case, that it’s not about this particular controversy. It’s about a bigger agenda. I mention it because I do think that this rule was generated by the council in order to further the conservation goals of the statute. That matters too, right?

Jody:

Yeah.

Andy:

That’s also important.

Jody:

Well, it’s reminiscent of Sackett. We can go back to other cases, other big decisions, where what’s missing from the Sackett decision is a discussion of the goals and purposes of the Clean Water Act. It seems that, especially in environmental cases, the agenda that Congress has established in those statutes, the need to protect the environment, in this case, the need for conservation of fragile fisheries, it just falls out of the litigation at some point, and they become about other things.

I’m struck by the briefing, it goes back, again, to the cert petition which laid the seeds for this, but the briefing that sort of uses these hyperbolic claims about how Chevron, this mild-mannered doctrine that lets agencies have some room to maneuver, led to a catastrophe, an explosion of regulation from unaccountable agencies. That’s the framing, and that’s just not true. What’s the evidence that this doctrine led to an explosion of regulation?

The idea here is there’s a fear that overzealous, unilateral presidents with regulatory agendas are going to somehow use this flexibility in the Chevron doctrine to do big things under statutes that don’t really allow them to do that. There’s a conservative agenda to stop them. The stoking of this fear of the government as hostile, foreign interloper, intruding upon liberty-loving, regulated communities. That’s the framing, and I note it because it’s a very striking anti-government framing of these issues.

Andy:

Yeah, I couldn’t say it any better. That’s exactly right.

[ADD MQD HERE!!!]

Jody:

Andy, before we conclude, I just wanted to ask a final question of you, which is, what are you betting on? How do you think this case would come out? Is there a soft landing that you’re counting on? Where do you think the Court will land? What do you think the most important implications will be for how the government does its job? That is, how agencies then approach implementing environmental statutes, and other statutes too?

Andy:

Yeah, I’m hopeful that the doctrine will be constrained. Cabined, to me, seems like the more likely result, I think. That’s probably because as an environmental lawyer, I have to be something of an optimist. We’re in the business of training students up to do good things, and I think that requires that I be optimistic. I think that the case has been made by people like Tom Merrill and Chris Walker, that it would be incredibly destabilizing to overturn the doctrine. I’m hoping the Court will take that into consideration.

I think you’ve made the point, which I wholeheartedly agree, that if the doctrine were overturned, courts would still defer to agencies in a myriad of cases, because they would have to, because they lack the expertise. Some judges would be more willing to do that than others, and others would implicate policy judgments as they saw fit, which I think is a real downside of overturning the Chevron doctrine.

I think in the immediate aftermath of a decision, overturning Chevron, the job gets a lot harder for government and for agencies. It gets harder for them to know how to proceed. It gets harder for the government, for DOJ to know how to defend the agencies. That, after all, is the goal, right? For the people who are hostile to the administrative state, to make it harder for government to do its job. That all tracks into a myth that government isn’t useful and is incompetent.

If you make it harder and harder for the government to do its job, then you can always say, “Well, they’re not doing a very good job,” because you’ve made it difficult for them to do it.

Jody:

It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you disable the government enough, and you beat up on it enough, then it becomes harder for it to deliver on its responsibilities. As an administrative law professor myself, I always look forward, in a way, to these big cases, because they’re wonderful teaching opportunities, but they’re so consequential, they’re so important. They have such far-reaching implications.

I think we don’t really have many defenders anymore of why the administrative state is so important. We don’t talk anymore about what the meat supply looked like in the United States before the Food and Drug Act. We don’t talk anymore about rivers exploding into fire because they were so polluted. We don’t talk anymore about the serious consequences of financial markets if they were completely unregulated, and had no boundaries around them, and consumers weren’t protected from fraud.

We could go on and on through a variety of laws that are meant to regulate a modern economy, a modern society, and protect public health against modern threats. Government is deeply involved in those enterprises. Those are enterprises that are good for society. This is not to say the government never over reaches. It’s not to say the government’s always efficient. It’s not to defend the government in every instance.

I’m the first to say we need better government, but this narrative of there’s important stuff that needs to be done, there are important protections that people care about, we don’t hear about that. What we hear about is a deep state overreaching and treading upon a liberty-loving people. That’s what bothers me so much about the narrative of these cases, that cumulatively, they feed to the public, and they feed to the press, a kind of one-way notion about what’s negative about government. I think it’s pernicious, and I think it’s corrosive.

Andy:

Completely agree.

Jody:

Let’s not end on that note. Andy, thank you so much for your expertise on this. I’m going to put myself in your lifeboat and say, I think that the Court may well cabin Chevron, keep it around, so that the lower courts have a kind of guidepost for how to approach how agencies make expert decisions in run-of-the-mill cases. The Court will not use it when they don’t want to.

Well, Andy, this has been really fun. I hope we get to do many more podcasts together. Let’s make a plan to reconvene and talk about Loper Bright after oral argument, so we can get your impressions and talk about where we think the court might be headed. We shall meet again on this very same issue. I hope it’s a date.

Andy:

Thank you. I look forward to it.


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Administrative Law Clean Water

Sackett v. EPA Decision: What the Justices Said and What this Means for Water with Jody Freeman, Richard Lazarus, and Steph Tai


 


In this episode, Harvard Law School Professor and EELP’s Founding Director Jody Freeman, who was also an independent director of ConocoPhillips, speaks with Harvard Law School Professor Richard Lazarus and University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Law Steph Tai about the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sackett v. EPA.

They discuss how the Court’s reliance on a dictionary definition of waters will drastically limit Clean Water Act protections: severely shrinking what qualifies as covered wetlands and streams, and as a result, enfeebling the federal government’s ability to protect the larger water bodies the act still clearly covers. With a deep dive into the history of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions, and the science of watersheds, they put into context how the Sackett decision flies in the face of what Congress intended when it passed this landmark legislation.


Quotes:

“[I]f the Court uses a continuous surface water connection test, which is what they’re moving towards, to traditional navigable waters required for wetlands, more than 50% of wetlands in some watersheds would no longer be protected by the Clean Water Act. With respect to streams: Ephemeral and intermittent streams would not be jurisdictional waters and thus more than 90% of stream length, in some watersheds, would no longer be protected by the Clean Water Act.” —Steph Tai [6:50]

“… [W]e don’t have to guess what the purpose of the Clean Water Act is, it’s the very first section of the act, section 101, it says its purpose is to preserve the biological, physical, and chemical integrity of the nation’s waters. That is the purpose of the statute. And unfortunately, what the court is done here, it’s made it impossible to do that both to those waters that are now no longer covered themselves, which are important, and because their connection to the waters the court says are covered. So all sets of those waters will no longer be effectively protected by the statute. And when Congress did this in 1972, they did it deliberately. They deliberately decided we needed a national law, a comprehensive law. They deliberately defined the term navigable waters to mean waters of the United States as a broad term, and the accompanying legislative history said, we’re doing that deliberately. We want to tap into the full scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. So, they were intentionally not making this depend on traditional notions of navigability. And that’s been the sort of the settled law. And now the court has turned back the clock.” —Richard Lazarus [13:45]

“I felt a sense of disappointment there wasn’t a dissent that really took the majority to task and chimed in about the danger of the Thomas-Gorsuch approach and view of the Commerce Clause… [L]urking here in the Thomas-Gorsuch concurrence is a very radical view of the Commerce Clause and what Congress can do and what it means for environmental law more generally.”  —Jody Freeman [42:50]

“There is a real tone and tenor and attitude of real disdain for the enterprise of the agencies in these cases. For the job the government has been given by Congress in these statutes, a sense of the government is the enemy. The government imposes and impinges on liberty. There’s a line in the Alito opinion, Richard, that says the Clean Water Act is a ‘potent weapon’ and it has ‘crushing’ consequences. Not, ‘there’s a mission.’ Congress gave the agency a mission to protect the waters of the United States.” —Jody Freeman [55:08]


Transcript

Intro:

Welcome to Clean Law from Harvard’s Environmental and Energy Law Program. In this episode, Harvard Law Professor and EELP’s Founding Director Jody Freeman, who is also an independent director of ConocoPhillips, speaks with Harvard Law Professor Richard Lazarus and University of Wisconsin Madison Professor of Law Steph Tai about the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sackett v EPA.

They discuss how the Court’s reliance on a dictionary definition of waters will drastically limit Clean Water Act protections: severely shrinking what qualifies as covered wetlands and streams, and as a result, enfeebling the federal government’s ability to protect the larger water bodies the act still clearly covers. With a deep dive into the history of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions, and the science of watersheds, they put into context how the Sackett decision flies in the face of what Congress intended when it passed this landmark legislation.

We hope you enjoy this podcast.

Jody Freeman:

Welcome to CleanLaw. Today, we’ll do a deep dive on the Supreme Court’s decision this term, in Sackett versus EPA. We’re joined for this discussion by Steph Tai and Richard Lazarus. First, let me introduce Steph. Steph is a professor of law at the University of Wisconsin. They are an expert in the interaction between environmental and health sciences and environmental law and administrative law. They have in the past, before becoming a law professor, been an appellate attorney at the Environment and Natural Resources Division in the Department of Justice, but now as a professor at the University of Wisconsin, Steph has become a leading expert who writes amicus briefs about the scientific background in environmental law cases. Welcome, Steph.

Steph Tai:

Thank you.

Jody:

Richard, of course, is known to our listeners as my partner here in the Environmental and Energy Law Program. He’s my colleague, of course, at Harvard Law School, and one of the nation’s best-known experts in environmental law and Supreme Court environmental litigation. Richard, you are the, as you know, the Howard and Katherine Aibel Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Welcome, and thank you for joining us.

Richard Lazarus:

Oh, Jody, I’m absolutely delighted to be here. I always like doing these podcasts.

Steph:

And I’m very excited to be here. Thank you very much.

Jody:

Well, this is going to be a very interesting conversation and we’ll get right to it. Richard, can I ask you, without going into the long saga that led up to this decision, to just summarize what the Supreme Court decision here amounts to? What did the Court hold?

Richard:

Yeah, and I’ll do it very quickly, Jody. So what this case concerned was the geographic reach of the Clean Water Act. That’s one of the nation’s most important pollution control laws passed, really, in 1972. The more precise legal issue before the Court turned on the meaning of navigable waters, which the statute defines as waters of the United States, and particularly in this case, as those terms applied to wetlands.

Most broadly speaking, the Court had two rulings in the case. The first, was the term waters in the United States are only those “relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water that form geologic features.” That’s a dictionary definition which the Court embraced. Then second, on the wetlands question in particular, the Court said, the only wetlands that are covered by the Clean Water Act are those which are “Indistinguishably part of a body of water that constitutes waters in the United States.” As we’ll discuss, both these rulings significantly reduce the reach of the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Water Act regulates discharges of pollutants in the waters in the United States. So this is a big case.

Jody:

So we’ll get to the implications in a moment, and I’ll turn to you, Steph, to talk first about what this means for water pollution control and management of the aquatic systems of the United States. But just to be clear for listeners who are coming to this for the first time, and Richard, you jump in here, if anything I say doesn’t jibe with you, we’re talking about the 1972 landmark Clean Water Act, which for the first time forbade the discharge of pollution into the nation’s waterways without a permit and also forbade the discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United States without a permit. So we’re talking today about those prohibitions.

Richard:

Absolutely. A revolutionary law, right? For the first time, what the Water Act did was said, “you cannot discharge pollutants into the waters of the United States without a permit.” So all those discharges were presumptively unlawful. Before they hadn’t been, the Clean Water Act says they’re all presumptively unlawful. If you want to do them, you’ve got to get a permit. That was dramatic.

Jody:

And that’s one of the revolutionary aspects of the law, and we’ll talk more about that in a bit, but just to put that out on the table as the framework, and then as everyone knows, I think, but I want to make clear, this law is jointly implemented by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers. And the Army Corps is in charge of issuing permits to anybody who wants to dredge or fill their property if their property qualifies as “Waters of the United States,” including wetlands, which this case defines. Right, Richard?

Richard:

Absolutely. It’s a really interesting statute that way, how two different agencies administer it.

Jody:

The last fact I want to mention that in this case the petitioners are two people, the Sacketts, who had a lot that was near a lake called Priest Lake, and they began backfilling it to build on it, and they did that without applying for a permit. So that’s what sort of kicked off litigation. And there’s a long saga of litigation, we can talk about it in a bit, but that’s the context here. These are property owners, they want to develop their property, they dumped or filled material into what arguably is waters of the United States, questions whether they have to get a permit, and if they don’t do that, are they subject to civil and criminal penalties? So with that background, Steph, based on what Richard said about the limited jurisdiction now of these agencies, as the Court narrowly defined what constitutes waters of the United States, what do you think are the implications for management of the nation’s aquatic systems?

Steph:

So to give some context into this, it’s not only the feds that have regulatory authority over wetlands in general. There are a few states that also have their own wetlands protections law, basically, dredge and fill permits for ones that are not federal wetlands. However, that’s not many of the states. And so what this means is that the loss of federal coverage is the loss of all coverage for these areas in those states that haven’t adopted anything that goes above and beyond the federal standard.

In our amicus brief, we represented 12 water science societies and we actually had a number of scientists working with us to conduct models to show the loss of wetlands coverage in various kinds of areas. One of the things that they determined was that if the Court uses a continuous surface water connection test, which is what they’re moving towards to traditional navigable waters required for wetlands, more than 50% of wetlands in some watersheds would no longer be protected by the Clean Water Act. With respect to streams: Ephemeral and intermittent streams would not be jurisdictional waters and thus more than 90% of stream length, in some watersheds, would no longer be protected by the Clean Water Act.

And this is shown through a number of different models looking at where continuous connections exist versus where there are either intermittent connections due to changes in climate, rainy season connections versus dry season, non-connections, various things like that. And so it’s going to be a pretty significant loss as a result of the test that’s being used by the Supreme Court.

Jody:

So, Richard, just to jump back to you, the way you articulated the Court’s holdings and the definition it used, I want to stress something you said. You said, when you were quoting from the Court, “Only those relatively permanent standing or continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographical features described in ordinary parlance as streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.” So now, we’re talking about what the agencies have jurisdiction to regulate. So those are the, what we recognize as waters of the US that are sort of relatively permanent and we recognize them on a sort of common conversation as that.

And then Richard, you talked about adjacent wetlands that are quote, “Practicably indistinguishable and have a surface connection.” So Richard, I just want to be really crystal clear about this. Are you saying that wetlands that are a mile or two or three or 10 away from a permanent standing body of water, like a lake or a river that is always flowing, are those wetlands that are a little bit further away, are they completely unregulable by the EPA and by the Army Corps?

Richard:

As I read the opinion, I don’t think you have to be a mile away. The Sacketts wetlands were 300 feet away. One was 30 feet away, and the Court said it’s not physically adjacent. It can be separated by a berm between the two, and according to the Court, it’s not regulated. This is a dramatic effect. I was actually just traveling around central Illinois last week and I was driving through it and I was looking at these water bodies going, “Not covered, not covered, not covered.” It was amazing to me how much would not be covered.

And to understand the significance of this, Jody, one has to realize that what the Court has done is not only eliminate a large number of waters that were themselves protected, they’ve actually made it impossible to protect those waters which are covered because most pollution doesn’t go in the first instance into those relatively permanent waters. It goes into water bodies that are hydrologically connected to them. So what will happen now is people will pollute into those other waters and those waters, because they’re hydrologically connected, those pollutants will end up in the covered waters. But because the non-covered waters are not covered, EPA will never know about those discharges. They’ll have pollution levels increasing in the covered waters, but they won’t know where the discharges are because the discharges aren’t covered.

Jody:

This gets us something really important. I want to flip back the Steph for more clarification. We’re talking here about how pollution moves around through hydrological connections in aquatic systems that are not always visible to the naked eye. I want to say the words “fate and transport,” but I know I’ll get in trouble. And the idea that a surface connection has to exist to have jurisdiction kind of flies in the face of the scientific knowledge we have about how these aquatic systems work. In other words, the pollutants move without there needing to be a surface connection. Steph, am I misstating the science terribly or have I got it about right?

Steph:

No, you’ve got it about right. And let me explain a little bit more. There’s a lot of different ways in which there can be hydrological connections, there can be subsurface connections where pollution can move through, for example, extremely porous subsurfaces like karst, and therefore something that appears on the surface not to be connected to some navigable waters is actually in fact connected. And that sometimes filling in with various dredge and fill materials into seemingly disconnected waters can actually still lead to travel of pollutants to these navigable waters. Things that everyone accepts are navigable waters. There’s that part.

But I also want to emphasize that there’s a lot of other types of connections that aren’t necessarily subsurface connections, but everyone recognizes their connections. So for example, there’s a lot of areas in the West, that for most of the year, are pretty disconnected from navigable waters because it’s the dry season. There’s a long dry season in the West. But when there actually is a rainy season, then there’s this very strong connection.

And so if you pollute those areas, and they might not even be watery areas, it might just be an area in which there is some kind of temporary stream during a rainy season, then you’ve got lots of pollution that can travel into what are considered traditionally navigable waters. And so we tried to emphasize that in our brief and we tried to emphasize that this science is well understood and it’s not magic.

I mentioned modeling, and that often causes discomfort for non-scientists, but these models are based on actual physical tests. Physical tests about how certain types of material can transmit pollutants through there, and sometimes very visible physical tests such as actually sending dye tracers through just to show that, yes, in fact, if you put something in this one area and there is a rainy season, yes, it ends up in another area. And so we tried to explain that to the Court, that the science isn’t magic, that it’s well understood, and it’s well understood that these types of areas can be connected in ways that don’t fit into the Supreme Court’s surface recognizable kind of test.

Jody:

So we often encounter this kind of problem in environmental law. I’m sure both of you would agree, where law and science don’t necessarily overlap or the law doesn’t take into account the science sufficiently.

And I just want to return to you, Richard, and ask you this, what’s the point of the Clean Water Act? Why does all this scientific conversation matter? Why does it matter that pollutants go from certain areas that are sometimes wet and sometimes dry and wind up in navigable waters of the US. Why does this conversation matter to the law under the Clean Water Act?

Richard:

Yeah, we don’t have to guess what the purpose of the Clean Water Act is, it’s in the very first section of the Act, Section 101, it says, its purpose is to preserve the biological, physical, and chemical integrity of the nation’s waters. That is the purpose of the statute. And unfortunately, what the Court has done here, it’s made it impossible to do that, both to those waters that are now no longer covered themselves, which are important, and because their connection to the waters the Court says are covered. So all sets of those waters will no longer be effectively protected by the statute.

And when Congress did this in 1972, they did it deliberately. They deliberately decided we needed a national law, a comprehensive law. They deliberately defined the term navigable waters, meaning waters of the United States, as a broad term, and the accompanying legislative history said, “We’re doing that deliberately. We want to tap into the full scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” So they were intentionally not making this depend on traditional notions of navigability. And that’s been the settled law. And now, the Court has turned back the clock.

Jody:

So I really want to get into this now in some detail because you’ve laid out what the Act clearly says and what the legislative history clearly shows, and yet the Supreme Court’s decision in this case seems to ignore both of those things. So let’s talk about this history that’s quite interesting, the fact that the Congress uses the term “navigable waters” and then goes on to define the term “navigable waters” to say, “Waters of the United States,” which seems broader, as you just said, compared to the traditional notion of navigation, waters of the US seems broader. Richard, why did Congress use the term navigable and define it more broadly?

Richard:

Yeah, I wish they hadn’t. That’s our conundrum. And in the opinion, what you see is, Alito scratches his head and he says, “Why did they define navigable waters as waters the United States?” And it essentially ignores the definition of waters of the United States and says, “Boy, they confused that, they should have just said navigable waters.”

And their answer, basically is, they took an old term of art, navigable waters, but then to make clear they were not wedding the jurisdiction of this statute to it, they defined it as waters of the United States, and they included legislative history to make it clear. As we may discuss soon, the Supreme Court understood just that. In 1985. They recognized it and they said they didn’t mean to go just traditional navigable waters. It’s of limited import, the term navigable. And they meant to go further understanding the hydrologic connection and how you can’t just focus on one, you got to focus on the whole. And the Court did that nine to zero in the Riverside Bayview case.

Jody:

Let’s talk about Riverside Bayview and then let’s talk about SWANCC and then let’s talk about Rapanos, and then let’s wind up here in the Sackett case. But I don’t want us to go too far down the rabbit hole. So let me give a quick framing and then turn to you, Richard, and then to you, Steph, to add some color commentary.

So Riverside Bayview, which Richard’s talking about, the 9-0 decision the Supreme Court handed down that said, “Look, when this Clean Water Act says navigable waters, that includes wetlands that abut navigable waters.” And Congress did not mean a traditional notion of you have to be able to essentially sail or have a ship traverse the waterway for it to be covered by the Act.

And then the Court in a subsequent case called SWANCC, struck down the migratory bird rule and held that isolated intrastate ponds, that’s the way the Court characterized them, isolated intrastate ponds that migratory birds touch down on that were not themselves adjacent to open water, you know, lakes or a running stream, that those ponds were not jurisdictional waters under the Clean Water Act. And so the Court there constricted what EPA and the Corps could do.

And then subsequent to that, right, Richard, we get to the Rapanos case, in which, bear with me folks, the Supreme Court vacated a lower court decision that extended jurisdiction of these agencies that read the Clean Water Act to cover ditches or drains or intermittently wet areas that were miles from open water. But the Court did not give us a majority rationale for rejecting those areas as wetlands because four justices, a plurality, agreed to one rationale, four justices would’ve deferred to the Army Corps and EPA’s authority to regulate those wetlands, in that case, in Rapanos, and one justice, Justice Kennedy laid out his own test for determining whether the areas in that case would’ve been covered by the authority of the Clean Water Act, and he called that the significant nexus test.

Richard, I just did my very best to be as brief as possible. Can you explain the Rapanos case from 17 years ago, I think it is, and how this decision in Sackett does or does not line up with Rapanos?

Richard:

Okay. If it’s okay with you, Jody, I’d like to go back a little before Rapanos.

Jody:

Sure.

Richard:

And then put Rapanos and perspective with regard to Sackett.

Jody:

Great.

Richard:

So what’s fascinating about the Sackett case is that it has Justice Scalia’s fingerprints all over it, although of course he died in 2016, but seven years later, a ruling comes out, which is all Justice Scalia, and this is underscored in a couple ways. One, the Riverside Bayview case is decided in the fall of 1985, nine to zero. What happened six months later? Justice Scalia joins the Court.

So what all justices find easy in the fall of 1985, unanimously easy, is that waters of the United States is functional, you’ve got to recognize the hydrologic cycle, they’ve got a problem. They can’t just deal with traditional navigability. They all get it, Rehnquist, everyone gets it. Easy case, nine to zero written by Justice White, who’s no big environmentalist.

Scalia comes on, September ’86, and right away he plants two seeds in the Court’s rulings, which come to fruition ultimately in Sackett. The first one is, he says, “Stop reading that legislative history,” which the Riverside Bayview Court had looked at. “Stop reading legislative history. That’s irrelevant. You’ve got to look at the text.”

Second, he says, “Congress, their Commerce Clause authority is really limited. It doesn’t extend to any activity affecting interstate commerce.” He plants those two seeds during the 1990s in a series of cases. Those two seeds then express themself for the first time, in a Clean Water Act case, in SWANCC in 2001. As you said, that’s where the Court says, “All right, we actually think the word navigable means something.” Why? Because they refused to look at the legislative history unlike Riverside Bayview. And they also say, “We think this raised some serious question of constitutional law, too,” because they’re now adopting Scalia’s idea of limited Congress Commerce Clause authority. That’s the first shoe that drops.

The second shoe looks like it’s dropping in 2006, that’s Rapanos. And just before it hits the ground, Kennedy boots it away. Because in that case, Scalia wants to do sort of this dictionary definition. The navigability is important. He wants to go back to waters being a dictionary definition of these permanent standing waters, geological features. But Kennedy denies him his fifth vote, and Kennedy announced a different test, significant nexus test, which actually was in the SWANCC case in 2001. He announces it and the shoe doesn’t drop. And EPA then does all these rule makings, which are a group hug of Kennedy’s significant nexus test.

Jody:

So Richard, let me intervene and ask one more thing here. And Steph, maybe you can chime in, too. Kennedy’s significant nexus test is an acknowledgement of the hydrological connection theory, that in fact, we shouldn’t go too far here and limit the authority of these agencies and limit what Congress can do to give the agencies power to regulate these waters that are adjacent and also that are hydrologically connected, because they have an impact. The aquatic systems are interlinked. Steph, can you comment on that, that Kennedy captured something that was true about the science of these systems. Right?

Steph:

Yeah. I think he recognized that it’s not just visual connections that makes an actual connection between potentially wet area and a navigable water. It’s actually really similar to the tests that Justice Breyer created in Maui versus Hawaii Wildlife Fund, where he talked about, “Look, if you have a discharge from a point source that’s not directly into surface waters but is a functional equivalent of a discharge into surface waters, then that counts for the permit requirements under the Clean Water Act.” And you can sort of see a connection between the significant nexus test and the functional equivalent test. They’re both trying to get at the same thing. Right? Some actual scientific connection between what’s the polluting activity and the actual pollution occurring in the waters.

Jody:

And Richard, back to you, as you pointed out, after the plurality decision in Rapanos, Kennedy’s concurrence, the EPA and the Corp had to go back and figure out, “Well, how are we going to regulate wetlands? What’s going to count? What fits under the significant nexus test?”

Richard:

Right. And so they follow Kennedy’s guidance, significant nexus, which obviously the other four justices, and that’s going to be Justice Stevens and all, they got broader, but they certainly also said, “We agree with Kennedy, too.” So there looked like there were five votes for that significant nexus test. And there was language in the SWANCC case written by Rehnquist supporting the notion of significant nexus.

So they run with it. But the problem, of course, is the Court isn’t static. And not long after, President Trump comes in, he puts three new justices on the Court and everyone knows that point that significant nexus is probably dead and Rapanos is going to be the new majority view. It’s so obvious, that in the Sackett case, which basically inverts the Rapanos plurality into a majority opinion, the petitioners in that case weren’t subtle. The cert petition basically said, I’m not going to quote, this basically said, look, there were four votes in Rapanos, we count at least five votes now. Grant this case and convert the plurality in the majority, and the Court granted. So no one was surprised, but disappointed.

Jody:

Well, so meanwhile, in the background over the period of years, the Obama administration tries to write a rule that will explain the jurisdiction of EPA and the Corp and what wetlands are covered and what aren’t, using the significant nexus test. Trump administration comes in, that rule gets repealed, rescinded, and replaced with a narrower definition. That rule gets rescinded and replaced now by the Biden administration, which is trying to put out its own regulations.

So there’s a series of rulemakings trying to define what constitutes jurisdictional waters under the Act, and there’s a bunch of litigation in the background that we won’t get into that’s trying to gum up the works and prevent these agencies from exerting their authority. So it’s really a legal mess when cert is granted in this case. And we ultimately get the decision we got. Let’s talk about that decision.

First I should mention the Sacketts have won twice. They first went up to the Supreme Court on the question of really an administrative procedure issue, justiciability issue, which was, hey, can they get judicial review when all that’s happened is a compliance order has been issued by EPA to comply with the Act? And they haven’t because they haven’t applied for a permit.

And the argument was, “Look, you’re not at the end of the agency’s decisional process. It’s not final. You’ve just received a compliance order, nothing has happened to you, so you don’t get access to judicial review.” That goes up Supreme Court in a case called, you won’t be surprised, Sackett, and they win. So they win on that issue and then they go back to the lower courts and they go up on the merits, Richard, as you described, and now they win this case. Let’s talk about the opinions. Richard, let’s talk about Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority. Tell us what you think of it, his reasoning, and whether you think it’s sound.

Richard:

Yeah, happy to do that. If it’s okay, I’d like to do one earlier jurisdictional issue.

Jody:

Sure.

Richard:

To show how much the government knew that this case was destined not to have a good result, they tried to kill the case. They withdrew the administrative compliance order against the Sacketts. They actually said, “We’re not going to enforce it, we’re not doing it now, we won’t in the future.” So they tried to make the case moot, they tried to kill the case, and they put a ruling. So they tried to say, “We’re done. Sacketts, go build. We’re not going to stop you from building.” And the Court took the case anyway, even though as a prac matter, there was nothing left to it. The mistake they may have made was they didn’t withdraw their original jurisdictional determination. And that’s what arguably kept it alive. All right?

So the Alito opinion for the Court, and it’s for five justices, and we’ll talk next about the concurring opinions. Let me tell you what I think was not surprising about it and what was surprising about it. What wasn’t surprising was that the majority, written by Justice Alito, embraces Rapanos. They take Scalia’s plurality and Rapanos and they basically make it just like the petitioners wanted, they make it a majority ruling. They rely on the dictionary definition of waters. That’s where they get basically the same definition of permanent geological features, standing waters, continuously flowing, streams, ocean, lakes. That’s all from Rapanos, it’s now a majority opinion.

They also reject the idea, which wasn’t a surprise, that Congress had ratified the prior more expansive view of the EPA because EPA had done it in the mid 1970s and Congress had since amended the Act twice, aware of what EPA had done, and even included the word wetlands. And so there was a good argument that it ratified, the majority rejected that. That wasn’t a surprise. Scalia had rejected it too in 2006. And this makes the case have broader legs.

The Court also in coming up with this narrow interpretation, they embraced certain statutory of construction, some cannons, which they said support a narrower reading of the law that’s significant here, it’s significant for all kinds of environmental statutes. And we’ll talk later, but this is not unlike the West Virginia Case the Court did a year ago.

Jody:

Yes. So I want us to definitely get there about the clear statement rule tear that the Supreme Court is on. So we’ll come back to that.

Richard:

Yeah. But they added to the clear statement rule in terms of major question notions that here you needed to have clear authorization because, one, the Clean Water Act has a criminal dimension to it. So whatever they said about jurisdiction would apply to potential criminal penalties, too. And that’s true for almost all environmental statutes. They said it has to be clear, and they also said it’s going to affect property rights. It’s going to affect private property rights. So they created two new cannons. And the rule of lenity cannon, by the way, is a direct repudiation of what the Supreme Court said, and a mid 1990s decision called Babbitt v. Sweet Home written by Justice John Paul Stevens, who addressed this issue and rejected it, and the Court doesn’t even cite the case.

Jody:

Well, wait, that was a little too quick. And I want folks to appreciate this. The Court essentially in Sackett is saying, the fact that there are potential criminal penalties here, and the fact that here there is an imposition on private property by the government are both reasons to read the government’s authority narrowly. And I just want to be clear about what you said about the jurisprudence on Lenity weighing against that construction. Say that one more time so we get it.

Richard:

Yeah. Basically the rule of lenity provides if a federal law may be applied criminally, then we need to make sure the defendant has fair notice of it. And so we’re going to read ambiguous provisions in the defendant’s favor. And the Supreme Court in a case over the Endangered Species Act in 1995-

Jody:

Babbitt.

Richard:

Babbitt v. Sweet Home, that doesn’t require us to read the statute as a whole, always in a way in favor of defendant. And therefore, say anything ambiguous has to go in the defendant’s favor. Why? Because one, a regulation can provide the missing clarity, and two, prosecutor discretion, and three, most criminal provisions require the violation be knowingly.

Jody:

Right. It’s a tough standard to meet.

Richard:

Which is an additional provision.

Jody:

And your point here is the Court is essentially repudiating that case. Babbitt versus Sweet Home, doesn’t bother to cite it, was your point?

Richard:

Yeah. They don’t even bother to cite the case.

Jody:

Steph, can you weigh in here, what’s striking to you about the Alito opinion? We’ll keep talking about this for a little while because there’s so much in it to wrestle with, but Steph, do you have initial reaction to that opinion?

Steph:

Yeah, there’s a few things I have in terms of reaction to that opinion. One thing is just that the “commitment” to textualism isn’t there. He even recognizes that the dictionary definitions treat adjacent as meaning next to. He agrees with the concurrences that say that no, the dictionary has defined adjacent as next to. And he does so again through that clear statement rule, which does seem sort of presented just so that he can reach a different conclusion than pretty much every single dictionary definition.

Jody:

Steph, let me jump in there just to make sure we’re clear on what we’re saying here. Richard pointed out that the Court was textualist in reading the word waters, to say these freestanding large geological structures like lakes, et cetera.

Steph:

Yes.

Jody:

But then it seemed to be not textualist in reading the word adjacent.

Steph:

Absolutely.

Jody:

Because adjacent wetlands would be, if we looked in the dictionary, and you’re saying what Justice Alito acknowledged was, look in the dictionary and look at that word, and it means next to, doesn’t necessarily mean conjoined. But then faced with that dictionary definition, he reverts and says, “Well, we don’t have to accept that,” and rereads adjacent to mean practically indistinguishable from the larger water body. Is that what you’re talking about?

Steph:

Yeah. For example, I flew on a plane recently and apparently I had no adjacent passengers because I wasn’t touching them or in a way visually indistinguishable from them. So it does seem to be a really extreme read of a word that’s fairly clear to most people.

Jody:

So a kind of selective textualism. Richard, can you weigh in on this? The sort of selective textualism?

Richard:

Well, one, selective textualism, and two, this was part of the opinion that was surprising. Because as a practical matter, wetlands are not fairly indistinguishable, practically indistinguishable. The whole idea is they’re not just part of that traditional water body. They’re nearby and they’re separate and they’re connected, but they’re hydrologically connected. They’re not the same thing. He said, “Wetlands are covered only if they’re part of that water body.”

And I think scientists are going to be scratching their heads, and EPA and the Corp, going to scratch and say, “What does that mean?” Because it’s just made up here and it doesn’t reflect the science of it. And there’s certainly a selective textualism. But here, there was also something revealing about the opinion. There was some language Alito used where he basically referred to the wetlands as fetid waters. And then he says, “We’re basically going to turn these fetid waters into places for the use and enjoyment of people.” So he basically is completely rejecting the policy decisions made by Congress in the Clean Water Act by saying, “I think these are feted waters.” That’s a 19th century view. It’s not a 1972 view. It’s a 19th century view in saying, “Let’s get rid of these feted waters and let them be used and enjoyed by people.”

Jody:

It’s certainly not a 2023 view, Steph, right? Tell us something about what wetlands do. And people now talk about wetlands as performing hugely valuable ecosystem services, like filtration of pollutants, flood control by buffeting floodwaters. Steph, are wetlands fetid waters? What do they do in our aquatic systems?

Steph:

They provide a lot of ecosystem services. One of the main things they do is provide buffers against floods. Another thing they do is they do a lot of chemical filtration. It’s not just that it’s a wet area that provides a lot of chemical filtration. It’s the specific ecosystem that is contained in that wetland that does that. So it is fine balance. Right? Sometimes I think that folks who think that, “Okay, if we fill in these ‘fetid waters’ we can just put in wetlands buffers elsewhere.” And science has shown that that’s really, really difficult to do. A lot of artificial wetlands don’t have the same filtration properties or even the same flood protection properties as actual natural wetlands, which developed over thousands of years and have reached that kind of ecological balance. And so there’s a great loss here.

Richard:

Yeah. Justice Alito, he has to work overtime to not include these waters. And he does it one by, as Steph says, ignoring the dictionary definition of adjacent, and two, ignoring the clear import of section 4O4G of the statute.

Jody:

Yes. I wanted to get you to 4O4G. So can you do that?

Richard:

Where Congress in 1977 makes clear that adjacent wetlands are covered. The definition of adjacent wetlands at the time that Congress says that is not this definition of Alito. And Alito basically is only way out of that, is to say, “Well, it couldn’t mean that because if it meant that that would be a radical expansion, and I’ve just said there’s no radical expansion.” But instead of saying, “No, this is evidence that there was deliberately,” he sort of does this tautology.

Jody:

It’s a tautological argument. And I wanted to just point out, and we may not have the time to really do this justice, but there is a moment in the Alito opinion, in the majority opinion where he says, “Category A is states can issue permits for some discharges into waters of the US. But then there’s category B, which is an exception to that, but not into traditional navigable waters.” And then there’s category C because the statute says, “Yes, well adjacent wetlands are included in category B, traditional navigable waters.” There’s this whole analysis he does, category A, B, C of the statute, to come to the conclusion that ta-da, “If you read it my way, you get to the inexorable conclusion inevitably that adjacent wetlands must be part and parcel and indistinguishable from the navigable waters.” And Justice Kagan, when we get to her, she sort of throws up her hands and says, “You can category A, category B, category C, this all the way to quadratic equations, and you cannot get the logic to work here.”

Richard:

Right. And he’s ignoring the legislative history. This wasn’t an incidental provision. This was fought over in 1977. There were people who tried to get the statute amended to take out wetlands, that navigable, waters, water of the United States, was not going to include wetlands. And they lost. And instead, Congress for the first time recognized that adjacent wetlands were covered. And they knew about EPA’s regulatory definition at the time, which prevailed in the courts. So he’s working really hard here and he’s not being a textualist.

Jody:

Yeah. And this gets us to the concurrences, which I think are really worth spending some time on to understand who’s arguing what in the concurrences. It’s interesting, Richard, and I wondered if you thought it was surprising that we didn’t have any dissents in the case. In other words, everybody, 9-0, thinks that the Sackett’s property don’t qualify as jurisdictional wetlands.

Richard:

That’s right. And I would say I was surprised by that, but I think it’s a little misleading because I think there was a lot of justice strategy going on there, in this way. The most surprising thing was that Kavanaugh did not join the five. He instead said, “I think it’s covered here by adjacency.” And he was willing to buy EPA and the Corp’s US argument on adjacency. At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts expressed some interest in that and so did Justice Barrett express some interest in it. I think what happened here is that Kagan, Sotomayor and Jackson were playing strategy. Kavanaugh was on that side. They were going to embrace Kavanaugh. They weren’t going to criticize him. They weren’t going to tear him apart for doing things. They were going to embrace it and say, “We agree with reversal, we’re with you,” in a hope-

Jody:

To get the chief.

Richard:

The chief or Barrett would come over. And once they didn’t, they didn’t want to look two-faced and say, “Never mind.” And so I think that actually if they were left to their own devices, we would’ve seen the kind of dissent we saw by the four justices written by Stevens on that. Instead, they’re willing to buy into it.

Jody:

Wait, just to be clear, you think the four might have gone the way of Steven’s dissent in Rapanos?

Richard:

In Rapanos. Right.

Jody:

And instead, it’s a concurrence.

Richard:

The three I think that Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson, left to their own devices, they might have done significant nexus with Kennedy or the broader view of Steven’s, but they were going to play, which shows you they’re going to play. Kavanaugh’s willing to come over. “All right, we love you, Brett.” And then they’re hoping, because there were noises made in argument both by Roberts who said, “It doesn’t have to be physically right there,” and Barrett who said that as well. So we’re just hoping they could bring one over and they kept that way.

Steph:

Can I add in a random point about Kavanaugh?

Jody:

Yes, please.

Steph:

So I don’t know if this actually influenced him or not, but this was the most targeted amicus brief I’d ever seen. It was Colorado’s amicus brief and it had, I think, two paragraphs devoted to the importance of clean water for beer. And so-

Jody:

For beer?

Steph:

That’s just funny.

Jody:

For beer?

Steph:

Yeah. And I was like, “Oh, this is targeted to Kavanaugh.”

Jody:

Yeah. About that. I just want to get to Kavanaugh for a moment because this concurrence, as far as I can tell, over and over repeating and repeating the fact that adjacent doesn’t mean adjoining and you can’t turn adjacency into adjoining, it’s like doing violence to that text. And he goes at this over and over again, and I just wanted both of you to comment on what’s going on there. Is it just what it seems like, which is he actually can appreciate there’s a difference between these two things? Or is it more, does he appreciate this hydrological connection idea and he’s worried about aquatic systems? What’s really going on there? Richard and then Steph.

Richard:

A quick answer. I really want to hear what Steph has to say, too. I think he emphasized it, oral argument, something, which is a major theme. He was really moved by the fact that every single administration, Democrat and Republican had taken this view of adjacency since the 1970s. Everyone. Reagan had done it, Bush one had done it, Bush two had done it. He said that in an oral argument. He said, “Well, everyone has thought it means that and Congress amended the law. Let’s do that. Let’s look at the system and see how it’s worked.” I think that affected him as much as the text, the fact that it had been settled and all administrations that what Obama or Biden and the rest had done here was nothing radical. It was what every administration had done, including, remember, he’s a product of the Bush administration, both one and two, and very much was involved politically during the Clinton administration.

Jody:

Right. Steph, your take on the Kavanaugh concurrence.

Steph:

Yeah. I also think that he actually does believe in the science somewhat. He joined the majority opinion in County of Maui versus Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which was a surprise to many. And that majority opinion committed to a functional equivalence test that was based on the science that we presented to them. Not saying that this was incredibly persuasive or anything, but it was something that seemed to be foundational to the way that Breyer ruled, and Kavanaugh agreed with it. And so I do think that that was driving his opinion somewhat in Sackett as well.

Richard:

Yeah, he’s shown more pragmatism.

Jody:

And the Kagan, Sotomayor and Jackson concurrence here. It’s quite short and it’s essentially a repeat of the kind of thing Justice Kagan wrote in the West Virginia case, which I want to bring in just a moment, but it’s essentially saying, “You’re not doing textualism, this is actually quite clear, adjacent doesn’t mean adjoining.” And she brings in, Richard, the history of the Clean Water Act. She brings in the purpose of the law, what Congress trying to actually accomplish here, which was entirely missing from the majority opinion. Anything there surprise you, Richard?

Richard:

Yeah. So what surprised me is that unlike the West Virginia clean air case from last year, she kind of wrote this one quickly. This is not a major effort at a dissent. She is not really tearing apart the majority. She takes no effort to respond to Thomas and Gorsuch who basically get a complete buy on what they write. I think it’s because she doesn’t want to do anything to alienate Kavanaugh, but there’s a cost to that. There’s a major cost because then a lot of those other arguments, like the dictionary definition, no response and other things. So I think I understand it strategically. My guess is maybe she was saving herself because she knew the next month was the Harvard and North Carolina admissions cases, and that’s going to be her long dissent. And I don’t think she really put as much into this as I hoped she would.

Jody:

It’s interesting because I felt a sense of disappointment there wasn’t a dissent that really took the majority to task and chimed in about the danger of the Thomas-Gorsuch approach and view of the Commerce Clause. And I do want to spend a couple minutes on that because lurking here in the Thomas-Gorsuch concurrence is a very radical view of the Commerce Clause and what Congress can do and what it means for environmental law more generally. Richard, can you give us a sense of the heart of that concurrence? What is Thomas doing when he says, “I’m going to pick up where the majority left off”?

Richard:

Yeah, it’s a crazy opinion. Alito’s is a really frustrating opinion, which I find unpersuasive. It’s not crazy. The Thomas and Gorsuch concurrence is completely out of bounds. So what he does, he says, “Look, we agree with the majority, waters of the United States is limited to this, those permanent geological features as in the dictionary.” Then he says, “But of course, that leaves two other limitations on the Clean Water Act we haven’t addressed yet, but we will in the future. One, it doesn’t have to be a water of the United States. It all has to be navigable.” And he says, “The test is the 19th century, the Daniel Ball case.”

Jody:

Daniel Ball. Unbelievable.

Richard:

Which basically means that it’s the only waters capable of being used as highways for interstate or foreign commerce.

Jody:

Literal navigation, what he saying.

Richard:

Right. Literal navigation. So he says, “Not only does it have to meet their narrow definitial waters, but that’s not enough.” So he says, “It’s got to be the 19th century Daniel Ball test.” But then, as though that’s not enough, he says, “And they can only cover it if the discharge affects navigability in some way.”

Jody:

If there are impediments in the way of ships.

Richard:

Right. So this Clean Water Act, the purpose of which Congress says, first provision, “preserve the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s water.” It turns out for Gorsuch and Thomas, it’s actually no more than the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 or 1892 or 1890. There are three of them in 1890.

Jody:

There are three of them, yeah. But they’re trying to eliminate a century of legislation.

Richard:

Yeah. But I’m just calling it the Rivers Harbor Act in 1972 because they’re saying that’s all the Clean Water Act in 1972 was.

Jody:

I see, I see.

Richard:

Was an updated version of the Rivers and Harbors Act. But here’s what really bothers me about this case, and that is I look really carefully at the legal analysis in it, and his citations, his quotes, his use of precedent, both the Court’s opinions and the statutes. And I have to say, it is either incompetent or dishonest, because I’ll give you a couple examples. He says, “The reason why we know this is so, these two limitations, is the Court has on a longstanding basis used the term navigable waters and waters the United States interchangeably.” So when Congress in 1972 defined navigable waters as waters of the United States, it wasn’t broadening it because the two have always meant the same thing.

Jody:

Which is not so.

Richard:

And he says, “It precisely tracks the language of the Daniel Ball and they treat them interchangeably.” You go back and look at the Daniel Ball decision, guess how many times the Supreme Court in the Daniel Ball case uses the term, waters of the United States? 5, 4, 3, 1? No, zero. The term, waters of the United States, does not appear once in the Daniel Ball case. What appears is, navigable waters in the United States.

Well, that of course may be the same thing as navigable waters. He refers to River and Harbors Act and says they use it interchangeably. They don’t. I don’t know whether it’s just incredibly bad research by a law clerk and no one bothered to check it up or not. But the one thing I did check, Jody, you’ll be happy to know, when I read this opinion, realized how poorly it was put together, that I’m happy to report there was no Harvard law student this year clerking for either Justice Thomas or Justice Gorsuch, because anyone who had taken our classes would not have made that mistake.

Jody:

Well, first of all, I appreciate the level of detail here that you’re bringing to the knowledge of the statutory history plus the case law. Right? Knowing this, well, we know that the evolution in the jurisprudence, he’s ignoring Riverside Bayview and all the other cases that really represent the modern jurisprudence of the Clean Water Act. What’s so worrying here, is you get thrust back a century or more as if nothing has happened. Similarly, as if the Commerce Clause had never developed.

Richard:

Right. And no one responds.

Jody:

That’s what I found very disappointing.

Richard:

Which means the lower courts, especially sympathetic judges, may say, “Well, the only ones who spoke to this issue and said that the new issues are Thomas.” It’s an invitation to a bunch of very conservative judge lower Courts to pick up his invitation.

Jody:

So let’s talk about invitation. Steph, can I come to you? What is going to happen next? When you read this, you were a government lawyer at ENRD in the Department of Justice. You know how these cases then lead to additional litigation. I think, Richard, you commented on the newness of the Court saying, “Oh, well, when regulation purports to affect property rights, oh, well, when environmental statute like this purports to impose or could potentially impose criminal penalties, we therefore ought to read the provisions narrowly, the authority narrowly.” Steph, how do you see that having legs in future litigation?

Steph:

Yeah, so I can respond from the government side angle because I have a colleague in HSSI who just completed a fellowship at the Office of Management and Budget, which again, reviews all federal rules. And what he’s been working on in the past year is responding to decisions like West Virginia versus EPA, and now Sackett, to sort of advise how to pack basically the regulatory background to respond to potential concerns raised by courts as a result of prior West Virginia versus EPA, but now potentially Sackett, because I think he’s still continuing with them.

And a lot of that is going to be talking about sort of potential limits in this affecting property rights. All the stuff that you can maybe glean from the concerns of justices coming out of those two opinions, to try to maybe walk back some of the severity of some of these challenges. Now, we know that these challenges are still going to exist. My suggestion is probably what’s going to happen is the regulations that come out now from the Biden administration are going to contain a lot more background, trying to say that, “No, no, there’s no major questions thing here. No, no, it’s not really going to affect a lot of property values because it also has its bonus in this other way.” Something to balance all of that out.

Jody:

So the government is going to have to play some defense based on decisions like these?

Steph:

Yes.

Jody:

You refer to West Virginia. So let’s talk about it now. I’ll give you my quick take, and then Richard, I’ll ask you for yours, and Steph for yours. We’ve had two really important decisions for environmental law in the last term and now this term, but they reach much more broadly, potentially. They’re high impact cases, but in different ways. And here’s my quick take. West Virginia versus EPA, which constrained the Environmental Protection Agency’s ability to choose the method they wanted for setting power plant, greenhouse gas standards, couldn’t choose a method that’s really the most cost-effective and the smartest way to cut CO2 pollution from the power sector. The Court limited what they could do. But in doing so, that’s really not a major constraint, I would say, on the operation of the Clean Air Act. I would say it’s bad for climate change regulation. I don’t think it’s the correct reading of the statute, but it doesn’t disable the agency in some general sense from implementing the Clean Air Act.

The far-reaching aspect of that case is really the Court’s formal embrace of the major questions doctrine, which has reached far beyond the environmental and climate arena to say basically, generally, to the federal government, to agencies, “Watch out. If you do things with rules, if you regulate in a way that we consider to be of major significance politically, economically, we are going to be looking for explicit, super, hyper, clear congressional language. Broad language isn’t going to suffice.” That’s the far-reaching ness of West Virginia versus EPA. To me, Sackett is much more disabling for the statute, and it also has these clear statement rules in it that are more far-reaching, but it’s not quite the major questions doctrine. So Richard, am I seeing this in a way sympathetic to how you see it, or is it different how you see the two together?

Richard:

Absolutely right, Jody. The actual ruling, the word system could not support the Clean Power Plan, and regulating based on the grid and all the rest of the detail. The actual ruling was striking down some of what EPA was trying to do, which was new and expansive, but it wasn’t a body blow. It would a wonderful thing if they had done it, and I wish they had.

This one is a body blow to the Clean Water Act. EPA wasn’t trying something new here. EPA was trying to do what they’ve been doing for 50 years and it’s working well, and the Court is using those same cannons and some more to basically undo what’s been happening. It’s much worse.

And I want to add one thing about sort of DOJ and ENRD and EPA, how they’ll respond to this case. Because I think people may underestimate how much they’re going to respond to it. These are government lawyers. They’re not public interest groups. They take what the Supreme Court says seriously. They’re going to say, “This is what the Court has said.” Like it or not, they take it seriously.

They’re not looking for a way to do an end run around the Supreme Court, especially an opinion which says, “You’ve been doing an end run around us. You’ve been ignoring our rulings.” They’re going to take it seriously. We may want to criticize the rulings of the rest, but they’re going to take them as rulings by the United States Supreme Court, a majority. And their job, and that’s ENRD, DOJ, and that is EPA, they’re going to take these rulings seriously.

Jody:

And the Corp.

Richard:

And the Corp will be celebrating because what basically had happened is the Court endorsed the Corp’s 1972 view of the Act. So the oldest people of the Corp, not the new ones, will be celebrating that they’re right. But I think that there’s going to be a real battle. I think the political people and the Biden administration will be pushing them to ignore the Supreme Court. Often the way that Trump political people may have told them to ignore the statutory text and the career people, they’re going to say, “We don’t like these rulings, but the United States Supreme Court has spoken. And our job is to obey the law, and it to take seriously the Court’s ruling, whether we like it or not.” So there’s going to be some tension, which we didn’t see, in the West Virginia versus EPA, there was an easy pathway. This one, there’s not. And how they come up with the next waters of the United States rule.

Jody:

See, I disagree a little bit there. I would say that the same tension that is the political impetus to try to do as much as you can under these statutes to accomplish the environmental protection or climate response mission that you think these agencies are obligated under the Clean Air Act and environmental protection under the Clean Water Act, I think that political mission is in some tension with the legal constraints in both these cases. There’s always that conflict an administration wants to push, and then career folks, and especially DOJ says, “No, there are constraints.” So the stress comes from the fact that we have these really old statutes that have not been updated to deal with contemporary problems, and the Court is increasingly saying, “Show us the explicit clear language. Show us the explicit clear language.”

Before I give you guys closing remarks and wind up, I do want to point out one thing that really affected me when I read the Alito opinion for the majority, and I wonder if you might comment on it. And it also connects to something in West Virginia and prior cases, too. There is a real tone and tenor and attitude of real disdain for the enterprise of the agencies in these cases, for the job the government has been given by Congress in these statutes. A sense of, the government is the enemy, the government imposes and impinges on liberty.

There’s a line in the Alito opinion, Richard, that says, “The Clean Water Act is a potent weapon and it has crushing consequences.” Not, “There’s a mission. Congress gave the agency a mission to protect the waters of the United States. This was a historic thing.” Nothing likewise in the Clean Air Act case West Virginia, similar language. And in prior cases that we all know well, Arlington and so on, the big cases involving regulation, there’s a real dismissal here, dismissive tone about what the government is doing. Did you have that reaction too? I think it’s very corrosive and very dangerous.

Richard:

I certainly did, and it’s one of the things that I find most troubling about it. It’s a very limited view of the role of the federal government in favor of the states. It’s unnecessary. The libertarian streak goes against government in general. It wouldn’t be just limited to the federal government, but I think would ultimately apply to the states as well. But you’re right, it’s all about these “fetid wetlands,” the crushing consequences of the statute. There’s no appreciation for the fact that these laws over the past 50 years have been so successful in protecting our air and our water, and more needs to be done. But he even acknowledged, in the beginning he says, “It’s been successful.” But now they’re going to make it so it can’t be successful. It’s very discouraging.

Jody:

Yeah. Steph, any closing comments from you? We’ve done this deep dive, but when you step back and look at Sackett and the aftermath and what you expect to see coming, any thoughts from you?

Steph:

My thoughts are, first, there’s just a reaction of dismay from Sackett, if only because maybe I had my hopes unduly lifted by success in Maui, so that was really disappointing. I think what we’re going to see now is just a lot more in terms of political advocacy on the state level so that state departments can step in. But again, there’s going to be a political split in that. And so to the extent that the political action is going to happen, I think that there’s going to be a pivot to state regulation of wetlands fills.

Jody:

So Steph, in that sense, a state like California that has a Porter-Cologne Act or a powerful clean water law, that could help fill the gap here, but you’re saying lots of states won’t?

Steph:

Right. And so that’s going to vary a lot. And then one thing that I think this might lead to, and this is really just speculative, but there’s been a lot of basically original jurisdiction cases between different states as a result of water disputes. This could potentially exacerbate some of that. Right? To the extent that there’s anything involving clean water related, and there are, you have a regulated state existing next to unregulated state, you might see more water tensions. Again, that’s not going to be a huge part of the original jurisdiction docket, but it definitely has been a rise in original jurisdiction docket stuff as a result of interstate disputes about water. And I can’t see how this would help that at all.

Jody:

Richard, you wrote a terrific op-ed in the Washington Post about this case. You did not hold back. I think it was the unleashed version of Professor Richard basically saying a very pithy version of the kinds of comments you’ve made here. Anything in closing that we ought to know about Sackett and the expected aftermath?

Richard:

It’s very disappointing. It’s a very disappointing decision. It’s the one which the Court has shown once again that it’s going to pay zero attention to the real problems this nation faces. And the statutes had enough give in them that a Court could fairly, just like Riverside Bayview case in 1985, they could fairly say, “This is good enough. The problem is important enough. It’s good enough to let the agency do its work.”

And we saw the Court do that with Rehnquist and White and a series of conservative justices in 1985. And this is the Court, which is on this sort of vendetta. “This is the only way to make law. This is the only way to do it, and you’ve got to do it this way.” And it’s got an anti-government thrust to it. And as a practical matter, since Congress doesn’t make laws at all, it’s an intellectual endeavor that actually makes it really hard to address the pressing problems of the day, whether it’s water quality for people or whether it’s climate change. And these problems are compelling. Time is not fungible. We lose time the longer we wait, and the Court just doesn’t care. Let the consequences fall as they might. And that’s exactly what Gorsuch has said, “You’ve got to do it the right way. And it doesn’t work, too bad.”

Jody:

I hate to end these podcasts on a negative note. I will say that this is going to be one of those cases that provides excellent fodder for the first year course in legislation and regulation, where here we are teaching them about tools and techniques of statutory interpretation, and we’re going to present them with a textualism when it turns out that the Court seems to perform textualism when it wants to and avoid textualism when it doesn’t want to. And I think Justice Kagan had it about right when she characterized the Court as being, well, she wouldn’t have said anything like intellectually dishonest, but certainly inconsistent in its application of textualism. Richard?

Richard:

Yeah. I think one can end up with a little upbeat part here, and that is, as Steph reminds us, it was just a few years ago that basically the same Court decided the County Maui case in a very pragmatic, positive way, we took account of it. Just last week, we saw a major civil rights case, the Voting Rights Act case, Milligan. The Court surprised us with a little more pragmatism, understanding how things work. Today, we had a major Indian law case, the Haaland case, surprised everyone. Everyone thought the Court was going the other way. Instead, it’s seven to two in favor of tribal rights.

Jody:

Yeah. There’s something about environmental cases though, Richard, isn’t there? There’s something about cases involving EPA. I can’t prove it, but it feels like a Court has a real reaction to the assertion of authority. Maybe because it affects property rights, maybe because environmental regulation affects the state-federal balance, maybe it’s a combination, but don’t you think there’s something about them?

Richard:

Oh, yeah. And there are three justices who say it at every possible opportunity, and that’s Gorsuch, Alito, and Thomas. And we just have to hope the more cases where, as in Maui, the chief justice and Kavanaugh breakaway.

Jody:

And maybe Barrett.

Richard:

And Barrett will. We just have to hope. Right?

Jody:

Yeah.

Richard:

And I never give up hope. I always think there’s a way to get to them. This case was certainly not a moment to celebrate, but there’ve been some other decisions this term where they’ve surprised us in a favorable way, and the Alito, Gorsuch, Thomas triumvirate has not prevailed.

Jody:

Well, let me leave it there. On that positive note. This has been a terrific discussion. I so appreciate, Steph, you joining us. It’s been terrific to have you on CleanLaw.

Steph:

Thank you for having me.

Richard:

Yeah, it was a real pleasure. Thanks, Jody.

Jody:

Richard, it was great, of course, my colleague and friend, to be with you. That’s it for today. We look forward to another podcast coming soon on the Loper Bright decision, what Will Happen to Chevron? Stay tuned. See you then.